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This thesis investigates the factors that influence the magnitude of goodwill impairment 
losses as well as the value relevance of these losses using a sample of 2,466 companies, 
drawn from 17 countries in which IFRSs have been made mandatory for all their domestic 
listed companies. The study period is 2007-2013 and includes 14,898 firm-year 
observations.  
 
The results obtained from the Tobit regression analysis involving variables drawn from 
agency/positive accounting theory, Hofstede’s theory of culture, as well as different 
theoretical institutional models, reveal that goodwill-impairment amounts are not only 
driven by economic factors and managerial reporting incentives, but also by country-specific 
factors, such as cultural and institutional variables.  
 
The results also confirm that the strength of the equity market is still the single most 
influential factor contributing not only to differences in accounting practices but above all, 
to differences in institutional quality between countries. The results of a K-means cluster 
analysis reveal that there are two groups of countries, corresponding to strong equity-
outsider and weaker equity-outsider clusters. By comparing the relative associations 
between goodwill-impairment amounts and economic factors and managerial reporting 
incentives across these two institutional clusters, estimation results reveal that firms in the 
strong equity-outsider cluster have recorded goodwill-impairment losses that are, on the one 
hand, strongly associated with economic factors, and on the other hand, weakly associated 




Further analysis also showed that while results for the pooled sample did not indicate that 
goodwill impairment losses were value relevant this was not the case for firms in the strong 
equity-outsider cluster, which have recorded impairment losses that are, on average, more 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Global Harmonisation of Accounting Standards  
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has been working along with the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to develop one set of global accounting standards 
as a means of increasing the comparability of accounting information throughout the world 
(Schipper, 2005; Foundation, 2010; Alexander and Archer, 2011). However, the demand for 
uniformity and comparability in accounting practices across countries persists, in spite of the 
worldwide adoption of International Accounting Standards (IASs) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) (hereafter referred to as IFRSs) (Ball, 2006; Zeff, 2007; Leuz, 
2010). According to the IFRS-revised constitution, the objective of the IASB is:  
“To develop, in the public interest, a single set of high-quality, understandable, enforceable and globally 
accepted financial reporting standards based upon clearly articulated principles.” (IASC Foundation, 
2010, Preface (2, a)). 
 
The IASB/FASB claim that the introduction of IFRS standards will provide greater benefits 
to the market participants around the world. This has been demonstrated in the form of a 
greater increase in market liquidity, a remarkable decline in a firm’s cost of capital, an 
increase in shareholders’ confidence, a surge in capital flows across national borders, and a 
considerable improvement in the quality of accounting figures during the post-adoption era 
(Barth et al., 2008; Epstein, 2009). These benefits, however, are unlikely to materialise, 
without proper implementation and enforcement of the standards (SEC 2000; Daske et al., 
2008; Hail et al., 2010; Leuz, 2010). The global adoption of IFRSs cannot, therefore, be 
viewed in isolation from associated mechanisms of enforcement. According to Daske et al. 
(2008), “the capital-market benefits occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be 
transparent and where legal enforcement is strong” (pp. 1085-1086). 
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Given the possible advantages of implementing IFRSs, the number of countries that 
require or permit the use of IFRSs as a basis for financial statements has mushroomed 
dramatically over recent years. Currently, more than 120 nations require or permit their 
domestically-listed companies to use IFRSs for preparing their consolidated financial 
statements (Deloitte, 2012; IFRS Foundation, 2012). Notably, IFRSs standards have 
swiftly gained worldwide acceptance after the adoption of Regulation No.1606/2002 of 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (EU) on 19 July 2002. 
The regulation requires all EU-based companies to prepare their consolidated accounts in 
accordance with the requirements of IFSRs (as adopted by the EU), from the calendar-
year 2005 onwards1. Others influential countries (e.g. Brazil, Canada, India and Japan) 
have adopted or proposed a roadmap with timelines to adopt or converge with IFRSs 
(IASB, 2012; IFRS Foundation, 2012). The United States (US), is perhaps the only major 
country not to officially adopt IFRSs (Needles, 2012). 
 
The simple (or alleged) adoption of IFRSs, however, does not seem to be adequate to 
produce financial reports that are easily comparable across globally-operating companies, 
unless the standards are uniformly applied across countries (Wulandari and Rahman, 
2004; Ball, 2006; Leuz, 2010). The adoption of IFRSs means little if they are either not 
applied in practice, or applied with significant degrees of variation.  In that regard, Ball 
(2006) has voiced scepticism regarding the uniformity of the application of IFRSs in 
practice, and suggested that diversity in accounting practices is virtually inevitable and is 
likely to be obscured by the superficial uniformity of standards. This will, in turn, provide 
misleading information to financial statements users. According to Ball, “uniform 
                                                          
1Companies can delay use of IFRSs until 2007 if: (a) they have debt securities that are only traded on an EU 
regulated market, or (b) they have been using another set of globally-recognised accounting standards and are 
publicly traded both in the EU and on a regulated third-country market.    
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standards alone will produce uniform financial reporting seems naive” (2006, p. 6). 
Several international accounting researchers/scholars also suggest that firms’ actual 
accounting/reporting practices are likely to vary across countries, even if the same 
accounting standards are used. Therefore, the harmonisation of accounting regulations 
(de jure harmonisation) will not necessarily inevitably lead to the harmonisation of 
accounting practices (de facto harmonisation) (D’Arcy, 2006; Chand et al., 2008; Nobes 
and Kvaal, 2010). 
 
1.2 Accounting Treatment of Goodwill under IFRS 
In an attempt to promote international convergence and harmonisation between IFRSs and 
US GAAP (US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), the IASB issued IFRS 3 
Business Combinations in early 2004. This followed in the footsteps of the equivalent US 
Standards: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.141 Accounting for 
Business Combinations and SFAS No. 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets issued in 
2001. The standard was issued in March 2004, and applied to mergers and acquisitions for 
which the agreement date was on or after 31 March 2004.  
 
On 10 January 2008, the IASB released a revised version of IFRS 3 “Business 
Combinations”, to replace IFRS 3 that was issued in 2004. The revised standard resulted 
from the second phase of the “Business Combinations Project”, which was undertaken by 
both the IASB and the FASB. The standard required all business combinations starting on 
or after 1 July 2009 to be accounted for using the acquisition method (previously referred to 
as the purchase method), which requires that an acquirer measures assets acquired and 
liabilities assumed at their acquisition-date fair values (IFRS 3, 2008, Para. 4). However, 
early adoption is permitted for annual reporting periods beginning on or after 30 June 2007. 
In parallel, the IASB has also revised IAS 36 “Impairment of Assets”, and IAS 38 
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“Intangible Assets”. The revisions, while promoting international convergence of 
accounting standards, seek to improve the relevance and reliability of accounting 
information that companies provide in their financial reports on business combinations.   
    
IFRS 3 (2008) continues the requirements of IFRS 3 (2004) that goodwill is no longer 
considered a wasting asset with a definite life during which it is consumed. Goodwill should 
not, therefore, be amortised as an expense on a straight-line basis because its value does not 
necessarily decline on a regular/systematic pattern. It may frequently happen with different 
amounts. According to IFRS 3, goodwill arising in the context of a business combination 
must be tested for impairment in compliance with IAS 36, at least annually, or more 
frequently if certain triggering events or changes in circumstances occur. The IAS 36 
impairment test applies to goodwill and other intangibles with indefinite useful lives, with 
the purpose of ensuring that assets are not carried at more than their recoverable amounts 
(IAS 36, 2008).  
 
To determine whether goodwill or other types of assets might have been impaired, the IAS 
36 in Paragraphs 12 to 17 provides a non-exhaustive list of internal and external factors that 
should be taken into account in making that determination. Although these factors, on their 
own, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the recognition of goodwill-
impairment, they are often considered relevant for the purpose of determining whether or 
not a probable goodwill-impairment loss exists. An obvious indication that an impairment 
loss may have occurred is when “evidence is available from internal reporting that indicates 
that the economic performance of an asset is, or will be, worse than expected” (IAS 36, 2008, 
Para 12 (g)). An example of an external indicator is when “an asset’s market value has 
declined significantly more than would be expected” (IAS 36, 2008, Para 12 (a)) or when 
5 
“the carrying amount of the net assets of the entity is more than its market capitalisation” 
(IAS 36, 2008, Para 12 (d)). That is when a firm’s market-to-book ratio is smaller than one. 
Another example of a potential external indicator is “significant changes with an adverse 
effect on the entity have taken place during the period, or will take place in the near future, 
in the technological, market, economic or legal environment in which the entity operates” 
(IAS 36, 2008, Para 12 (b)). 
 
The revised versions of IFRS 3 and IAS 36 represent the latest episode in the accounting 
treatment of goodwill. The impairment-only approach under IFRS defines goodwill, in terms 
of its nature or attributes2, as “an asset representing the future economic benefits arising from 
other assets acquired in a business combination that are not individually identified and 
separately recognised” (IFRS 3, Appendix A). This means that goodwill is a resource that 
generates economic benefits in the future only in combination with other assets not being 
capable of separate identification. Accordingly, intangible assets, which are not separately 
identified, are recognised as a portion of the value ascribed to goodwill, especially because 
these kind of assets failed to simultaneously satisfy the two recognition criteria set out in the 
previous version of IAS 38 “Intangible Assets”, which required an entity to recognise an 
intangible asset (whether purchased or internally-created) if, and only if: (i) it was probable 
                                                          
2 It is necessary to understand the meaning of the term goodwill in the context in which it is being used. 
Therefore, this definition of goodwill is consistent with the bottom-up perspective, which focuses on the 
constituents/components of goodwill, rather than on the way in which it is measured, and attempts to 
understand or account for goodwill as a catch-all moniker for all other intangible assets that are acquired in a 
business combination but do not appear on the acquiree’s balance sheet. As stated in the summary of the 
Exposure Draft issued by the US FASB in September 1999, “goodwill may consist of one or more unidentified 
intangible assets and identifiable intangible assets that are not reliably measurable.  The elements of goodwill 
have varying useful economic lives…Because those and similar elements cannot be reliably measured 
separately from each other, they are accounted for collectively as goodwill”. 
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that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset would flow to the entity; 
and (ii) the cost of the asset could be measured reliably. 
 
Technically, goodwill acquired in a business combination does not produce cash-inflows 
separately from other assets (or groups of assets). Goodwill cannot be purchased or sold 
separately, because its value is not established by reference to a traded market (Hoggett et 
al., 2003). Unlike many other assets, goodwill cannot be measured directly, but rather can 
only be measured indirectly as a residual3 amount being the difference between (a) and (b): 
a) “The aggregate of (i) the consideration transferred measured at fair value on the date of acquisition, 
(ii) the amount of any non-controlling interest (NCI) in the acquiree, and (iii) the acquisition-date 
fair value of the acquire’s previously held equity interest in the acquiree and; 
b) The fair values of the identifiable assets acquired and the liabilities assumed on the acquisition 
date” (IFRS 3, 2008, Para 32).  
 
In exceptional circumstances, when an acquirer can make a gain from a bargain purchase  in 
which the amount of net assets acquired (assets acquired less liabilities assumed or incurred) 
exceeds the aggregate values of the consideration transferred, plus any NCI, plus an 
acquirer’s previously held equity interest in the acquiree, negative goodwill or badwill will 
initially arise and the resulting amount of goodwill will be immediately taken into the profit 
and loss account for the period of acquisition (IFRS 3, 2008, Para 34). 
 
Unlike SFAS-141(R), Accounting for Business Combinations, the revised version of IFRS 3 
provides an acquiring company involved in a partial acquisition (i.e., the acquisition is less 
than a 100% of the equity in the acquired company) with the option, on a transaction-by-
                                                          
3 The definition of goodwill as a residual is consistent with the top-down perspective, which focuses on the 
measurement or calculation of goodwill as “a subset of a larger asset, i.e. the company in total” (Bloom, 2008, 
pp. 24).  
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transaction basis, to measure the NCI (previously referred to as minority interest) in an 
acquiree either at its  acquisition-date fair value (full goodwill) or at its proportionate share 
of the acquiree’s identifiable net assets (partial goodwill). Under the traditional partial 
goodwill method (IFRS only), goodwill is measured on a proportionate4basis, in which the 
amount recognised as goodwill at the date of acquisition is entirely attributable to the parent 
company (i.e., excluding the NCI’s share of goodwill). Under the newly-introduced full 
goodwill method (optional under IFRS, mandatory under US GAAP), goodwill is measured 
on a full basis, in which the goodwill of the entity as a whole is attributable to both the parent 
and the NCI (i.e., including the NCI’s share in goodwill) (Alexander and Archer, 2011, 
Glaum et al., 2007, IASCF, 2009).  
 
Under IAS 36, the impairment review of goodwill will take place at cash-generating units 
(CGUs) level.5 Thus, from the date of acquisition, an acquirer shall assign goodwill to a 
CGU (or a group of CGUs) that is/are expected to benefit from the synergies arising from 
the business combination. Each CGU shall represent the lowest level within the entity at 
which goodwill is monitored for internal management purposes. This level, however, cannot 
be larger than an operating segment determined in accordance with IFRS 8 Operating 
Segments (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 80). IAS 36 defines CGU as “the smallest identifiable group 
                                                          
4 Partial goodwill is determined as the excess of the consideration paid by the acquirer over the acquirer’s 
proportionate share of the acquiree’s identifiable net assets measured at acquisition-date fair values.   
5 Under SFAS-142, goodwill is tested for impairment at the level of reporting unit(s), which is an operating 
segment or one level below an operating segment (referred to as a component). Therefore, there is a possibility 
that goodwill is tested at a lower level than the level of the SFAS-142 impairment test. This indicates that firms 
are most likely to experience a higher incidence of impairment loss under IFRS rather than US GAAP (i.e. 
larger amounts of goodwill-impairments at higher frequencies). In this regard, Shamrock (2012, p. 202) wrote 
that “because US GAAP test goodwill at a high level, the superior performance of an operation of an entity 
subsidizes the poor performance of another business unit”. 
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of assets that generates cash inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows from 
other assets or groups of assets” (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 66). 
  
The CGU to which goodwill is assigned shall be tested for impairment, at least annually, or 
more frequently if there is an indication that the unit may have been impaired. An impairment 
loss should be recognised for the CGU if, and only if, the carrying amount of the unit exceeds 
its recoverable amount (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 90). While the former is defined as “the amount 
at which an asset is recognised after deducting any accumulated depreciation and 
accumulated impairment losses”, the latter can be achieved by recognising the higher of an 
asset’s or a CGU’s fair value less costs to sell (net selling price) and its value in use. The fair 
value less costs to sell is defined as “the amount obtainable from the sale of an asset or cash-
generating unit in an arm’s length transaction between knowledgeable, willing parties, less 
the costs of disposal”.  
 
The definition explicitly excludes forced sales or liquidations, where the seller is compelled 
to sell and the buyer knows about the seller’s need to sell, which would, in turn, reduce the 
amount a non-particular (i.e., hypothetical) buyer would be willing to pay in cash to a willing 
seller of the asset(s). The value in use, however, represents “the present value of the future 
cash flows expected to be derived from an asset or cash-generating unit” (IAS 36, 2008, 
Para. 6). The amount of impairment is allocated to: “first reduce the carrying amount of any 
goodwill allocated to the cash-generating unit (group of units); and then, reduce the carrying 
amounts of the other assets of the unit (group of units) pro rata on the basis” (IAS 36, 2008, 
Para. 104). Any goodwill-impairment losses will be immediately recognised as an expense 
in the income statement and will not be reversed in a subsequent period (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 
124). 
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1.3 Uneven Implementation of Goodwill-impairment Practices 
The IASB suggests that today’s impairment-only approach for goodwill will more accurately 
reflect the economic attributes of goodwill, compared to the straight-line approach of 
amortisation. 
“The Board [concluded that] …if a rigorous and operational impairment test could be devised, more 
useful information would be provided to users of an entity’s financial statements” (IASB’s Basis for 
Conclusions on IAS 36 Impairment of Assets). 
 
Several research studies reveal that the impairment losses on goodwill are negatively 
associated with the firm’s underlying economic attributes, implying that managers are using 
their impairment discretion in an efficient manner, and thereby recording impairment losses 
that more accurately reflect changes in the value of goodwill (Godfrey and Koh, 2009; 
Chalmers et al., 2011). These results are consistent with other studies reporting negative 
associations between firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their market values, implying 
that the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment under the impairment-only approach has 
increased relative to the value-relevance of amortisation charges (Li and Meek, 2006; Zang, 
2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2012).  
 
The impairment-only accounting model for goodwill has, however, been criticised by 
scholars who argued that goodwill-impairment testing may not always be evenly performed 
between firms that operate in different countries (Astami et al., 2006; Ball, 2006; D’Arcy, 
2006). One reason is that the implementation of goodwill-impairment testing requires the 
use of professional judgement, accordingly leaving managers with a great deal of discretion 
in determining the timing and magnitude of goodwill-impairment losses (Massoud and 
Raiborn, 2003; Beatty and Weber, 2006; Wines et al., 2007; Ramanna and Watts, 2012). 
Several studies (e.g. Sevin and Schroeder, 2005; Hayn and Hughes, 2006; Swanson, 2007; 
Haman and Jubb, 2008) have found that the impairment test of goodwill has been used as a 
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vehicle that enables management to manage reported earnings either upward (or downward) 
through delaying (or accelerating) recognition of impairment loss. In his 2012 speech at FEE 
Conference on Corporate Reporting of the Future, Horst Hoogervorst, the Chairman of the 
IASB, voiced scepticism over the reliability of goodwill-impairments: 
 “Most elements of goodwill are highly uncertain and subjective, and they often turn out to be illusory. 
Given its subjectivity, the treatment of goodwill is vulnerable to manipulation of the balance sheet and 
the P&L… in practice, entities might be hesitant to impair goodwill, so as to avoid giving the impression 
that they made a bad investment decision. … The question is if our current rules provide sufficient rigor 
to these decisions.” 
 
Another reason for country diversity in goodwill-impairment assessments is that managers 
from different countries will exercise their accounting discretion differently as a result of the 
difference in their local factors (Ball, 2006). These factors are perceived to constrain 
managers from using their impairment discretion opportunistically. A small but growing 
body of research literature has emerged in recent years that examines the role of national 
institutions on the outcomes of impairment-testing of goodwill. 
 
Van de Poel et al. (2009) found evidence that goodwill-impairment decisions that managers 
make are affected by the strength of their country’s judicial system. More precisely, 
managers from countries that scored high on the rule of law index tend to engage in goodwill-
impairment decisions more frequently when compared to their counterparts in countries with 
relatively low rule-of-law scores. Verriest and Gaeremynck (2009) also found that impairing 
companies tend to operate in countries with higher values on the anti-director rights index, 
implying that managers from countries with stronger legal protection for minority 
shareholders impair their goodwill relatively more often. However, the research in this area 
is still in its infancy and a number of questions remain unanswered.  
11 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
This thesis has two main objectives: 
i) To investigate the factors that influence the magnitude of goodwill-impairment 
losses for a sample of companies drawn from a number of countries. 
 
ii) To investigate whether the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses differ 
between different clusters of countries.  
 
The first research objective deals with the incentives that firms may have in reporting 
goodwill-impairment losses. These may be opportunistic, economic, institutional-specific, 
or cultural-specific. The second research objective complements the first one, and addresses 
the question of whether goodwill-impairment losses are taken into account by market 
participants in firm valuations. Moreover, the institutional and cultural factors which are 
used in the tests relating to the first research objective are also used to examine whether they 
affect the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses.  
       
1.5 Motivations for the Study  
Accounting for goodwill represents an extremely compelling area of study for at least three 
reasons. First, goodwill has long been one of the most complex and controversial issues in 
accounting. Goodwill, unlike many other assets, does not produce cash flows independently 
of other assets and cannot, therefore, be directly measured, but rather it can only be measured 
indirectly as a residual amount. Furthermore, goodwill can be tested for impairment only as 
part of the impairment test for CGU(s) to which goodwill is allocated. Second, shareholders 
tend to attach relatively greater importance to goodwill than any other items of the balance 
sheet (Godfrey and Koh, 2001). Third, “goodwill accounting is till this day indeed an 
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interesting example of how differences between countries’ accounting standards can lead to 
an uneven playing field” (Zeff and Dharan, 1997, cited in D’Arcy, 2006, p. 24). 
 
1.6 Contributions of the Study 
This study makes serval contributions to existing literature in many important ways:  
i) Using Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture, the current study develops a workable 
framework linking a particular pattern of firms’ goodwill-impairments with the 
cultural characteristics of their country of origin. So far as I know, international 
differences in goodwill-impairment outcomes have never been well explained in 
terms of cross-cultural differences. This study adds to existing research by 
investigating the impact of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on the reporting of 
goodwill-impairment amounts; and how firms’ goodwill-impairment behaviours 
vary, in predictable ways, across countries with different cultural contexts. 
 
ii) Whereas previous studies on the determinants of goodwill-impairments have mostly 
focused on economic/reporting incentives, the present study relies on a more 
comprehensive framework for explaining goodwill-impairment choices by 
considering the direct and indirect impact of national institutions in constraining 
managers’ ability to report goodwill-impairment losses that lack relevance or 
economic reality. This study contributes to prior research and analyses the role of 
firms’ economic and reporting incentives in determining the amounts of goodwill-
impairments, conditional on the strength and quality of their country’s institutions.  
 
iii) One of the most fruitful and significant contributions of this study has been the 
development of reliable and valid measures of institutions for 70 countries using 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). This is something, which has always been 
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overlooked or taken for granted by international accounting researchers, who 
routinely make claims that their measures of institutors are naturally valid, without 
thinking about the question of whether (or the degree to which) these measures, 
which operationalise institutional constructs, accurately reflect the concepts they 
seek to measure. As Jacob Jacoby, Professor of Psychological Sciences, put it 
succinctly, “Most of our measures are only measures because someone says that they 
are, not because they have been shown to satisfy standard measurement criteria” 
(1978, p. 91).  
 
iv) Numerous studies have been undertaken in the area of goodwill-impairment using a 
small sample of firms from a single country, rather than multiple countries. 
Accounting researchers, however, have scarcely investigated differences in the 
assessment of goodwill-impairment across countries, in particular, those from 
outside Europe. This is despite the fact that IFRSs have been widely adopted not only 
in Europe but also in countries outside Europe, making differences in goodwill-
impairment conclusions and disclosures across countries/regions highly likely. So 
far as I know, the current study, along with Glaum et al. (2015)’s, are the only studies 
that compared goodwill-impairment practices using a (large) sample of firms from 
countries within Europe and outside Europe. 
 
v) The present study also contributes to the existing literature on the value-relevance of 
goodwill-impairment because, in contrast to existing research, it considers the 
association between firms’ goodwill-impairment charges and their markets values in 
a context that has never been examined before, thereby providing evidence on the 
value-relevance of goodwill-impairment for a comprehensive sample of listed 
companies from 17 countries in which IFRSs are in use. 
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vi)   Almost all previous studies on goodwill-impairments have used the firm’s level of 
debt as a proxy for managerial incentives to manipulate earnings through goodwill-
impairments. This study contributes to existing research by providing evidence 
consistent with the monitoring role of debt in limiting managers’ ability to manage 
the timing, and magnitude of goodwill-impairment recognition. Results of prior 
empirical studies, therefore, must be interpreted with caution, because some proxies 
for reporting incentives (e.g. debt and ownership structure) are also good proxies for 
monitoring, governance and oversight.  
 
vii) The current study extends previous research by using a much longer and a more 
recent sample period covering 2007-2013. The sample spans the financial crisis of 
2008-2009, the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s. This is a crucial advantage 
required to find a regular or systematic pattern of goodwill-impairment over time, 
and to find whether this pattern is affected by the crisis. To do this, I split the sample 
into the crisis period (2007-2009) and post-crisis period (2010-2013).  
 
This study is related to the work of Swanson (2007), Van de Poel et al. (2009), Verriest 
and Gaeremynck (2009), Amiraslani et al. (2013), and Glaum et al. (2013 and 2015) who 
empirically examined the impact of the country-specific factors on the determination and 
reporting of goodwill-impairment losses. I have extended their work by developing a 
more comprehensive framework linking a particular pattern of firms’ goodwill-
impairments with the institutional/cultural characteristics of their country of origin, and 
developing the most up-to-date, reliable and valid measures of national institutions, as 
well as by using a comprehensive sample of publicly-traded companies over a much 
longer and more recent period. Furthermore, I have examined the impact and importance 
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of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on goodwill-impairment practices across countries 
inside and outside Europe. I have also extended the work of Lapointe-Antunes et al. 
(2009) on the value-relevance and timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses, and 
provided new evidence of the differences between investors from different countries (and 
different country groups) in terms of the perceptions about the importance goodwill-
impairment losses. The empirical evidence is consistent with early cross-country studies 
(e.g. Alford et al., 1993; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Hung, 2000) on the value-relevance of 
accounting information when applied in a goodwill-impairment text.  
 
1.7 Organisation of the Study 
The chapters in this thesis are organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature 
on the association between goodwill-impairment amounts and economic/reporting 
incentives. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework, which will be used to explain 
international differences in goodwill-impairment determinants. It also reviews the literature 
examining the role of national culture and institutions in explaining differences in accounting 
practices across jurisdictions. Chapter 4 develops the research hypotheses, and the research 
methodology adopted for the purpose of this study, as well as the data collection methods 
adopted for this study. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present the empirical results and provide 
interpretation of research findings and their significance. The final chapter provides a 
conclusion of the results and a discussion of implications, and limitations of this study, as 
well as recommendations for further research. 
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2 Chapter 2:  Review of Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to review empirical studies which examined the factors that 
influence goodwill impairment losses (the first research objective of the study), and studies 
that examined the value relevance of goodwill impairment losses (the second research 
objective of the study). 
 
2.2 Determinants of Goodwill Impairment Losses 
These studies are classified into two groups. Studies which examined goodwill impairment 
losses in one country, and studies which examined goodwill impairment across a number of 
countries. The review also includes studies that examined the determinants of write-offs of 
other intangibles and long-lived assets. 
 
2.2.1 Single-Country Studies 
Using a sample of 2,754 firm-year observations over the 1992 to 1998 period, Riedl (2004) 
compared the relative associations between the reported write-offs of long-lived assets with 
economic factors/reporting incentives before and after the issuance of SFAS 121, 
Accounting for the Impairment of Long- Lived Assets. The main objective of the study was 
to assess whether managers use their discretion to determine the amounts of write-offs 
reported in the years after to the introduction of SAFS 121. Proxies for economic factors 
include (1) a macroeconomic factor measured by the percent change in the US GDP, (2) an 
industry factor measured by the median change in the firm’s ROA, and (3) three 
microeconomic factors including, the percent change in sales, change in pre-write-offs-
earnings, and change in OCF. Proxies for managerial reporting incentives include (1) an 
indicator variable for a change in senior management, (2) a big bath variable when earnings 
are unexpectedly low, (3) a variable for earning smoothing incentive when earnings are 
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unexpectedly high, and (4) an indicator variable for the existence of private debt (firms with 
private debt tend to have restrictive covenants in their debt agreements than their 
counterparts with publicly-issued debt). 
 
 Results from the Tobit regression analysis showed that the associations between the reported 
asset write-offs and economic factors have significantly weakened after SFAS 121, relative 
to those reported before the standard. These associations are consistent across macro-, 
industry-, and firm-specific factors. This indicates that the amounts of write-offs reported in 
the post-adoption of SFAS 121 periods are less reflective of the true value of the firm, as 
compared to those reported before issuance of the standard.  The results, also, showed that 
the write-offs amounts reported after SFAS 121 are strongly and significantly associated 
with big bath reporting incentive as opposed to those reported in the pre-adoption of SFAS 
121 periods, implying that the asset write-offs are not driven by changes in the underlying 
economic values of assets, but rather by the managers’ reporting incentives. Overall, the 
results add evidence that managers use the unverifiable discretion in SFAS 121 in an 
opportunistic manner; rather than in the manner allowing them to convey their personal 
perceptions of substance and economic reality, resulting in write-off amounts that are of low 
quality. These findings are consistent with the critics of the impairment standard. As Lynn 
Turner, the former Chief Accountant of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
states: 
“Today’s U.S. impairment standards are resulting in nothing more than one-time Big Bath charges that 
lack relevance or economic reality. The reality is that if there is a decline in the value of a business, it 
is a decline over time, not overnight…, it lacked a clear picture that would provide investors with the 





Due to the inherent subjectivity and unverifiability allowed under the impairment standard, 
critics argue that goodwill-impairment losses are unlikely to be representationally faithful 
and, therefore, are not reliable. Rather, they believed that the impairment-only approach has 
resulted in an overall reduction in the reliability of financial reporting by offering managers 
the flexibility they need and desire to more easily adopt or justify their discretionary 
reporting choices (i.e., to impair or not to impair) or by not restricting opportunistic earnings 
management using assets write-downs. 
 
This view was also supported by Kvaal (2005), who raised the question of whether 
impairment losses reflect only the reductions in the current value of goodwill asset, or 
whether they rather reflect other factors that are not entirely compatible with changes in asset 
values (e.g. a change in management should have little or no impact on the impairment 
decision). Using a sample of 238 firms (excluding firms in the financial and the oil and gas 
sectors) within FTSE 350 index at the end of year 2002, the author found evidence (against 
the null hypothesis of unbiased impairment accounting) that the amounts of goodwill-
impairment losses were statistically significantly associated with the changes of the 
chairman of the board (13.994, p-value < 0.001), whereas their association with the share 
performance measures was statistically insignificant. The evidence found by the author 
strongly suggests that goodwill-impairments losses are void of economic content. This in 
turns throws doubt on the perceived usefulness of the impairment standards (in both IFRS 
and US GAAP) for providing information that is more relevant to investors.  
 
In response to the adoption of SFAS 142, Beatty and Weber (2006) separately analysed the 
determinants of the manager’s decision on whether to take a goodwill-impairment, using 
232 impairing firms taken from 553 US firms that are more likely to impair (i.e., firms whose 
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difference between their market and book value of equity is not greater than their goodwill). 
The primary objective of their study was to empirically investigate factors affecting 
managers’ preferences for reporting certain current goodwill-impairments below the income 
from continuing operations (i.e., as a cumulative effect arising from changes in accounting 
principles), or recording uncertain future goodwill-impairments above the line in the income 
from continuing operations (i.e., accelerating versus delaying the recognition of goodwill 
write-offs when SFAS 142 is adopted). To that end, a probit regression and a censored 
regression were used respectively to investigate the determinants of the goodwill-
impairment decision as well as the amounts of goodwill-impairments. 
 
 After controlling for the effects of firms’ economic performance, results show that the 
probability and the amounts of goodwill-impairments that are recorded at adoption of SFAS 
142 (i.e., recorded as a cumulative effect of adopting of SFAS 142) are relatively small for 
firms that have less slack in their existing debt covenants, firms that have earnings-based 
management bonus plans, firms listed on an exchange with listing requirements (i.e., to avoid 
being delisted). Their results also indicate that firms that are riskier in terms of the standard 
deviation of their stock returns, and firms that have a higher market’s response coefficient 
to earnings from continuing operations, as well as firms whose chief executive officers 
(CEOs) have a shorter tenure, will report TGIL that are greater in magnitude. Overall, the 
results suggest that firms’ debt contracting and market incentives/disincentives drive 
managers’ decision to accelerate or delay recognition of impairment losses. 
 
Using a sample of 870 companies (comprised of 255 impairing firms and 615 non-impairing 
firms), Zang (2008) examined the degree to which managerial incentives proxies explain 
variations in the amounts of TGIL (as reported by US companies at the date of the adoption 
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of SFAS 142). After controlling for actual (economic) goodwill-impairment, the author 
found evidence consistent with the hypotheses of debt contracting and big bath, that highly 
levered firms appear to report lower amounts of goodwill-impairments in order to avoid 
potentially costly consequences of violating their debt covenants, whereas companies  that 
have recently experienced a change in their CEOs tend to impair greater amounts of their 
goodwill in the adoption year that can be recorded as “a cumulative effect of accounting 
change, to which analysts and investors often assign a lower value weight than income items 
from continuing operations” (pp.42), so managers can reduce future impairment losses, and 
consequently report higher profits in later years.  
 
Using a sample of 331 firms drawn from Compustat (comprised of 78 impairing firms, and 
253 non-impairing firms), Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) empirically examined whether and 
how managers’ reporting incentives and disincentives (i.e., constraints) may have played a 
role in determining TGIL (as recorded by Canadian companies after the mandatory adoption 
of Section 3062 in 2002). They find evidence against the standard setters’ contention that 
the impairment test of goodwill will force companies to record impairment losses that better 
reflect the current reduction in the value of goodwill. The evidence reveals that accounting 
and reporting choices related to goodwill-impairment losses are more influenced by 
managers’ reporting incentives to overstate and/or understate goodwill-impairment charges 
reported in the transitional period. More specifically, results show that companies with lower 
ROE and/or ROA than their industry peers tend to record higher amounts of TGIL, in their 
attempt to decrease the deviations from industry median/average ROA and/or ROE, and 
consequently “bring the value of these ratios towards the industry norm6” (p. 39). Similarly, 
                                                          
6 This is consistent with institutional isomorphism, which suggests that firm managers look closely to industry 
norms, and will therefore follow the industry practices. Institutional isomorphism is broken down into three 
categories: Coercive isomorphism occurs when organisations adopt specific internal structures and procedures 
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firms with higher leverage than their industry peers tend to record lower amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses in the transition period, in their attempt to avoid further 
deviations from industry median/average debt-equity ratio. An explanation for these findings 
may be attributed to the fact that during the transition period, Canadian firms were mandated 
to use the retroactive method, wherein transitional goodwill-impairment losses (TGIL) are 
charged against equity and thus have no effect on firms’ net income at all. They rather reduce 
the values of assets and equity equally, and consequently, directly increase ROE, ROA and 
leverage.  
 
Further evidence supporting the big bath hypothesis reveals that companies experiencing a 
change in their CEO tend to take more goodwill-impairments in the transition period, and 
thereby place the blame on the prior management team for poor past acquisitions, and create 
a favourable platform for the development of higher reported earnings and/or higher reported 
equity in the years to come. Finally, their empirical results show that widely-held firms tend 
to record lower amounts of TGIL to avoid any intervention and scrutiny by outside investors, 
who have no access to the information necessary to evaluate the performance of past 
acquisitions, and consequently determine whether goodwill value has been impaired. 
 
In addition, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) empirically investigated the relationship between 
the proportion of independent directors that are financially literate, on the audit committee 
and abnormal transitional goodwill-impairment losses (ATGIL), measured as “the reported 
transitional goodwill impairment loss minus the normal transitional goodwill impairment 
                                                          
due to pressure either from the state or from other organisations. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an 
organisation copies or emulates the internal structures and procedures adopted by other organisations. 
Normative isomorphism occurs when organisations adopt the structures and procedures advocated by particular 
dominant professions, professional bodies and/or consultants (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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loss predicted by regressing the reported loss on the economic impairment proxies and 
control variables” (p. 49). To account for the censored distribution of the reported losses, a 
value of zero was assigned to the normal loss when its predicted value was negative. TGIL 
are overstated if their reported values are above the predicted/normal values (i.e., positive 
abnormal losses). TGIL are understated if their reported values fall below the 
predicted/normal losses (i.e., negative abnormal losses). Ideally, TGIL are neither overstated 
nor understated (i.e., zero abnormal losses). The results reveal that the number of 
independent/financially literate directors on their audit committee is negatively and 
significantly (p-value < 0.013) associated with positive abnormal losses, but positively and 
significantly (Pp-value < 0.026) associated with negative abnormal losses. The overall 
results suggest that firms with higher audit quality (in terms of competence and 
independence) tend to record lower ATGIL. This is consistent with audit committee’s role 
in constraining managerial opportunism/earnings management associated with the 
impairment of goodwill, which is relevant to the author’s conclusion that “managers’ ability 
to act opportunistically depends–at least partially–on the effectiveness of the audit 
committee’s monitoring” (p. 38). 
 
These findings lend support to an earlier study (Ahmed and Guler, 2007) that assessed the 
role of corporate boards of directors in monitoring the managers’ discretionary behaviour 
concerning the determination and reporting of goodwill write-offs. After controlling for 
economic and reporting incentives, the results showed a strong association between the 
likelihood of a goodwill-impairment loss and firm-level measures of corporate governance, 
namely (1) Percentage of outside directors on the board; (2) Percentage of outside directors’ 
ownership;(3) Separation of the role between Chairman and CEO; (4) Number of directors 
serving on boards; and (5) Number of directors who are active CEOs. More precisely, the 
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results showed that impairing firms were, on average, more active in reducing inside, busy, 
and active directors, compared to their non-impairing counterparts. By the same token, 
impairing firms are more apt to separate the positions of their Chairman and CEO, compared 
to non-impairing firms. 
 
The previous results seem consistent in the post-adoption of SFAS 142 period. Masters-Stout 
et al. (2008) investigated the role played by CEOs of Fortune 500 companies in determining 
the amounts of goodwill-impairment losses reported after the issuance of SFAS 142 during 
the period 2003-2005, and found compelling evidence that incoming CEOs continue to 
impair larger amounts of goodwill compared to their predecessors, so they can put the blame 
on the previous management and clear the deck or clear out the rubbish to improve earnings 
over future reporting periods. The results suggest that goodwill-impairment testing applies 
differently, at a minimum, between the old and new CEOs, and thereby leaves the door open 
to potential earnings manipulation.  
 
In a recent study, Jordan and Clark (2011) compared the levels of earnings for impairing and 
non-impairing companies in both 2001 and 2002, using two performance measures: 
ROA/ROS. Their empirical results reveal that the median ROA and ROS did not vary 
significantly between these two groups in 2001. In 2002, the 29 impairing companies, 
however, reported median ROA/ROS significantly lower than those reported by the 51 non-
impairing firms. The authors interpret the obtained results to strongly suggest that “it is 
unlikely that depressed earnings in one period alone would cause management to doubt the 
value of its goodwill… the impairment losses were likely recorded because managers for 
these companies viewed 2002 as an opportune time to take big baths and further reduce their 
already depressed earnings” (p. 68).  
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In seeming contradiction to the big bath hypothesis, Jahmani et al. (2010) point out that the 
number of firms that had experienced three consecutive years of losses, and had ‘actually’ 
impaired their goodwill was found to be insignificant during 2003-2005 period, implying 
that these companies were using goodwill-impairment testing as a primary tool to avoid 
recognising any goodwill-impairment charges, and consequently manage the volatility of 
reported earnings. Moreover, Chambers (2010) used a logistic regression model to examine 
whether firms that have incentives to increase their earnings per share (EPS) strategically 
avoid reporting goodwill-impairment losses to manage their reported earnings upward. 
Using a sample of 16802 firm-year observations with goodwill assets (representing 4713 
firms) over the period 2004-2008, the author found that firms whose EPS/ ΔEPS is negative 
(i.e., below zero) or close to zero are less likely to impair their goodwill in order to report 
EPS above zero or above prior year EPS.  
 
Seemingly contrary results are no longer seen as contrary, but as supportive of managers’ 
competence to use goodwill-impairment testing as a powerful tool to artificially inflate or 
deflate the reported earnings if they have the incentive to do so. However, “it is not clear 
which incentives will prevail” (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008, p. 38). For instance, managers 
of firms with unexpectedly low earnings are expected to manage their earnings either 
downward by aggressively accelerating the recognition of goodwill-impairment charges 
(i.e., take a big bath), or upward by delaying or postponing the recognition of impairment 
losses, or at least keeping them to the lowest level possible in order to avoid or mitigate 
further losses. However, when earnings are unexpectedly high, managers are expected to 
manage their earnings downward, by conservatively accelerating goodwill-impairment 
charges in order to create cookie-jar reserves that could be used in later years to smooth out 
bumps (or ups and downs) in earnings (i.e., earnings smoothing ), or in the words of Arthur 
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Levitt, a former chief accountant of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “to 
satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings path, wishful thinking 
may be winning the day over faithful representation” (Levitt, 1998). The current accounting 
treatment of goodwill-impairment could, therefore, be thought of as just or a load of hocus-
pocus. It does represent a grey area where it is difficult to hold the line on discretionary and 
non-discretionary impairments that reflect managers’ desires, rather than the true value of 
goodwill. 
 
Ramanna (2008) provides a strong argument in favour of AT, predicting that at least some 
management of goodwill-impairment is opportunistic (goodwill-related earnings 
management). Differently put, some firms are more likely than others to use their SFAS 142 
goodwill-impairment discretion opportunistically so as to either accelerate or delay the 
timing of recognition of goodwill-impairment losses, resulting in an underestimate or 
overestimate of assets and earnings. Ramanna also identified three types of firm 
characteristics that are likely to increase the probability of and magnitude of goodwill-
impairments that can be managed. First, the number and size of an acquirer’s reporting units. 
For an acquiring firm, the larger the number and size of its reporting units, the greater its 
discretion in determining goodwill-impairment charges. For example, firms with large and 
numerous reporting units have substantially greater flexibility in initially allocating acquired 
goodwill either to poorly performing units to accelerate the recognition of goodwill-
impairment losses (i.e., take a big bath), or to better-performing units (i.e., with existing 
internally-generated growth potential) to delay the recognition of any goodwill-impairment 
losses. Second, higher market-to-book ratios. Reporting units with higher M/B ratios, are 
more likely to absorb the impairment losses, giving them greater discretion to avoid 
reporting any future impairments. Third, the unverifiability of net assets. Reporting units 
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with higher proportions of unverifiable net assets (i.e., assets that are not bought/sold 
separately in open and active markets and thus their values cannot be established by 
reference to traded markets), have greater flexibility in estimating the current value of net 
assets and goodwill, giving them greater discretion in determining goodwill-impairment 
losses. 
 
In a different approach to testing whether managers exercise their goodwill write-offs 
discretion to reflect their firms’ underlying economic attributes, Godfrey and Koh (2009) 
investigated the correlation between US firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their 
investment opportunities (IOS), which is a six-item composite measure explaining 93 % of 
the common variance between the following six measures:  (i) investment intensity; (ii) 
growth in the market value of assets; (iii) market-to-book value of assets; (iv) R&D expense 
to total assets ; (v) market-to-book value of equity; and (vi) earnings-to-price ratio. Using a 
pooled sample of 575 firm-year observations reporting goodwill-impairment charges above 
the line over the period 2002-2004, Godfrey and Koh found strong evidence that the amount 
of goodwill-impairment losses firms report in their early years is significantly and negatively 
associated with firms’ IOS. One-standard-deviation increase in firms’ IOS leads to a 10.49 
per cent fall in goodwill-impairment amounts, implying that the association is economically 
significant. This result held even after controlling for other contracting and political 
incentives, such as leverage and size of the firm. 
 
 Their results also showed that both firms’ returns on assets (ROA), and firms’ stock returns 
(RET) were strongly (negatively) related to goodwill-impairment amounts, implying that 
“firms faring well economically have less reason to record large impairment losses” (p. 138). 
Overall, the results revealed that around 53 percent of the variations in goodwill-impairment 
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losses are explained by firms’ economic performance, leverage and firm size. However, 
economic performance measures (IOS, ROA and RET) appear to be consistently (across all 
years) more dominant in their correlations with goodwill-impairment amounts than the 
contracting and political incentives (leverage and firm size), with ROA remains the most 
important factor. Finally, the authors conclude that “at least in their initial years of adopting 
SFAS 142, managers use the flexibility allowed within the goodwill-impairment reporting 
regime to reflect the economic value of underlying economic investment opportunities” (p. 
138).  
 
In the Australian context, Stokes and Webster (2010) investigated whether the association 
between the amounts of goodwill written off and firms’ IOS is stronger in the presence of 
high-quality auditing, as proxied by the BIG4 (Deloitte Touche, PwC, Ernst & Young, and 
KPMG). Using two samples of firms (BIG4 and non-BIG4) over the period 2006-2008, they 
ran two separate Tobit regression models, one for each group of firms, to determine the 
degree to which the regression coefficients and R-squared values for these two models are 
significantly different. The two-group model links a goodwill-impairment loss with 
multiples of variables meant to capture a firm’s underlying economics (i.e., IOS, ROA and 
RET), and its reporting incentives (i.e., firm size and leverage ratio). The overall results 
showed that the BIG4 model has higher explanatory power compared to the non-BIG4 model 
(R-squared of 0.46 versus 0.32).  
 
More specifically, their empirical results showed that goodwill-impairment losses were 
negatively and significantly (-0.05, p-value < 0.00) associated with IOS for the only firms 
audited by BIG4 auditors, whereas the IOS coefficient for the non-BIG4 group was neither 
negative nor statistically significant (0.01, p-value = 0.308), suggesting that “goodwill-
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impairment losses under IFRS reflect firms’ underlying IOS only when firms are audited by 
BIG4 auditors” (p. 16). The results, also, showed that the BIG4 group had a relatively higher 
ROA coefficient estimate in absolute value, compared to the non-BIG4 group (-0.39, p-value 
< 0.000 versus -0.31, p-value < 0.000), whereas all other coefficients were statistically 
insignificant for the both groups. In order to provide a better insight into the joint effects of 
auditor type and firms’ IOS, the two samples were pooled to form a single composite sample 
of 1376 firm-years observations (composed of 857 BIG4 and 519 non-BIG4) and the Tobit 
regression was repeated with the addition of two further variables (i.e., BIG4 and BIG4 * 
IOS) capturing the incremental contribution of BIG4 auditors to the impact of IOS on firms’ 
goodwill-impairments. The parameter estimate results demonstrated that the IOS coefficient 
was no longer significant, while the coefficient on the interaction term (BIG4 * IOS) was 
negatively significant (-0.05, p-value <0.05), indicating that the association between firms’ 
goodwill-impairments and their  IOS depends, at least partially, on the quality of auditing 
provided by BIG4 auditors, who enforce compliance with IFRS and constrain opportunism 
discretion by management to ensure that no impairment loss has been made, unless a firm 
has suffered from impairment in its goodwill’s underlying economic value. 
 
In a similar study, Chalmers et al. (2011) empirically examined whether the impairment-
only approach will properly and fairly reflect the underlying economic value of goodwill as 
opposed to the straight-line method of amortisation required under Australian GAAP, by 
comparing the relationship between Australian firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their 
IOS before and after their adoption of IFRSs. Their results showed that goodwill-impairment 
losses are more closely related to firms’ underlying economic fundamentals (IOS and 
accounting returns) than goodwill amortisation charges. More specifically, the results 
revealed that return on assets consistently remains the most economically significant factor, 
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which alone explained 33 percent of the variations in goodwill-impairment losses, indicating 
that “better-performing firms are less likely to experience events giving rise to goodwill-
impairments” (p. 652). These findings support the argument that the impairment-only 
approach under IFRS is likely to provide a better measure of the economic value of goodwill 
than the systematic amortisation approach because the trigger for any impairment loss 
recognition is driven by the change in economic conditions. This suggests that the write-
downs of goodwill are more closely linked to the real economic decline in asset values (i.e., 
economic reality), as opposed to goodwill amortisation charges, which are “relatively 
arbitrary estimates of goodwill diminution and do not necessarily reflect their economic 
counterparts” (p. 637).  
 
In the UK context, AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) examined the way in which accounting 
discretion is exercised by UK firms’ managers in determining what goodwill-impairment 
losses they should report. They argued that it is possible for managers to opportunistically 
use the discretion embodied in the impairment standards in order to manage the level and 
variability of reported earnings (to disguise the true performance of their firms, if they are 
performing poorly, and protect their private control benefits by avoiding outside 
intervention), resulting in goodwill-impairment losses that do not faithfully represent the 
economic value of goodwill (i.e., goodwill-impairments are  more associated with proxies 
for managerial opportunism). It may even be possible that the same discretion will be used 
efficiently by managers in order to reveal their privately held information on their firms’ 
financial position and performance, resulting in goodwill-impairment losses that are more 
reflective of their firms’ underlying attributes (i.e., economic measures of performance are 
more dominant in their association with goodwill-impairment losses). Using firm level 
pooled data over the first two consecutive years (2005-2006) of the initial application of 
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IFRS 3 (2004), the authors empirically investigated the degree to which proxies for firm 
economic performance, and reporting incentives, as well as corporate governance measures 
explain the total amounts of goodwill-impairment losses recorded by the UK’s largest non-
financial firms trading on the London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market. 
After controlling for economic proxies, their empirical results revealed that goodwill-
impairment losses are strongly associated with earnings smoothing and big bath reporting 
incentives (-0.09 and 0.10 respectively). The results also showed positive correlations 
between goodwill-impairment amounts and effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
  Interestingly, AbuGhazaleh et al. interpreted the findings as evidence against the existence 
of opportunistic behaviour, and suggested that managers appear to be exercising their 
accounting discretion afforded by the impairment standards in an efficient manner, rather 
than acting opportunistically. Finally, the authors whimsically concluded that the 
impairment test of goodwill has enhanced the quality of information reported on goodwill 
(as intended by the IASB), and provided firm managers with a framework that faithfully 
reflects changes in the underlying economic value of goodwill. However, the conclusion 
drawn by the authors are not sufficiently supported by the evidence presented in their favour. 
Rather, the empirical evidence the authors cite supports the view that the impairment test of 
goodwill provided managers with another tool to manage earnings, practically their 
empirical results revealed that earnings smoothing and big bath were more dominant in their 
association with goodwill-impairments than economic factors. None of the variables used 
by the authors to capture the actual impairments of goodwill (B/M, size of goodwill, number 
of CGUs, change in turnover, change in OCF, and ROA) were practically or statically 
significant, with the exception of the book-to-market variable, which was statistically 
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significant at the .05 level, but not practically important, explaining only 2 to 3 per cent of 
the variations in goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
 Another issue to consider is that the values of adjusted R-squared in Pooled Tobit and 
Pooled OLS models (13.2 % and 18.6% respectively) were relatively low; they were not as 
high as expected, implying that a significant proportion of the variation in goodwill-
impairment losses were not explained by the factors for which the two model accounted (i.e., 
the factors had little impact on determining goodwill-impairment losses). The main reason 
for low adjusted R-squared values is that neither model was completely or correctly 
specified, suggesting that some important variables had been omitted from the models, such 
as change in industry-adjusted ROA, change in industry-adjusted ROE, change in industry-
adjusted M/B ratio, industry-adjusted sales growth, and the percentage change in UK GDPP. 
Hence, the two models did not appear to fit the data well; although the use of Pooled OLS 
regression improved the fit of the model by 5.4%, but it was not yet a well-fitting model. 
Moreover, the authors decided to pool the data, assuming the data were naturally poolable, 
without thinking of the question of whether the data were poolable or not, ignoring the 
unobserved effects specific to firm or time, which can be captured by using one of panel 
regression models (FE/RE). While the authors managed to control for the time-specific 
effects by including a year dummy variable in their default model, they failed to control for 
omitted firm characteristics (e.g. firms’ ownership structure and median or average change 
in firm’s industry ROA). 
 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) also examined the effects of corporate governance indicators 
measured at the firm level in providing managers with strictly enforced negative incentives 
(i.e., discipline) to report high-quality goodwill-impairment losses. They hypothesised that 
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the impairments of goodwill are a function of firms’ underlying economics, managerial 
incentives, and corporate governance structure. After controlling for managerial incentives 
and actual impairments proxies, they found evidence, in line with the role of corporate 
governance in monitoring and disciplining poorly performing and/or opportunistic 
managers, that the amounts of goodwill written-off are positively (significantly) associated 
with strong corporate governance. These results imply that managers constrained by 
powerful disciplining mechanisms are more apt to use their goodwill-impairment discretion 
in a timely and efficient manner, rather than acting opportunistically, allowing them to reveal 
their own expectations about the firms’ underlying financial performance and position, 
resulting in impairment charges that are more representative of the decline in goodwill’s 
underlying economic value.  
 
The earliest studies thereon found mixed results regarding the determination and reporting 
of firms’ goodwill-impairment losses. This, in turn, makes their value in research studies 
questionable, or makes their findings and conclusions nonsense, inconclusive, and hard to 
compare (i.e., one-time relationships). Consistent with this view, Riedl (2004) argued that 
the association between goodwill-impairment losses and economic/reporting incentives 
remains a priori unclear. This has led several researchers to analyse the conditional 
association, in which the effects of the impairment standard on the characteristics of 
goodwill-impairment losses are investigated, given the specific value of a third variable, 
which acts as an antecedent, mediator, or moderator. The observed relationship between 
goodwill-impairments and firms’ economic/discretionary indicators may be maintained, 
increased, decreased, or even reversed when third variables are taken into account (e.g. 
internal/external governance mechanisms bringing together the interests of insiders and 
outsiders).  
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2.2.2 Multi-Country Studies 
Using a sample of 47 European largest companies listed on FTSE 30 during the period 2005-
2006, Verriest and Gaeremynck, (2009) empirically examined the impact of firm 
performance, ownership structure, and firm- and country- level corporate governance on the 
firms’ decision to impair their goodwill and the quality of impairment disclosure, as 
measured by a check-box of five disclosure items, which are all meant to provide relevant 
information to investors regarding the valuation of goodwill. These five items include: (1) 
whether goodwill is mentioned separately in the notes or not; (2) whether the CGUs are 
mentioned over which goodwill is allocated or not; (3) whether the effective amount of 
goodwill that is allocated to the CGUs is disclosed or not; (4) whether the discount rate used 
to calculate value in use is disclosed or not; and (5) whether the growth rates of the expected 
future cash flows used to calculate the value in use is disclosed or not. 
 
 The authors hypothesise that companies with low degrees of ownership concentration, and 
companies with more independent board members, as well as companies that separate the 
roles of chairman and CEO will impair their goodwill more often. Their empirical results 
show a positive association between the incidence of impairment losses and the number of 
independent members on the board, implying that companies are more likely to impair their 
goodwill in the existence of strong governance mechanisms. Their results, however, revealed 
that the independence of the board of directors does not seem to have a consistent impact on 
the disclosure quality of the impairment. The authors suggest that the reason for these mixed 
results is simply due to a lack of statistical power, a problem which is usually caused by 
using a sample size that is too small to detect meaningful effects.7Finally, the authors found 
                                                          
7 From the researcher’s point of view, the authors assume that firms’ decisions to impair their goodwill are 
associated with the amount of information disclosed regarding their impairment decisions, i.e. impairing firms 
will have a higher quality of impairment disclosure. However, this is not necessarily/always true for at least 
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consistent evidence that companies operating in countries with strong anti-director rights are 
more apt to impair their goodwill and disclose more information on their impairment test. 
This is consistent with the findings of Paananen (2008), who found evidence that firms 
disclosing more information about fair value estimations of their goodwill tend to operate in 
countries with a high level of investor protection. 
 
Van de Poel et al. (2009) studied the impact that BIG4 auditors and the rule of law may have 
had on the association between the likelihood, or probability, of taking a goodwill-
impairment charge and firms’ reporting incentives (big bath and earnings smoothing) after 
controlling for country-, industry-, and firm-level economic factors (change in GDP, median 
change in firms’ industry ROA, and change in firms’ sales/OCF). Using a sample of 
European companies operating in non-financial industries, and mandated to use IFRSs 
during the period 2005 and 2006, they found that t firms’ decision to impair their goodwill 
is positively associated with income-decreasing reporting incentives. In particular, firms 
appeared to more frequently impair their goodwill, when their reported earnings were 
unexpectedly low (i.e., take a big bath), or when their reported earnings were unexpectedly 
high (i.e., smooth earnings).  
                                                          
two reasons; first, the so-called quality disclosure index does not seem to represent the quality of information, 
but rather the quantity or adequacy of information released about the impairment test of goodwill. Amiraslani 
et al. (2013) find evidence in favour of this view suggesting that a majority of companies appear to be box-
ticking their way through the compliance process (pp. 10). In January 2013, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) reported on its review of accounting practices related to impairment testing of 
goodwill and other intangible assets under International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36, Impairment of Assets. 
According to the report, which reviewed 2011 data: “Although the major disclosures related to goodwill-
impairment testing were generally included, in many cases these were of a boilerplate nature and not entity-
specific” (ESMA, 2013pp. 3). Second, the authors ignore the fact that not all goodwill-impairments are incurred 
for economic reasons; some impairment losses are discretionary and reflect nothing more than big bath 
reporting behaviour. For example, a firm that decides to impair its goodwill may score high in terms of 
disclosure quality, even though it lacks the relevance or economic reality. 
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The result also revealed that companies that are audited by BIG4 are inclined to record 
goodwill-impairment charges more often than their non-BIG4 counterparts. However, this 
was only true when the sample was restricted to firms with overvalued goodwill on their 
balance sheet (Market value – Book Value < Goodwill t-1). The effects of Big4 auditors on 
the relationship between income-decreasing incentives (BATH and SMOOTH) and the 
frequency of goodwill-impairment losses were measured using the interaction term(s) 
between BIG4 and income-decreasing incentives (BATH * BIG4 and SMOOTH * BIG4). 
The results reveal that BIG4 auditors negatively and significantly affect/moderate the 
relationship (i.e., the strength and direction) between the occurrence of goodwill-
impairments and income-decreasing incentives. This finding indicates that when income-
decreasing incentives are low, companies that are audited by non-BIG4 are more apt to delay 
recognition of goodwill-impairments (type II error), whereas they are more apt to accelerate 
recognition of goodwill-impairments, when earnings are unexpectedly low (high) (type I 
error). Overall, the results suggest that “BIG4 auditors do a better job in constraining the use 
of the goodwill-impairment test as a tool to manage earnings” (p. 33).  
 
Furthermore, the results showed that the coefficient on the rule of law variable (i.e., LAW), 
a proxy for a country’s judicial system, is positive and highly significant. This finding 
indicates that when other factors are held constant, companies operating in countries 
characterised by a strong legal/judicial system tend to impair their goodwill more often 
compared to their counterparts. This is consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006), who 
suggest that companies located in countries with strong legal/judicial systems have a higher 
propensity to report conservatively or aggressively. The overall results indicate that the 
impairment test of goodwill is not evenly applied across auditors and countries. These results 
confirm the doubts raised by Ball (2006) regarding whether managers and auditors will apply 
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the impairment test of goodwill and other assets with the same diligence in all IFRS-adopting 
countries. 
 
Nevertheless, the study can be criticised on at least two main grounds. First, the authors have 
taken the conservative (or prudence) approach, rather than the faithful presentation approach, 
to interpret the constraints provided by the type of auditor and quality of judicial system on 
the occurrence, and goodwill-impairment amounts, suggesting that firms audited by a BIG4 
auditor or located in countries with strong judicial systems appeared to report conservatively 
(i.e., impair more of their goodwill and more often). They thereby overlook the fact that 
conservatism/prudence is no longer a desirable/ fundamental characteristic of the quality of 
financial reporting information (IASB, 2010). Second, the authors did not consider the joint 
effects of auditing and judicial systems on the impairment of goodwill. Numerous studies 
(e.g. Van der Plaats, 2000; Choi and Wong, 2007; Francis and Wang, 2008) have pointed 
out that the role of auditors’ governance depends on the national institutional settings in 
which auditors operate, and suggested that if certain factors are present in the institutional 
settings, the auditors’ independence and objectivity will be likely to improve. More 
specifically, Francis and Wang (2008) explored the joint effects of  investor protection and 
auditing on earnings quality, and found evidence that without being domiciled in countries 
with good investor protection, being audited by a BIG4 auditor per se is not a sufficient 
condition for achieving a higher quality of reported earnings, The evidence indicated that 
“in the absence of investor protection, BIG4 auditors simply do not have incentives to 
enforce high-quality earnings8…our findings refute the view that BIG4 auditor behaviour is 
uniform throughout the world, irrespective of country-specific context” (p. 185).  
                                                          
8 Choi and Wong (2007) examined the impact of the strength of a country’s legal environment on the 
governance role of auditors, and found that in countries with weak legal protection of outside investors, auditors 
act as a partial substitute for weak legal institutions and, therefore, play an even stronger governance role.  
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In a recent study, Glaum et al. (2013) developed a model that brings together firm- and 
country-specific variables to empirically investigate the joint effects of the firm- and 
country-specific characteristics on firms’ levels of disclosure and compliance with the 
requirements of IFRS 3 and IAS 36. Using a sample of 357 firms operating in the 17 
European countries, they found that compliance with IFRSs is simultaneously determined 
by firm- and country-level factors. At the firm level, they found that the size of goodwill, 
prior experience with IFRSs, the type of auditor, the existence of audit committee, the 
issuance of equity shares/bonds, and ownership structure play important roles in compliance. 
At the industry level, they found that financial firms (i.e., banks, insurance companies, real 
estate) exhibit below-average compliance (-3.064, p-value < 0.001) relative to those their 
counterparts in manufacturing and other services. At country-level, they found evidence of 
legal origins effects, with firms from Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries displaying 
an above-average level of compliance, whereas firms from Middle-Eastern Europe displayed 
below-average compliance. This indicates that compliance differs across countries, and these 
differences are systematically influenced by legal origins.  
 
Further investigation reveals that compliance is significantly associated with the strength of 
public law enforcement (as proxied by public enforcement index developed by Djankov et 
al. (2008), the size of national equity markets (as proxied by (1) market capitalisation of 
domestic listed companies/GDP, (2) number of domestic listed companies/ population, and 
(3) market turnover/GDP) and cultural dimension of the European Social Survey (openness 
versus conservation). In order to provide better insight into how country-specific variables 
impact compliance in combination with firm-level variables (i.e., whether the impact of firm-
level variables on compliance is moderated/influenced by country-level variables), 
interaction terms between firm- and country-level variable were employed. The results show 
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that the coefficient of the interaction term (ENFORCE X AUDIT_COM) is negative and 
significant, indicating that when an audit committee exists, the level of compliance increases 
for only firms located in countries with lax enforcement mechanisms. This finding suggests 
that “a substitution effect appears to exist between the strength of the country-level 
enforcement system and company-level supervision of the accounting function” (p. 33). The 
results, also, show that the level of compliance is affected more by firms’ ownership 
structure in countries with weak public enforcement. Interestingly, their results, however, 
reveal that the positive effect of the existence of audit committee on the level of compliance 
is greater if a firm is domiciled in a country with a relatively large stock market, implying 
that a complementary effect appears to exist between the size of national stock markets and 
the audit committees on compliance. 
 
Amiraslani et al. (2013) examined the impact of institutional differences on the speed of 
recognition of impairment charges in the post-adoption period of IFRSs (2006-2011) using 
Leuz (2010)’s country cluster classification. Cluster (1) consists of countries characterised 
as outsider economies with strong enforcement, Cluster (2) comprises countries 
characterised as insider economies with strong enforcement, and Cluster (3) contains 
countries characterised as insider economies with weak enforcement. Using a sample of 
4474 publicly-listed companies from the EU (plus Norway and Switzerland), they found that 
those companies in cluster (1) countries appeared to recognise goodwill-impairment losses 
in a more timely fashion (20.7%), followed by 12.9% and 5.9% for companies in Cluster (2) 
and (3) countries respectively. This finding indicates that the timeliness of goodwill-
impairment losses is dependent on a country’s institutional quality, suggesting that 
“companies operating in strong regulatory and enforcement settings appear to recognize 
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economic losses on a more timely basis than those based in jurisdictions where enforcement 
is anticipated to be weaker” (p. 2). 
 
 Additionally, the authors investigated the joint impact of the firm- and country-specific 
characteristics on the quality of impairment disclosure across the three European country 
clusters during the period 2010-2011. By using a self-constructed survey based on EY’s 
checklists summarising the disclosure requirements of IFRSs; they found strong evidence 
that the quality of impairment disclosure is likely to be high for firms audited by one of the 
BIG4 auditors, firms operating in the oil and gas industry, larger firms, highly leveraged 
firms, firms with higher intensity of goodwill-impairments, and firms domiciled in Cluster 
(1) countries in which legal institutions are strong. The overall results indicate that firms 
from different countries respond/comply differently to the disclosure requirements, despite 
being subject to the same accounting standards, suggesting that “changing accounting 
standards alone may not be sufficient to ensure uniform financial reporting across Europe 
due to uneven enforcement” (p. 7).  
 
Using 8,110 non-financial firm-year observations and 1,358 financial firm-year observations 
from 21 countries where firms apply IFRSs (either voluntarily or mandatorily) over the 
period 2005-2011, Glaum et al. (2015) recently investigated the impact of a country’s 
enforcement system on the timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses. Glaum et al. postulate 
that “the application of the goodwill impairment test may depend on a firm’s institutional 
setting, in particular, its legal environment and the strength of its capital market supervision 
and enforcement” (p. 2). Their initial results revealed that firms’ decisions to impair their 
goodwill were not only based on market/accounting measures of performance, but also on 
reporting incentives. Further investigations revealed that goodwill-impairment decisions 
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were also associated with lagged (i.e., not contemporaneous) stock market returns. This 
finding may reflect managers’ tendency to delay the recognition of any necessary goodwill-
impairment losses. However, this finding was sensitive to the effect of enforcement system 
in the country. That is, the finding was only applicable to firms domiciled in countries with 
low scores on the audit and enforcement index, developed by Brown et al. (2014). In 
particular, firms domiciled in countries with relatively high scores on the audit and 
enforcement index tend to publicly report goodwill-impairment losses in a timelier manner, 
when compared to their counterparts in countries with relatively low scores on the audit and 
enforcement index.  
 
2.3 Value Relevance of Goodwill Impairment Losses 
In this section, two types of studies are examined; studies which tested directly the value 
relevance of goodwill impairment losses using models related to the basic Ohlson (1995) 
model, and studies which examined the relationship between goodwill impairment losses 
and share prices using a variety of methods, such as the market reaction to the announcement 
of goodwill impairment losses. 
 
 One study, Li et al. (2004) examined a sample of U.S. firms reporting TGIL for the first 
time during 2002 and 2003. They found evidence that market participants (investors and 
financial analysts) revise their short/long-term forecasts of earnings downward after the 
announcement of impairment losses, and their forecasts are revised significantly downward 
when the impairment loss increases in its magnitude. This evidence supports, but perhaps 
not quite as strongly, the claim that impairment losses provide new information relevant to 
the market about the firm’s future prospects. Further analysis showed that while the 
impairment loss was positively associated with indicators of overpayments for initial 
acquisitions made by impairing firms during the preceding five years, it was negatively 
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associated with pre-announcement performance indicators over a preceding two-year period 
(the period in the late 2000 and early 2001 that coincided with the market collapse). This led 
the authors to conclude that “it appears that, for these firms, the value of goodwill may have 
been partly impaired at the outset due to initial overpayment for acquisitions and deteriorated 
further due to the subsequent economic recession and the market downturn in late 2000 and 
2001.” Overall, their results suggested that an impairment loss could be reasonably predicted 
by market participants who were able, at least partially, to capture the decline in the 
economic value of goodwill.  
 
Ahmed and Guler (2007) studied the potential effects that the adoption of SFAS No. 142 
may have on the reliability of goodwill write-offs and goodwill balances using a sample of 
5680 firm-year observations from 1999-2004. They found a negative and significant 
association between goodwill (and its impairment losses) and stock returns/stock prices in 
the post-adoption period of SFAS 142. In general, the evidence suggests that the standard 
has had a favourable effect on the reliability of goodwill amounts and their impairment 
losses. They also examined whether the association between goodwill-impairments and 
stock returns may differ, in terms of its strength, among firms with high and low number of 
segments9. The results revealed that in the post-adoption period, this association was 
stronger for firms with a high number of segments as compared to their counterparts. These 
results led the authors to conclude that “the larger the number of segments, the less likely it 
is that increases in goodwill values in one business unit will offset goodwill-impairments in 
                                                          
9 It would make more sense if the comparison were made between firms with one reporting unit and firms with 
more than one reporting unit because under US GAAP goodwill is tested for impairment at the reporting unit 
level, which is not necessarily an operating segment. It might be an operating segment or one level below an 
operating segment. Thus, an operating segment could be larger than a reporting unit is and thereby have more 
than one reporting unit. However, since data on the number of reporting units are not directly available, 
researchers instead appear to use the number of business/geographic segments.  
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other business units thereby avoiding recognition of the impairment” (Ahmed and Guler, 
2007, p. 11).  
 
In fact, the opposite is equally possible. That is, firms with multiple reporting units have the 
potential, particularly in the impairment field, to use their accounting discretion 
opportunistically either by allocating the whole or any part of the goodwill  to the usually 
well-performing units and thereby avoid, or at least minimise, the recognition of impairment 
losses; or by allocating the whole or any part of the goodwill to the poorly-performing units 
so as to take a big bath or smooth reported earnings over time (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; 
Shamrock, 2012).  
 
This view is also clearly supported by the results of Bens et al. (2011), who found that the 
market reacted differently to goodwill write-offs depending on firms’ characteristics (such 
as analyst following, firm size, and number of firm segments) that are likely to affect their 
ability to implement the impairment test and consequently impact the association between 
returns and goodwill write-offs. The results show that, on average, stock market returns were 
significantly (and negatively) associated with the unexpected impairment charges. However, 
their results also demonstrate that the impairments/returns association becomes less 
significant for firms with low information asymmetries (i.e., those with high analyst 
following and high institutional ownership), small-sized firms, and multi-segment firms. The 
overall results suggest a significant decline in the information content of goodwill-
impairments, despite an increased value-relevance of those impairments, which rather came 
at the expense of their reliability. 
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These findings are consistent with critics’ contention that fair value, as a basis for 
impairment valuation in goodwill, requires assumptions that cannot be objectively verified 
or falsified by an external party, and thereby making it harder to implement the impairment 
test reliably, but at the same time easier for managers to manipulate. This, in turn, is likely 
to make the outcomes of the impairment test even less informative to investors than they 
should be. Consistent with view, Watts (2003) wrote, “Assessing impairment requires 
valuation of future cash flows. Because those future cash flows are unlikely to be verifiable 
and contractible, they, and valuation based on them, are likely to be manipulated” (p. 22). 
  
On the contrary, using a sample of firms reporting goodwill-impairments at year-end 2001, 
Chen et al. (2008) carried out their research, and found evidence that goodwill-impairments 
recognised in 2001 primarily provided new information to the market in 2002, although they 
were partially impounded in market prices in the prior year. This led the authors to conclude 
that the application of the impairment model should still be able to provide relevant 
information to the market, if investors were either partially or totally unaware of the 
impairment loss, or their assessments were significantly different from the amount 
recognised. On the other hand, the authors suggest that managers’ response and their 
interventions in implementing the accounting standards remain the Achilles’s heel of the 
impairment model, because managers are more inclined to abuse their discretion allowed by 
the impairment standards to delay (or accelerate) the recognition of goodwill-impairments 
to avoid possible negative consequences in a future period. This, in turn, will result in a 
failure to report or disclose goodwill-impairment losses in a timely fashion, and thereby 
offsetting the potential benefits that would be realised, if the impairment test was applied in 
a manner consistent with the impairment framework. 
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Using a sample of firms reporting goodwill-impairment charges during the period 2002-
2005, Jarva (2009) examined whether SFAS 142 had enhanced or weakened the ability of 
goodwill write-offs to predict future cash flows. He found that goodwill-impairment losses 
appear to be more directly related to future cash flows following the adoption of SAFA 142, 
and their predictive power to make forecasts of cash flows remains statistically significant 
for one and two years ahead (0.206 and 0.188 respectively). Jarva also analysed the 
impairment avoidance motives by investigating a sample of firms that decided not to impair 
their goodwill when there is an indication for impairment, labelling them as “the dog that 
did not bark.”10Jarva, however, failed to find compelling evidence that managers 
opportunistically avoid recognising impairment losses, meaning that goodwill-impairment 
amounts are more closely linked to economic indicants than opportunistic behaviour (e.g. 
agency-based incentives). 
 
Similarly, Hamberg and Beisland (2009) investigated the effects that the impairment-only 
approach has had on the ability of accounting information to explain the level of and the 
change in market values of returns, by using a sample of Swedish companies trading on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) during the period 2001-2007. Their empirical results 
reaffirmed the conclusion reached by the IASB that “straight-line amortisation of goodwill 
over an arbitrary period fails to provide useful information”. The authors, also, compared 
                                                          
10 In reference to one of the most popular Sherlock Holmes short stories “Silver Blaze”, written by the British 
author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Scotland Yard’s Inspector Gregory ask Sherlock Holmes “Is there any other 
point to which you would wish to draw my attention?” Holmes replies, “To the curious incident of the dog in 
the night-time”. Gregory says, “The dog did nothing in the night-time.” Holmes says, “That was the curious 
incident.” In the case of goodwill, the absence of goodwill-impairment losses, when they are expected (i.e. 
goodwill non-impairments), provides strong evidence that “companies have strong incentives to manipulate 




the value-relevance of impairment losses before and after the switch from Swedish GAAP 
to IFRS, and found that the coefficient on goodwill-impairments reported in the IFRS period 
is small and statistically insignificant (t-stat: 1.46) compared to those reported in the Swedish 
GAAP period (t-stat: 7.65). The results also revealed that goodwill-impairments under 
Swedish GAAP have an incremental value-relevance of 4.31% relative to those reported 
under IFRS (only 0.23%). These findings shed light on the question of whether changes in 
accounting for goodwill (as suggested by IFRS 3 and SFAS 142) were justified, or turned 
out to be a one-eyed solution to the amortisation approach that has been so often proved to 
be irrelevant to investors or has little value-relevance. Consistent with this view, Schultze 
(2005) argued that goodwill-impairment losses will not only occur as a result of a 
deterioration of the firm’s economic performance, but also will occur due to several reasons 
even if they are not economically viable. It is the “consequence of an only half-hearted 
implementation of full-fair-value accounting” (p. 295). For example, the prohibition on the 
reversal of impairment losses for goodwill creates misleading accounting and “leads to an 
impairment loss with no economically sensible meaning” (p. 292). 
 
Notwithstanding the above, many authors were tempted to jump to the conclusion that the 
impairment standard is net beneficial in the sense of providing managers with an unbiased 
framework to credibly convey their private information and expectations to existing 
shareholders with regard to their firms’ future prospects and growth opportunities, resulting 
in impairment losses that faithfully represent the economic decline in the current value of 
goodwill. They base this conclusion on their interpretation of finding negative correlations 
between goodwill-impairments and firms’ economic performance as evidence of the net 
benefits or the effectiveness of the impairment standard (Ramanna, 2008).  
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Ramanna (2008) has strongly criticised the feasibility of their interpretation given to findings 
and the validity of their conclusions drawn from them in two regards. The first is that these 
studies primarily focused on the recorded impairments in explaining the determinants of 
goodwill-impairment decisions, whereas firms avoiding impairments were utterly ignored. 
Ramanna argued that “without an investigation of the extent and causes of impairment 
avoidance, it is difficult to make conclusions on the net benefits of SFAS 142” (p. 255). The 
second criticism is that their findings or, at least, some of their findings, can be subject to 
alternative explanations. Such as, goodwill-impairment losses are used as a managerial 
strategy to take a big bath now or from time to time, thereby getting rid of all the bad news 
in one go, and avoiding taking little showers in the future. Due to the difficulties inherent in 
splitting up goodwill-impairment losses into discretionary and non-discretionary elements, 
finding any statistically significant relationship between goodwill-impairment amounts and 
share price performance is not necessarily evidence of an increase in the value-relevance or 
information content of reported losses.11Kvaal (2005) asserts that “the distinction between 
biased and unbiased impairment accounting is inextricably connected with value-relevance” 
(p. 54). Alternatively, the recognition of goodwill-impairments may also be explained with 
reference to management’s inability to avoid reporting losses despite the significance of 
discretion potential under SFAS 142.  
 
 Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2009) studied the value-relevance and timeliness of TGIL as 
reported by Canadian firms, and found evidence that reported losses were negatively (and 
                                                          
11 Finding a weak association between firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their underlying economics is 
not necessarily an evidence of managerial opportunism, it may be attributed to the higher frequency and lower 
average amounts of goodwill-impairments reported after the standard was adopted (Riedl, 2004). However, 
this claim is not necessarily true, because a higher frequency of small impairment losses could be indicative of 
low-quality reporting of goodwill-impairments.  
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significantly) associated with their share prices. This result is useful because it indicates that 
even though fair value estimates are subject to measurement error and/or managerial 
discretion, computation of goodwill-impairment losses, which are based on fair value, are 
often viewed by investors as being sufficiently reliable measures of goodwill depletion. This 
supports the notion that “reliability is about faithful representation, not precision” (pp. 59).  
 
Using a pooled sample of 528 firm-year observations over the period 2005-2006, 
AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) also studied the relationship between UK companies’ goodwill-
impairment charges and their market value of equity. Their results showed that the amounts 
of goodwill-impairment losses are significantly negatively associated with the market value, 
implying that investors perceived these impairments losses as relevant to their firm 
valuation. Overall, the results suggest the quality of information on goodwill and its 
impairment has been greatly enhanced after the introduction of IFRS 3, by allowing 
managers to reliably convey their private information about the expected cash flows of their 
firms (i.e., consistent with signalling hypothesis). 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the literature concerning studies on the 
determinants of goodwill-impairment amounts as well as the value relevance of these 
impairment losses. For the purpose of this study, prior studies are classified into two groups; 
studies which examined goodwill impairment losses in single country (single-country 
studies), and studies which examined goodwill impairment across a number of countries 
(multiple-country studies). The review also includes studies that examined the determinants 
of write-offs of other intangibles and long-lived assets. The chapter finally discussed studies 
examining the association between market values and goodwill-impairment amounts, as well 
as studies examining the market reaction to the announcement of impairment losses.  
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3 Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the main theoretical approaches in studies on the determinants of 
goodwill-impairment charges so as to sketch out a complete picture of the conceptual model 
that will adequately explain the pattern of relationships (inter-relationship) among goodwill-
impairment losses and variables capturing firm-and country-specific characteristics. The 
chapter, then, considers the positivistic theoretical perspective(s), which have been used to 
interpret the management’s goodwill reporting choices. The chapter continues to address the 
theoretical debates in a broad perspective, rather than a narrow view, which is critical to 
properly explain national/international differences in goodwill-impairment. The chapter, 
finally, proposes a theoretical model, which takes into consideration the influence of both 
internal and external factors on goodwill-impairment amounts. 
   
3.2 The Choice of Theoretical Perspective 
  According to Hoque (2006), “a major problem confronting a researcher… is which 
theoretical perspective is most apt” (p. 1). This is no doubt true, particularly in IAR, where 
accounting researchers hold worldviews that constitute an interdisciplinary perspective on 
the theory and the practice of accounting (Ryan et al., 2002).  
 
Furthermore, firms’ accounting and reporting practices remain locally-oriented and are 
likely to reflect the cultural, legal, political, and economic conditions under which firms 
operate. This has led many highly prolific accounting scholars (Zeff, 1971; Wallace, 1987; 
Choi and Mueller, 1992; Gernon and Wallace, 1995; Ball, 2006; Pope and McLeay, 2011; 
Sunder, 2011; Wysocki, 2011) to believe that IAR requires an interaction between different 
theories or different levels of theories (micro/macro), which do not contradict, but rather 
complement each other. This indicates that cross-country studies are likely to be more 
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difficult and complicated than those conducted at the national level. As Gernon and Wallace 
(1995) explain: “seldom was there an effort to draw linkages between theories examined in 
one era and those examined in another, or to find out whether partial theories could be fitted 
together into a large, coherent whole” (p. 55).  
 
In addition to these two primary reasons, the lack of a universally-accepted and agreed-upon 
comprehensive theory (or even a conceptual framework) that can correctly explain why 
expected behaviour in accounting in similar circumstances may be different or why actual 
behaviour in accounting in apparently different circumstances may be similar was another 
reason for difficulty in selecting an appropriate theoretical perspective in the field of 
international accounting (Nobes, 1998; Wallace and Gernon, 1991; Pope and McLeay, 2011;  
Wysocki, 2011). Deegan and Unerman (2011) state, “At present there is no single clear 
theory that explains international differences in accounting practices” (p. 98). As Choi and 
Mueller (1992) state, “Each individual academic and each individual practitioner has his or 
her own individually formulated accounting theory to work with” (p. 29). 
 
This, however, does not only apply to accounting theories at the international level, but also 
applies to any theories of financial accounting on any level. In that regard, Riahi-Belkaoui 
(2004) states “No comprehensive theory of accounting exists at present. Instead, different 
theories have been and continue to be proposed in the literature” (p. 108). In fact, the theory, 
as it currently exists, is far from complete, and this is expected because the world is 
extremely complex, interrelated and constantly changing. “Complexity and change ensure 
that we will never have a complete theory of accounting” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
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It must always be born in mind, however, that all theories of financial accounting, without 
exception, have limitations. This is, in part, because theories are by nature abstractions of 
the real world, and accounting is a human subject. Thus, one cannot really expect that all 
people will act or react in a similar manner. In this respect, Deegan and Unerman (2011) 
wrote, “So far no accounting theory has ever been successful in overthrowing all other 
alternatives” (p. 15). Therefore, it has been suggested that different theories of accounting 
are likely to provide a fuller and more rebounded perspective. This, in turn, will help us to 
better understand particular accounting-related phenomena. Difficulties arise, however, 
when two or more of these theories present diametrically opposite explanations/predictions 
(Deegan and Unerman, 2011). In such a case, a choice of theory must be made. However, 
the preference of one theory (or perspective) over the other depends in part on a researcher’s 
value judgement and philosophical assumptions. In this sense, all research is value-laden.  
 
3.3 Philosophical and Theoretical Perspective 
Almost without exception, the prior literature on goodwill-impairment has adopted 
positivistic philosophical/theoretical perspective and methodology. Researchers formulate 
their research question(s) and develop their theoretical model(s), which specify the 
hypotheses to be tested. The individual hypotheses were mainly derived from the 
accumulated body of prior literature (e.g. prior empirical work) and other theoretical 
considerations (e.g. theory). Researchers who adopt a purely positivistic approach usually 
rely on arm’s length research methods, e.g. quantitative methods that fully dominate the 
mainstream of goodwill-impairment literature.  
 
On the basis of the critically reviewed literature and bearing in mind that it is not the 
researcher’s primary interest to pass judgement on what constitutes an appropriate practice 
of goodwill-impairment testing, the positivistic approach is adopted to provide a theoretical 
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framework and some empirical evidence, which may be of use in the interpretation of 
management’s goodwill reporting choices.  
 
3.4 Theories of International/Financial Accounting 
Most goodwill-impairment studies relate differences in goodwill-impairment practices 
specifically to micro factors, such as firm- and industry- level variables, without regard to 
the environmental conditions to which all firms in a particular country would be subject, and 
which vary from one country to another (also referred to as the de-institutionalisation of 
accounting processes). Therefore, these studies can only be said to provide a partial 
explanation of the practice of goodwill-impairment, and are often criticised for being inept 
for explaining accounting differences. This may help to explain the inconsistency of results 
for the same variables in different studies and/or settings. Furthermore, the studies relied 
heavily on micro-level theories, particularly Agency Theory (AT) and Watts and 
Zimmerman’s Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), and thereby fail to offer an explanation 
of differences in accounting practices at the international level.  
 
This helps to explain why scholars in the field of international accounting have been more 
reluctant to use such theories as a theoretical lens to explain international accounting 
differences (Hoque, 2006); and why the majority of goodwill-impairment studies deviate 
from cross-country comparison and narrowly focus on one single domestic context/country 
by picking up only firms operating in the same country. Nevertheless, influential efforts have 
been made in recent years (Van de Poel et al., 2009; Amiraslani et al., 2013; Glaum et al., 
2013) to embed the process of making goodwill-impairment decision and reporting within 
its cultural and institutional context (i.e., context-specific), suggesting that goodwill-
impairment losses are primarily associated with the specific environment of an enterprise 
and/or firm- and industry-specific characteristics. 
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Over the last decades, the globalisation and development of financial markets has made 
accounting standards and practices increasingly international in orientation (Ryan et al., 
2002). IAR has focused upon comparative country studies, whose purpose was to explain 
the worldwide diversity or disparities in accounting practices in terms of 
contextual/institutional factors such as culture, economic development, and legal and 
political systems. IAR has predominantly relied on macro-level theories (i.e., the 
institutionalisation of accounting processes) without taking into consideration the effects that 
individual characteristics (such as firm size, ownership and governance structure of the firm, 
etc.) may have on the financial reporting of the firm, and has therefore been seriously 
questioned in recent years. It has been argued that future research should aim to consider 
both micro and macro arguments for the same framework rather than over-emphasise on just 
one element (Hoque, 2006). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, this requires the development of a meso12-level framework, 
or a multidimensional framework which bridges the gap between the micro and macro levels 
of theories, and thus provides depth and more comprehensive theoretical basis for 
understanding the interaction between accounting and the environment in which it operates.  
 
3.5 Micro-level Theories used in Goodwill Write-Off Studies 
AT provides a rich theoretical premise13for understanding the relationship arising when one 
party (the principal) appoints another one (the agent) and delegates the authority to make 
decisions on the principal’s behalf to perform a task. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined 
                                                          
12 A meso-level theoretical framework is one that links macro- and micro-level theories (Creswell, 2009). 
13 AT has been attractive to accounting researchers because it allows them “to explicitly incorporate conflicts 
of interest, incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive problems into [their] models 
(Lambert, 2001, p. 4). 
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an agency relationship as “contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision-making authority to the agent” (p. 308). 
 
 A commonly conceptualised agency relationship is between the owners of the firm, i.e., 
shareholders/debtholders (the principals) and managers (the agents). The efficiency of the 
principal-agent relationship is affected by individualistic and opportunistic interests held by 
each party. Agents, however, may not always act in the best interests of the principals, who 
may elect to monitor agents’ actions and offer incentives through contracts (e.g. salaries), 
which help align the individual interests of principals (e.g. to maximise firm value) with the 
agents’ interests. Therefore, two potential conflicts of interests are likely to arise between 
shareholders and managers from one side, and managers and debtholders from the other side.  
These conflicts give rise to agency costs, such as monitoring cost, bonding cost, and residual 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 
In theory, goodwill is deemed to have been impaired when its carrying amount falls 
materially below its recoverable amount (IAS 36, 2008, Para 90). The difference between 
the carrying amount of goodwill and its recoverable amount is recognised as an impairment 
loss (IAS 36, 2008, Para 104). However, in practice, the implementation of the impairment 
standard requires highly subjective estimates and assumptions, allowing firms managers to 
more easily justify their accounting choices as to whether or not to take any goodwill-
impairments that will affect net income directly. As Riedl (2004) states, “Explicit and/or 
implicit incentives may exist for managers to manipulate write-off amounts” (p. 824). An 
accounting choice is defined as “any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (either 
in form or substance) the output of the accounting system” (Fields et al., 2001, p. 256). 
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However, the accounting choices related to goodwill-impairments are hardly observable or 
not observable at all and are usually referred to as covert options (Nobes, 2006), which only 
exist under the surface of superficial uniformity of accounting standards. Under the 
impairment standard’s subjective criteria, there will always be sufficient room for the 
exercise of professional judgement, a judgement that partly depends on the environment of 
financial statement preparers, allowing them a certain degree of discretion and flexibility to 
determine whether, when, and how much to impair. 
 
Managers will, therefore, make selective choices when testing goodwill for impairment, if 
they have explicit (via contractual agreement) or implicit incentives to do so. For example, 
when performing the impairment test of goodwill, managers can be selective in the discount 
rates employed to estimate the recoverable amount of CGU(s). Managers could also decide 
to allocate goodwill to well-performing CGUs and thus report zero goodwill-impairment to 
circumvent debt covenant violation. Thus, the amount (and timing) of goodwill-impairment 
recognition is still subject to the discretion of the management, who still has an impact on 
the decision of goodwill-impairments. As Elliott and Shaw (1988) assert that the write-offs 
of assets “differ from most financial statement information because of greater discretion as 
to their magnitude and timing” (p. 92). 
 
Managers, who are agents of shareholders, may take advantage of the discretion contained 
in the impairment standard to manipulate earnings either by not recognising an impairment 
loss when it occurs, or by recognising it only when it is advantageous to do so (opportunistic 
perspective). That is, managers are likely to mask their private control benefits, non-value 
added/maximising activities from outsiders and thereby reduce outside intervention by 
managing the amount, timing, magnitude, and variability of goodwill-impairment losses 
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reported. An ample number of empirical studies (Riedl, 2004; Beatty and Weber, 2006; 
Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Zang, 2008; Ramanna et al., 2009) have found evidence that 
agency-based incentives, such as big bath and earnings smoothing, lower the association 
between goodwill-impairments and firms’ underlying economic attributes. These results, 
therefore, suggest, or at least imply that the impairment test of goodwill is often used as 
means to manipulate reported earnings by either avoiding, or at least minimising the 
recognition of impairment losses when goodwill actually becomes impaired, or by recording 
goodwill-impairments only when it is beneficial and suitable for the company management 
to do so.  
 
An alternative view is that managers may use their accounting discretion in an efficient 
manner that reflects the economic decline in the value of goodwill resulting from poor past 
firm performance, or change in firm performance, and declining industry trends (efficiency 
perspective). Another rationale for accounting choice is the information perspective, 
postulating that managers exercise their accounting discretion to impart their private 
information on the firm’s expected (future) cash flows (Holthausen, 1990). That is, managers 
will avoid opportunism and use their discretion in an attempt to make accounting numbers 
more informative to all users. The difference between the two previously mentioned 
perspectives and the information perspective is that the first two perspectives (either 
opportunism or efficiency) affect the firm’s cash flows, while the information perspective 
only provide information on the firm’s operating cash flows, without having a direct effect 
on them (Holthausen, 1990).  
 
The latitude allowed by the impairment standard enables managers to exercise their 
discretion when performing the impairment test of goodwill. Whether managers 
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systematically use their accounting discretion either opportunistically (i.e., to make them 
better-off at the expense of some other contracting parties) or efficiently (i.e., to reflect the 
firm’s underlying economic attributes) alludes to one of the long-standing questions at the 
heart of positive accounting research.  
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986 and 1990)14 proposed three main hypotheses that explain or 
predict managers’ choices of accounting practices.  
i) The bonus hypothesis, which proposes that if managers of companies are paid a 
bonus based on net income, they will be more likely to select accounting methods 
that maximise their bonus payments;  
 
ii) The debt hypothesis, which proposes that companies close to violating their debt 
covenants will probably select accounting methods that lead to an increase in the 
current year’s earnings. Researchers have found that the higher a company’s debt-
to-equity ratio, the more likely it is to adopt income-increasing methods, and thereby 
avoid violation of debt covenants; and  
 
 
                                                          
14 Since its general inception in the 1970s, PAT has not shown significant development.  As Deegan and 
Unerman, (2011) state, “Since the early days of Watts and Zimmerman, there have been three key hypotheses. 
A review of the recent literature indicates that these hypotheses continue to be tested in different environments 
and in relation to different accounting policy issues, even after passing of over 30 years”. Sterling (1990) 
similarly posed the following question: “What are the potential accomplishments? I forecast more of the same: 
twenty years from now we will have been inundated with research reports that managers and others tend to 
manipulate accounting numerals when it is to their advantage to do so” (p. 130). In commenting on the lack of 
development of Watts and Zimmerman’s PAT, Fields et al. (2001) state, “Fundamentally, we believe it is 
necessary to step back from the current research agenda, and to develop the infrastructure surrounding the field. 
In a sense, the accounting choice field has been a victim of its own perceived success, and has outrun the 
development of theories, statistical techniques and research design that are necessary to support it. We therefore 
are calling for a return to work in these basic areas, before the field is able to advance further” (p. 301). 
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iii)  The political cost hypothesis, 15which proposes that companies subject to political 
scrutiny will be more likely to adopt income-decreasing methods. Researchers have 
found that larger firms will adopt accounting methods that reduce accounting 
income. 
 
In order to explain managers’ choice of a particular accounting method, positivist researchers 
often utilise either the efficiency or the opportunistic perspective of PAT. More specifically, 
early empirical accounting choice studies that examined the agency costs associated with the 
above three hypotheses typically adopt the opportunistic perspective, which implies that 
when selecting particular accounting methods, managers will act in an opportunistic way to 
maximise their self-serving utility, even at the expense of the other party. For example, when 
firm managers select particular accounting method(s), it is because the choice will increase 
reported earnings, and consequently increase their bonus payments. However, subsequent 
positive accounting research has focused on the efficiency perspective, which implies that 
managers may select a particular accounting method because the method will best reflect the 
economic reality of the underlying transactions (i.e., the efficiency perspective), rather than 
because it will lead to an increase in their bonus. The selection of different accounting 
methods by different firms is, therefore, justifiable and seems to be the consequence of 
different firm-specific characteristics (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). For instance, the choice 
                                                          
15 The hypothesised relationship between management’s choice of particular accounting methods and their 
relative income effects does not necessarily hold for the reasons Watts and Zimmerman’s PAT suggests. For 
instance, the influence of size may be explained by other reasons than are given in PAT. Watts and Zimmerman 
(1990) argue that, in an attempt to avoid political costs, managers of large companies have greater incentives 
to reduce earnings figures by selecting an income-decreasing accounting method. In contrast, managers of large 
firms are less likely to manipulate reported income, since large firms are exposed to greater attention from the 
public than the smaller ones and, therefore, are exposed to greater pressure from shareholders and market 
analysts for increased quality of disclosure (Glaum et al., 2013, Amiraslani et al., 2013). This indicates that 
PAT explanations are, at best, incomplete. 
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of a particular method of asset depreciation is often explained on the basis that the method 
most correctly reflects the underlying use of the asset, indicating that firms with different 
patterns of asset use will adopt different depreciation or amortisation methods/policies. 
 
In practice, however, two notable problems have arisen. The first problem is referred to as 
the multiple accounting choices problem, which is observed when positivist researchers only 
consider individual accounting choices while they are studying whether a given firm adopts 
a particular accounting method, although, at the same time, the firm may also adopt another 
unsearched accounting method, which may have even opposing effects.16Therefore, 
“considering one accounting method choice from the portfolio of all the accounting choices 
being made within the firm provides an incomplete picture” (Deegan and Unerman, 2011, 
p. 306). Fields et al. (2001) similarly document that “managers may make multiple 
accounting method choices to accomplish a specific goal...examining only one choice at a 
time may obscure the overall effect obtained through a portfolio of choices” (p. 288).  
 
The second problem is the issue of “multiple, and potentially conflicting, motivations for the 
accounting choices”. As Fields et al. (2001, pp. 290-291) explain: 
 “Most of the work … focuses on a single motive for accounting choice decisions...By focusing on one 
goal at a time, much of the literature misses the more interesting question of the interactions between 
and trade-offs among goals…For example, what may appear to be an opportunistic choice of an earnings 
increasing accounting method choice…may be in fact a response to avoid a bond covenant violation)”. 
 
In reality, the right choice is not always discernible. It has proven extremely difficult to 
firmly conclude that the accounting choices exercised by managers are driven solely by 
                                                          
16 As Deegan and Unerman (2011) explain, “Reported profits are affected by many different accounting 
choices, some of which may be income increasing while others are income decreasing (thereby potentially 
offsetting each other).” 
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opportunistic or efficiency perspective (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). For instance, 
managers may choose accounting methods that lead to an increase in the stock price before 
expiration to make exercising the stock options they hold profitable. The choice of the same 
accounting method may, however, be influenced by the objective evaluation by managers 
that the firm’s current stock price is undervalued. It would, therefore, remain difficult in 
practice “to distinguish between these two situations, but it is the presence of such mixed 
motives that makes the study of accounting choice interesting” (Fields et al., 2001, p. 259). 
This is particularly true because the above two (or three) explanations for accounting choices 
are overlapping and not mutually exclusive (all may be partial explanation of the observed 
accounting choices).  
 
Many of the empirical regularities, which had been interpreted/predicted on the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers, could have also been interpreted/predicted as occurring for 
efficiency reasons (Holthausen, 1990). In critique of prior studies on earnings management, 
Fields et al. (2001) raised the question of “whether earnings management is opportunistic or 
based on performance measurement”, and suggested that “this is a difficult distinction and 
is likely to be time varying and unlikely to be mutually exclusive” (p. 289). Christie and 
Zimmerman (1994) similarly argued that dichotomizing accounting choices into 
opportunism or efficiency is unlikely to be the right categorisation, because neither 
opportunism nor efficiency is likely to explain the variation -on average- in choice across 
industries and through time. They proposed that,   
“It appears unlikely that either efficiency or opportunism separately is able to explain the rich panorama 
of observed accounting choices. Future studies should adopt research strategies that incorporate both 
opportunistic and efficiency rationales to explain accounting method choices” (p. 27). 
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Whether the opportunism or efficiency motivations dominate – on average- managers’ 
choices of particular accounting methods, one should control for the economic determinants 
of accounting discretion, such as growth opportunities/potential (e.g. sales growth) and 
measures of firm performance. Bowen et al. (2008) wrote, “In equilibrium, a well-specified 
set of economic determinants should adequately describe observed opportunism in 
accounting discretion if opportunism is expected by the contracting parties and contracted 
upon” (p. 352).  In the context of asset write-offs, “the credibility of a manipulation study’s 
research findings depends on the extent to which the experimental design controls for such 
economic factors” (Wilson, 1996, p. 172). Similarly, Jarva documents “It is well known that 
accounting amounts result from the interactions among various features of the financial 
reporting system (e.g., accounting standards, enforcement, and litigation)” (2009, p. 1083).   
 
Another related issue concerns the relative importance/influence of efficiency and 
opportunism depends on control mechanisms (or interactions among different control 
mechanisms) by which self-interested managers are monitored, motivated and disciplined to 
act in the best shareholders’ interests (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994). Such control 
mechanisms include both internal mechanisms (i.e., firm-level corporate governance), such 
as monitoring by the board of directors, and external mechanisms (i.e., country-level 
corporate governance), such as investor protection and securities laws that protect outside 
investors against expropriation by the insiders (Bushman and Smith, 2001).  
 
Nonetheless, internal corporate governance mechanisms that can reduce the agency conflicts 
between management and shareholders, are costly, and therefore are less effective and 
limited in their ability to control the opportunism and self-serving activities (Christie and 
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Zimmerman, 1994), “In these circumstances, it is not surprising that external means of 
coercion…can come to play a role”17 (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988, p. 11).  
 
In addition to being more effective in constraining managers’ self-serving actions, Fields et 
al. (2001, pp. 295-297) stipulated that since “researchers cannot undo the choices that have 
been made and examine the firm in a controlled environment”, researchers should take into 
their consideration the “environment in which accounting choices are made”.  
 
Fields et al. (2001) finally concluded that:  
“Academic accounting research must ultimately address the fundamental questions of whether, under 
what circumstances, and how accounting choice matters. These questions are difficult because of the 
complexity of the environment in which accounting choices are made. There may be many (difficult to 
observe and measure) effects and motivations surrounding each choice” (p. 301). 
 
The same conclusion had been reached many years ago by Thomas (1986, 1988, and 1991), 
who demonstrated that the choice of disclosure and measurement practices is related to 
particular differences in circumstances or what he refers to as circumstantial variables, which 
have hardly been considered at a theoretical level, let alone tested. The term, circumstantial 
variables, was coined by Cadenhead (1970) to replace the phrase differences in 
circumstances with an easier and less cumbersome one.  
 
                                                          
17 For example, the World Bank have been critical of the uneven auditing standards used by the Big Five 
accounting firms between developed and developing economies and have blamed the lax auditing standards in 
some of the Asian countries for part of the crisis in 1998. Countries with relatively strong accounting (high 
quality of financial disclosure) and capital market enforcement regimes (such as Hong Kong and Singapore) 
were relatively unscathed by the financial crisis while countries with weaker accounting and enforcement 
regimes (such as Indonesia and Thailand) saw significant negative impact on their economies (Saudagaran and 
Diga, 1999). 
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In other words, accounting choices are situational or situation-specific, depending on the 
unique characteristics of each circumstance. Therefore, the selection of the most appropriate 
practice(s) for an enterprise can be explained by the variation in the response to the unique 
situation being faced. As Thomas (1986) explains, “Management’s choice of reporting 
practices are contingent upon the differing constraints on entities” (p. 254).18He further 
argues that such constraints can be conceptualised in terms of the environment of the 
enterprise, and its organisational attributes. This strongly suggests that the nature of the 
contingent factors, which are likely to affect management’s choices of accounting practices, 
can be classified into two types namely: internal and external. 
 
According to Thompson (2011, pp. 68), 19“organisations find their environmental constraints 
located in geographic space or in the social composition of their task environments,” that is, 
whether organisations face a relatively homogenous or heterogeneous environment. There 
are thus two perspectives (physical/ locational and social), which have been brought to bear 
on the conceptualisation of the environmental variables that are likely to influence 
accounting and reporting decisions. Similarly, Moll and Hoque (2006) argued that 
management’s choice(s) of accounting practices are often made in response to the multiple 
                                                          
18 This is consistent with Douglass North, a well-respected economist in the area of institutional research, which 
defines institution as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, 
social, or economic. …In the jargon of the economist, institutions define and limit the set of choices of 
individuals” (North, 1990, p. 3). This definition focuses specifically on the role of institutions in monitoring 
and restricting the ability of individuals, who have incentives to tilt these rules to their own benefit, to engage 
in opportunistic practices. North understood institutions as the rules of sport, which define the way the game 
is played, and organisations as the players whose objective is to win the game by fair means and sometimes by 
foul means. This critically depends on how well these rules are enforced and how severe the punishment will 
be when the rules are violated.   
19 Originally published in 1967.   
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(and sometimes contradictory)20 institutional pressures, implying that “organisations are not 
passive recipients of the choices of its members or of institutional rules” (p. 14). 
Furthermore, Elliott and Elliott (2008) asserted that the company’s financial reporting 
practices did not evolve in an environmental vacuum. They are dynamic responses to 
changing micro- and macro- conditions, which may involve political, social, and economic 
conditions under which the company is permitted to operate.  
 
Many accounting scholars have also supported this view, who quite consistently argued that 
different national environments significantly influence the way accounting is regulated and 
practised, strongly suggesting that accounting does not exist in a vacuum or operates in 
isolation; it is rather a direct product of circumstances and influences of its national 
environment in which it operates. Mueller (1968) was one of the first to explain why 
accounting must respond to changes in environment to survive: 
“In society, accounting performs a service function. This function is put in jeopardy unless accounting 
remains, above all, practically useful. Thus, it must respond to the ever-changing needs of society and 
must reflect the social, political, legal and economic conditions within which it operates. Its 
meaningfulness depends on its ability to mirror these conditions” (p. 95). 
 
Frank (1979, p. 593) documented that 
“If environmental factors play an important role in the development of accounting concepts and 
practices, and if these environmental factors differ significantly between countries, then it would be 
expected that the accounting concepts and practices in use in various countries also differ.”  
 
In a similar vein, Choi and Mueller (1992, p. 22) argued that  
“If we accept the proposition that the environments in which accounting operates are not the same in 
different countries or even in different organizations, it stands to reason that accounting must necessarily 
differ from case to case” 
                                                          
20 Given the multiple and sometimes contradictory institutional pressures that organisations face, “they will 
frequently need to be selective in their response to the wider institutional environment” (Moll and Hoque, 2006, 
p. 190). 
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In addition, Gernon and Wallace (1995) state,  
“The technical and social aspects of accounting are Siamese twins21, intricately linked but separated by 
default… Accounting is not a neutral, but a partisan…The commitment of the new genre has been to 
eke out theoretical arguments and report on empirical studies by embedding accounting in its 
organisational and social contexts” (pp. 59-76).  
 
This leads the way to a wave of research aimed at studying the social nature of accounting, 
and especially what role financial accounting/reporting can play in its social, political, and 
economic contexts (Ryan et al., 2002).  
 
A review of the literature on international accounting shows that international accounting 
research (IAR) most commonly takes the form of either (many of these studies are discussed 
in detail below): 
(i) grouping countries on the basis of the similarities/differences either in terms of their 
accounting standards/reporting practices, or in terms of their institutional/cultural 
characteristics (e.g. Mueller, 1968; Frank, 1979; Nair and Frank, 1980; Nobes, 1983; 
Gray, 1988; Doupnik and Salter, 1993, and 1995; Nobes, 1998; Ball et al., 2000; 
D'Arcy, 2001; Leuz et al., 2003; Leuz, 2010).  
 
(ii) Or testing for differences in certain accounting and reporting practices between 
firms located in different jurisdictions (e.g. Ali and Hwang, 2000; Guenther and 
Young, 2000; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hung, 2001; Bushman et al., 2004; Burgstahler 
et al., 2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Lang et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009). 
 
                                                          
21 By the same token, “accounting corruption is likely to accompany socio-political corruption” (Houqe et al., 
2012, p. 8).  
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 In both cases, the goal was to provide a complete (or compatible) explanation for 
international accounting differences, and their results were attributed to particular 
differences in circumstantial variables. Little attention has, however, been devoted to 
conceptualizing these potential differences in circumstances. To put it differently, there has 
been no systematic method to determine either empirically or conceptually what constitutes 
a significant difference in circumstances, although several attempts had been made to 
identify the environmental factors that would probably affect the actual reporting and 
disclosure practices. This, however, has been dealt with on an ad hoc basis (Thomas, 1988). 
 
This, along with the idiosyncratic nature of the conceptualisation process, makes it difficult 
to identify these circumstances and environmental influences/constraints. In this respect, 
Schweikart (1985) asserted that “the difficult task is to identify those salient22environmental 
variables which can be expected to affect the decision situation and, accordingly, the 
information needs of the decision maker” (p. 92). At that time, Schweikart observed that 
there had been little empirical work to explain accounting differences in different parts of 
the world, but there was “no formal statement of theory on which to base empirical research” 
(p. 90). In a similar vein, Gray (1983), cited in Wallace and Gernon, (1991, p. 291) 
emphasised that “a major difficulty of this type of work is the necessity to develop a 
comparative framework by which similarities and differences may be evaluated and 
explanatory variables identified and generalizations developed” (1983, p. 40). Recently, 
Perera and Baydoun (2007) argued that the association between accounting and its 
environmental is not addressed in a systematic way, suggesting that very few studies have 
attempted to develop a theoretical framework that provides a detailed and systematic 
                                                          
22 The purpose is to explain accounting choices simply in terms of a few selected variables, without attempting 
to understand the totality of the local context. 
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explanation of why particular patterns of accounting and reporting practices arise in a 
particular country. A large number of contingent factors is available, stemming either from 
empirical work or from theoretical speculation (Otley, 1980). 
 
Radebaugh (1975) was one of the first to provide a detailed description of the environmental 
variables likely to affect the development of accounting/disclosure practices in developing 
countries. Nobes (1998) reviewed the literature and confirmed that multiple theoretical 
models have been proposed in order to identify and classify the reasons for accounting 
differences at the international level. As Nobes explicates, many of these reasons are 
interrelated, and in most studies, only a few are included at a time. Occasionally, several are 
included. A number of these reasons have been identified and firmly established as 
institutions, and others have been linked to the culture of the country in which enterprises 
operate (i.e., cultural).  
 
3.6 Macro-level Theories in International Accounting Studies 
3.6.1 Hofstede’s Theory of Culture 
According to Hofstede (2001, p.15), national culture is defined as a “the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people 
from another”.  
 
Culture is a rich area for empirical investigation. There has been a considerable volume of 
empirical research that touches on the role that national culture plays in influencing 
managers’ accounting choices (Hope, 2003a). In particular, many accounting researchers 
have used both Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and Gray’s accounting subcultural values in 
explaining historical differences in accounting practices across nations (Perera, 1989; 
Doupnik, 2008; Deegan and Unerman, 2011).  
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Gray (1988) was recognised as a pioneer in the field of international accounting whose work 
has made a world of difference over the last twenty-five years. He developed a framework 
that links cultural characteristics of a particular country with a particular pattern of that 
county’s financial reporting system. Drawing on Hofstede’s (1980) initial work, Gray 
hypothesised that cross-cultural differences play an important role in explaining or 
predicting different development patterns of accounting systems among nations. He, then, 
identified four accounting values, which correspond closely to Hofstede’s original four 
dimensions of culture. 
 
During the late 1960s and early 1973, Geert Hofstede (1980) conducted a major study in an 
attempt to develop appropriate quantitative measures of culture, using more than 100,000 
IBM employees from over 50 countries (subsequently extended to 76). As a result of his 
original study, four dimensions of culture were derived, namely, (1) individualism, (2) power 
distance, (3) uncertainty avoidance, and (4) masculinity. A fifth dimension, long-term 
orientation, was added afterwards in order to reflect cultural differences in East-Asian 
countries. 
 
Individualism refers to the degree to which a society can maintain interdependence between 
individuals. It relates to one’s self-concept: I or we. In an individualist society, there is a 
preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which people are expected to look after 
themselves and their immediate families only. In contrast, in collectivist societies, there is a 
preference for a tightly knit social framework wherein people are bound together and expect 
their relatives, clan, and tribes to take care of them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
Power distance refers to the degree to which a society’s members accept unequal distribution 
of power and authority amongst institutions and organisations. Uncertainty avoidance refers 
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to the extent to which a society’s members feel comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Masculinity represents for “a preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and 
material success” (Hofstede, 1985, p. 348). 
 
Gray states that Hofstede’s model of cultural dimensions can affect a country’s financial 
reporting system both directly (through their effects on a country’s institutions, such as its 
legal and political system, capital markets, corporate ownership and so forth) and indirectly 
through their effects on four dimensions identified at the level of accounting subculture. 
These include (1) Professionalism; (2) Uniformity; (3) Conservatism; and (4) Secrecy. 
Professionalism represents a preference for the use of independent professional judgement, 
and the development of professional self-regulation. Uniformity accounts for a preference 
for the enforcement of uniform and consistent accounting/reporting practices across firms 
and over time. Conservatism refers to a preference for the use of prudence and caution 
approach to the measurement subsets of accounting practices in order to deal with the 
uncertainty and ambiguity of future events. Secrecy refers to a preference to restrict the 
disclosure of a company’s financial information to its management and its main providers 
of finance. 
 
Gray suggested that a close association might exist between conservatism and secrecy. 
Indeed, he found that firms located in countries with low scores on individualism and ranking 
high in terms of uncertainty avoidance tend to be more conservative in measuring assets or 
income, and less willing to disclose accounting information to the public, they instead prefer 
to restrict access to their own accounting files to those involved in management and 
financing. Gray, however, pointed out that such an association can be established, if and 
only if, Hofstede’s dimensions of culture are accurately measured with sufficient reliability. 
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Gray suggested that individualism and uncertainty avoidance are, arguably, the most 
important of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in explaining and predicting different 
behavioural patterns between accountants from various jurisdictions. 
 
 Salter and Niswander (1995) attempted to operationalize and test Gray’s hypotheses in 
twenty-nine different countries to find out whether an association might exist between 
Gray’s accounting value constructs and Hofstede’s four dimensions of culture. The results 
showed that only the uncertainty avoidance construct appeared to be closely associated with 
all of Gray’s accounting values, whereas other cultural dimensions seemed to have no impact 
on accounting values as anticipated by Gray. In particular, their results showed that 
uncertainty avoidance was positively and significantly correlated with both measures of 
secrecy, suggesting that countries with relatively high scores of uncertainty avoidance tend 
to be more secretive and consequently exhibit low levels of transparency in their financial 
reporting. In view of the results, Salter and Niswander (1995, pp. 391-392) conclude that 
“uncertainty avoidance correctly predicts a country’s profile in terms of Professionalism, 
Uniformity, Conservatism, and Secrecy approximately 80% of the time”. 
 
However, it must be born in mind that Gray’s accounting values can serve only as 
intervening variables between Hofstede’s dimensions of culture and the characteristics one 
might expect to find in accounting practice. This is because “all of Gray’s values are defined 
in terms of preferences for particular courses of actions rather than in terms of apparent 
attributes of financial statements, such as the qualitative characteristics described in the 
FASB’s Conceptual Framework project” (Baydoun and Willett, 1995, p. 82). Therefore, one 
of the difficulties in applying Gray’s framework of accounting values is to identify the 
preferred form and content of financial statements. By following in the footsteps of Professor 
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Timothy Doupnik, one can confidently conclude that almost none of Gray’s accounting 
values will explain precisely differences in goodwill-impairment practices globally. For 
example, the accounting value usually connected with measurement, conservatism, does not 
necessarily provide a good explanation for why companies in culturally-conservative 
countries intentionally overstate goodwill-impairment amounts. But the opposite can be true 
in that companies in culturally-conservative countries should be less exposed to impairment 
(i.e., less likely to have impaired assets), because they tend not to overestimate the book 
values of their assets, and consequently their market values will always be higher than their 
book values.   
 
Baskerville (2003), nevertheless, claimed that Hofstede had never studied culture and cast 
serious doubts on the accuracy of the measurement of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions for 
several reasons.  
 
Firstly, each dimension seemed to be closely associated with several aspects of socio-
economic factors, such as population size and growth, the level of education, professional 
class, GDP, GNP, economic growth, and latitude. The results showed, for example, that low 
scores of power distance are strongly associated with higher levels of education and a high-
status occupation. Results further revealed that a country’s wealth, and population explain 
approximately 58% of the variation in power distance. 
 
 Secondly, Hofstede analysed individual differences in attitudes, perception, and human 
behaviour among IBM employees of different races, ethnic backgrounds, and culture. 
However, such differences can be in a large part attributed to non-cultural factors, rather 
than culture alone. Therefore, careful consideration should be given when utilising 
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Hofstede’s theory within the accounting discipline, especially because its scope is limited to 
a particular organisation, and his findings may not be applicable to other domains. In that 
regard, Gernon and Wallace documented that the use of Hofstede’s cultural values in the 
arena of international accounting seems “trapped by a paradigm myopia by its reliance on 
the framework suggested by Hofstede [1980, 1983] for understanding national work-related 
values” (1995, p. 85). 
 
 Thirdly, apart from the difficulties and inherent limitations in using numeric indices and 
matrices to provide quantitative measures of cultural dimensions, another problem arises 
from the status of the participant observers being outside the culture. Many IBM employees 
have come from other countries, and thus may not have a clear picture of the culture, 
reporting what individuals say they do, rather than observing what they actually do.  
 
Finally, Hofstede’s model was based on the proposition that equates nation states with 
cultures, which is not the case, as one or different kinds of cultures might be identified within 
one nation state. For example, ninety-eight different types of cultures have been observed in 
forty-eight African countries, whereas eighty-one different cultures have been identified 
across thirty-two West European countries (O’Leary and Levinson, 1991). Moreover, in 
ethnographic studies, the anthropologists conceptualise three distinct types of societies 
according to their levels of acculturation within a population: monoculturalism, 
biculturalism, and multiculturalism (Skinner, 2002). For example, Canada is often referred 




In reply to Baskerville’s criticism, Hofstede (2003) argues that although it is true that nation 
states are not the best unit of analysis used in studying cross-cultural differences, they are 
still the only type of units available for comparing cultural differences and similarities, and 
are still better than nothing. 
 
 Despite wide criticism of Hofstede’s quantitative measures of national culture, there is no 
reason why those measures should not continue to be used in comparative accounting 
research to explain international differences in accounting practices. They are good proxies 
of the concept of culture, and arguably still the best measures that are available with strong 
conceptual and empirical support.  
 
As Doupnik (2008) states, 
“None to date has been accepted by the cross-cultural research community as a clear successor to 
Hofstede. The use of Hofstede’s dimensions to operationalise the concept of culture has the benefit that 
they have been theoretically linked to accounting phenomena (Gray, 1988). They have been shown 
empirically to be related to cross-national differences in accounting practices (Doupnik and Tsakumis, 
2004), and experimentally to cross-national differences in the application of accounting rules 
(Tsakumis, 2007)” (p. 322). 
 
In his recent response to his critics that country scores become obsolete over time, Hofstede 
(2011) suggests that cultural change does not occur very quickly; sometimes it takes 50 to 
100 years.23Therefore, “there is no reason why they should not play a role until 2100 or 
beyond” (p. 82).  
 
                                                          
23 An important feature of cultural dimensions is that they are “generationally stable, reproducible, and 
relatively resistant to change” (Crothers, 2012, p. 12). Some researchers argue that the elements of culture 
persist over hundred(s) of years (Esmer and Pettersson, 2007).   
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In support of Hofstede, Nobes (1998) argued that culture might provide a framework through 
which countries could be classified into two clusters: culturally self-sufficient and culturally 
dominated. He suggested that accounting and reporting practices could be easily predicted 
in countries that are still culturally dominated, or at least strongly influenced, by other 
countries, due to their inheritance of colonialism. For instance, one could easily predict how 
accounting works in Gambia (a former British colony), as opposed to Senegal (a former 
French colony). Nobes then stressed the importance of the colonial inheritance as a major 
explanatory factor that has always exerted a huge amount of influence over the development 
pattern of accounting/reporting practices in many countries outside Europe, particularly 
developing countries, and that influence will continue to overwhelm other environmental 
factors, such as the strength of a country’s equity markets.  
 
Nobes and Parker (2010) pointed out that most of the former British colonies in Africa have 
an identical, or even very similar, disclosure pattern in their financial reporting, which is 
dependent largely on that of the UK, even though no equity market exists. This influence 
has, however, become weaker over time, particularly in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, mainly due to the international influence arising from contextual factors that 
“had begun to affect accounting in all countries, sometimes overwhelmingly” (Alexander 
and Nobes, 2010, p. 79). Examples of these factors might include globalisation of capital 
markets, international harmonisation of accounting standards, and more recently, mandatory 
IFRSs adoption around the world (Nobes and Parker, 2010). Consistent with this view, 
Zeghal and Mhedhbi (2006) showed that developing countries that have a capital market and 
have aspects of Anglo-American culture are most likely to adopt IASs, suggesting that all 
the influences arising from the former colonial powers are greatly outweighed by the 
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international influences that come from the increasing internationalisation of accounting 
standards. 
 
Even previously, Doupnik and Salter (1995) synthesised theoretical frameworks in 
international accounting to introduce a general model of accounting system development, 
which links accounting practices with a number of environmental and cultural factors 
hypothesised as relevant elements of the model. They suggested that an accounting system 
does not exist in a vacuum, but rather interacts with the external environment, and 
institutional structure. Therefore, understanding the interrelationship between the accounting 
system and environment in which it operates has proved useful in reducing cross-national 
differences in accounting practices and consequently increasing the comparability of 
financial reporting between countries. The authors pointed out that external environment 
factors (such as geography, history, colonialism, etc.) are likely to affect a nation’s 
accounting system indirectly through their ability to influence a society’s culture and its 
institutional structures, whereas cultural values can affect the accounting system both 
directly and indirectly through their influence on a country’s institutional structure. Doupnik 
and Salter postulated a list of environmental factors that are likely to determine the 
development pattern of a country’s financial reporting system, and explain cross-national 
differences in accounting/reporting practices. These include: (1) a country’s legal system, 
(2) the nature of a firm’s relationship with its providers of capital and the development of 
financial markets, (3) taxation, (4) level of inflation, (5) political and economic ties, (6) a 
country’s education level and its accounting profession, (7) level of economic development, 
and (8) culture.  
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Doupnik and Salter did not, however, provide the rationale behind their selection, nor did 
they stipulate which of these factors were the most common/important factors that 
contributed to accounting diversity among nations. Besides, Nobes (1998) raised concern 
over the terminology of their model and its application, suggesting that Doupnik and Salter 
did not seem to provide a general theory, but rather a mix of theories, for at least two reasons. 
First, the authors assumed that each country has one accounting system, which is not 
necessarily the case, because a country could have more than one accounting system in one 
year and/or over time; for instance, one system for small and medium-sized companies, and 
another for publicly-listed companies. Second, the authors include ten variables in their 
general model to control for national differences among nations (four are cultural, and six 
are institutional) and hypothesise that culture can affect a country’s accounting system both 
directly and indirectly through its influence on institutional structure. This means that there 
is a strong possibility of double counting or corollary, especially because the authors did not 
attempt to see whether their variables are interrelated with one another. An important 
application of corollary is that countries with similar patterns of accounting practices are 
likely to have a similar culture and institutional structure. 
 
Doupnik (2008) studied the relationship between Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture and 
earnings management practices, such as earnings smoothing and earnings discretion, across 
a sample of 31 countries. The Results revealed a statistically significant relationship between 
the two cultural dimensions of individualism and uncertainty avoidance24and earnings 
management, in particular, earnings smoothing, whereas all other dimensions of culture, 
                                                          
24 These findings are consistent with Han et al. (2010) who provide evidence that the cultural dimensions of 
uncertainty avoidance and individualism (along with legal environment) are important determinants of 
managers’ earnings discretion practices across countries.  
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namely masculinity, power distance, and long-term orientation, were found to be 
insignificant in explaining international variations in earnings management practices. 
Therefore, managers in uncertainty avoiding and collectivist countries are more apt to 
smooth their reported earnings to avoid the instability that is likely to arise from potentially 
negative events, such as reporting losses or decreases in earnings relative to prior periods, 
violation of debt covenants, and missing analysts’ expectations. The results also suggest that 
national culture explains about 49% of the variations in earnings management. Based on 
these results, Doupnik concludes, “Culture is a potentially important factor that should not 
be overlooked. At a minimum, culture should be viewed as a control in future research” 
(2008, p. 338).  
 
This is consistent with the earlier observation of Gernon and Wallace (1995, p. 91) who state 
that “it is not that culture is not relevant. But culture should also incorporate institutional 
factors, especially the role of the state, financial and capital markets, accounting professions, 
etc.” This is discussed next. 
 
3.6.2 Institutional Frameworks Explaining International Accounting Differences  
There has been a significant amount of research on the identification and classification of 
plausible/real causes25underlying international differences in accounting/reporting practices. 
A long list of these causes is found in the writings of Nobes (1998). The most frequently 
cited are institutional and cultural factors. Institutional factors include, for example, the type 
of legal, financing, and taxation systems in a country, and its degree of investor protection, 
as well as its level of equity markets development. Cultural factors include, for example, 
                                                          
25 Although it is very difficult to directly infer a cause and effect relationship between these factors and 
accounting differences, relationships can be established, and reasonable deductions and inferences about the 
strength and direction of these relationships can be made (Alexander and Nobes, 2010; Choi and Meek, 2011).   
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language, geography, history, colonial inheritance, education, and religion. Some of these 
factors, such as language and geography, have an explanatory power derived from 
autocorrelation, while the influence of other factors, such colonialism and imperialism, 
which explained some of the variations of practices in financial reporting at the international 
level, has become increasingly weaker over time, because of the growing presence of 
international influences, which overwhelmingly affected accounting practices in all 
countries, such as globalisation of the word’s stock markets, global convergence of 
accounting standards, and more recently the worldwide adoption of IFRSs (Alexander and 
Nobes, 2010; Nobes and Parker, 2010). 
 
There is a widespread consensus, at least conceptually, amongst accounting scholars that 
despite the adoption (or alleged) adoption of IFRS, accounting and reporting practices will 
continue to vary systematically at firm, and country levels, which will result in several 
flavours of IFRSs or different de facto standards in each country. Recent research indicates 
that national institutions play a crucial role in shaping accounting practices, at least, as 
strongly as accounting standards (Ball et al., 2000, and 2003; Ball, 2006; Burgstahler et al., 
2006; Nobes, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Leuz, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, there remains considerable controversy about what should count as the main 
explanatory factors that explain most of the variations of accounting practices in an 
international context. This is mainly attributable to the lack of a universally agreed-upon, 
comprehensive theory26 (or even a conceptual framework27) capable of explaining the 
                                                          
26 International accounting researchers still lack general theory capable of explaining the differences in 
accounting practices internationally. 
27 Since accounting theory development has been unsuccessful, a change of direction from theorisation to 
conceptualising has evolved (Choi and Mueller, 1992). 
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existence of different patterns of accounting and reporting practices across different 
countries (Wallace and Gernon, 1991; Nobes, 1998; Pope and McLeay, 2011; Wysocki, 
2011; Glaum et al., 2013). Many researchers, therefore, are strongly convinced that IAR 
requires an interaction between different theories, and hence is likely to be more difficult 
and complicated than those studies conducted at the national level, especially because firms’ 
reporting practices remain locally-oriented, reflecting cultural, social, legal, political, and 
economic conditions under which firms operate (Zeff, 1971; Wallace, 1987; Choi and 
Mueller, 1992; Gernon and Wallace, 1995; Ball, 2006; Pope and McLeay, 2011; Sunder, 
2011; Wysocki, 2011). 
 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) have made progress in developing a workable framework (albeit 
with no statistical support), which provides insights into the determinants of accounting 
quality across different countries. They argued that accounting quality is largely dependent 
on (i) the quality of the accounting standards; (ii) a country’s legal and political system; and 
(iii) financial reporting incentives. Those three factors will directly affect financial reporting 
quality. They, also, discussed how a country’s legal and political systems can indirectly 
impact accounting quality through their influence on the incentives of ownership, financial 
market development, capital structure and tax system.  
 
 Nevertheless, the authors managed to overlook or failed to address the role and relative 
importance of culture in explaining differences in the properties of accounting output. 
Another criticism is that this framework puts the emphasis on country-specific institutions, 
whereas firm-specific incentives and constraints, such as firm-level governance 
mechanisms, were utterly ignored and overlooked. According to Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006), “a complete understanding of the realised properties of accounting numbers, 
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including conservatism, must incorporate the influence of financial reporting incentives 
generated by existing institutions” (p. 108). 
 
 Verriest et al. (2012) also proposed that firm-level corporate governance determines the 
quality of financial reporting at least as strongly as country-level governance. After 
controlling for a range of institutional factors, including investor protection, legal 
enforcement, and securities regulation, they found robust evidence that companies with 
strong corporate governance will provide more transparent financial reports that are of 
higher quality, and apply IFRSs more rigorously than those firms with relatively weak 
mechanisms of corporate governance. In a similar vein, García Lara et al. (2009) examined 
the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on accounting quality, as measured by 
earnings timeliness and earnings conservatism. They found that firms with stringent 
governance provisions tended to report earnings figures that are asymmetrically greater for 
bad news than for good news, suggesting that strong corporate governance structures have 
resulted in an increase in the demand for more conservative accounting numbers. However, 
Bushman et al. (2004) conjectured that the direction of this causal relationship should be 
reversed, because “where the timeliness of financial accounting information is relatively 
low, firms will substitute towards relatively more costly monitoring and specific information 
gathering activities to at least partially compensate for low timeliness of the accounting 
information” (p. 170).  Empirically, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine which 
perspective is more correct. One way to resolve this dilemma is to take the position that both 
perspectives are correct in the sense that the association between firms’ governance 
mechanisms and the properties of their accounting numbers is reciprocal. 
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Other accounting scholars (Nobes, 2006; Alexander and Archer, 2011; Choi and Meek, 
2011; Nobes and Parker, 2010) have attempted to identify a combination of institutional 
factors that are likely to be important in explaining the existence of different patterns of 
accounting practices across countries (or groups of countries). However, many of these 
studies fail to provide useful insights into issues, such as the potential endogeneity in some 
of the institutional variables and the interdependencies between macro- and micro-level 
variables. Nobes (2006) also suggests that some of the variables, which had previously been 
identified in the earlier literature as being explanators for cross-country differences in 
accounting reporting practices, are no longer relevant for today’s IFRS consolidated 
financial statements. Nobes, instead, proposed a combination of three main factors, namely 
(1) a country’s legal, (2) financing, and (3) taxation systems that will continue to drive 
international differences in practice under IFRS.  
 
Chand et al. (2008) studied the reasons for accounting differences that exist in the past, and 
asked if any of those reasons will continue to hold in the IFRS context. They identified three 
reasons that explain differences in accounting/reporting practices. These include the nature 
of business ownership and the financial system, the level of accounting education, culture 
and experience of professional accountants. Nobes (1998), however, suggests that the level 
of professional accounting education should be considered as a dependent variable instead 
of an independent variable. In his words, “differences in professional education may be a 
result of accounting differences rather than their cause” (p. 172). 
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Alexander and Archer (2011) proposed that accounting practices in developed nations can 
be differentiated on the basis of five sets of explanatory variables28namely, the relative 
importance of law; prescription/flexibility; the role of the accounting profession; the 
providers of finance; and the influence of taxation. They argued that the source of finance 
remained the most important factor in explaining international variations in accounting 
practices. For example, firms operating in countries with different patterns of finance tend 
to adapt their financial reporting to meet the special needs of major suppliers of finance. 
 
3.6.3 International Classifications of Accounting  
Nobes and Parker (2010) argued that international classifications in accounting can be 
divided into those pertaining to the characteristics of accounting standards and/or reporting 
practices (intrinsic classifications), and those pertaining to the institutional characteristics of 
countries (extrinsic classifications). The two types of classification closely resemble those 
proposed by Gray (1988) who identified two approaches to international classification of 
accounting. First, an inductive approach in which a researcher starts with observing a set of 
accounting principles and reporting practices in order to identify the general pattern of 
accounting in a particular country, and provide an explanation (i.e., develop a theory) based 
on a variety of environmental factors of that country, such as social, economic, legal, 
political and cultural factors. Second, a deductive approach in which a researcher starts with 
identifying a particular factor or a particular set of environmental factors that are believed to 
explain or predict some variation in accounting in order to identify a particular behavioural 
pattern of reporting practices, which is being widely followed by a set of companies 
operating within a particular country. 
                                                          
28 Some of the five variables mentioned above, however, have limited applicability to countries with developed 
economies, suggesting the need to define other variables, which are peculiar to most developing countries. 
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It has also been suggested that the research work on international accounting classifications 
has been done in two ways: Judgemental classifications remain extremely subjective, and 
rely on descriptive writing or one’s own personal knowledge and experience. Empirically-
derived classifications use primary or secondary data and apply statistical techniques to 
determine clusters of countries with identical or even similar pattern of accounting principles 
and reporting practices (Choi and Meek, 2011). However, most of the classification studies 
are now primarily of historical interest and remain no longer as relevant as they were fifty 
years ago (Nobes and Parker, 2010). For the purpose of this study, I focus particularly on 
those aspects of classifications as long as the update survives in the IFRSs era. 
 
3.6.3.1 Ex-post Classification 
Nobes (1998) proposed the adoption of a hierarchical system that classifies countries into 
groups based on the similarities and/or differences in their financial reporting practices. He 
suggested a two-class model of accounting systems (Class A versus Class B). The 
classification parallels the important features of Anglo-Saxon and Continental European 
models of accounting. Nobes hypothesised that the type of financing systems is associated 
with a country’s financial reporting system. Class A accounting model is more likely to be 
pronounced in countries with strong equity-outsider systems, such as Australia, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA). In such countries, capital is directly 
raised from a large number of investors who have an arm’s length relationship with 
companies and have no privileged access to a company’s relevant information. Therefore, 
there will always be a greater demand for high-quality, public, and audited disclosures of an 
entity’s annual financial statements that should accurately reflect the underlying economic 
reality of the reporting entity. Conversely, countries with weak equity-outsider systems, such 
as France, Germany, and Italy, are most likely to have a Class B accounting model, since the 
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majority of companies’ shares are held by a small group of individuals, families, banks and 
the state. Thus, there will be less demand for public disclosure of information about a 
company’s financial performance and its financial position. 
 
Besides, Nobes suggested that differences in the type of legal systems have only limited 
relevance to the classification of financial reporting systems, even though some connection 
may exist between a country’s legal system and its accounting system. Class A appears to 
be more pronounced in common-law countries, whereas Class B is associated with code-law 
countries. However, this distinction is problematic, especially in the case of Netherlands, a 
country with a code-law system, but also has many aspects of accounting that closely 
resemble those found in the UK and the US. In recent years, the case has changed since the 
adoption of IFRSs in Europe. Since 2005, most of the Continental European countries, which 
are founded on a code-law system, have begun to adopt investor-oriented financial reporting 
such as is found in Anglo-Saxon common-law countries (Choi and Meek, 2011; Nobes, 
2011a). 
 
Nobes also argued that international differences in tax systems play only a small role in 
affecting the classification of countries’ financial reporting system. Countries that use the 
Class A accounting model are unlikely to be affected by differences in tax regimes, mainly 
due to the separation between tax and the accounting system. However, such differences in 
tax regimes can be a major cause of accounting differences within groups of countries using 
the Class B model, wherein accounting is closely connected with taxation and still serves its 
tax purposes. However, it is unclear whether the taxation system could be seen as a factor 
explaining accounting differences (i.e., whether a particular set of accounting practices are 
affected by tax issues) or vice versa. According to Alexander and Nobes (2010), differences 
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in taxes might better seen as a result of, rather than a cause of accounting differences, which 
largely affect the calculation of taxable income. 
 
Several studies provide some empirical evidence on the reliability and validity of Nobes’s 
classification. Guenther and Young (2000) investigated whether the relationship between 
accounting earnings, measured as aggregate return on assets, and real economic activity, 
measured as the percentage change in a country’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) varies 
between five industrialised countries with different financial reporting and disclosure 
systems. They found that accounting earnings in the UK and the US are more strongly 
associated with a real economic activity, as opposed to those of France and Germany. The 
results suggest that in common-law countries where the financial system is market-oriented, 
and where there is a separation between taxes and accounting rules, firms report earnings 
figures that are more reflective of their underlying economic activity.    
 
Furthermore, Ali and Hwang (2000) studied the value-relevance of accounting information 
(earnings and book value of equity) among manufacturing firms located in 16 different 
countries. They found evidence of low value-relevance of accounting data in bank-oriented 
countries; countries whose accounting and reporting practices follow the Continental model; 
and countries whose measurement practices are strongly influenced by tax rules. 
 
Nobes’s classification can be criticised on many grounds. First, Nobes classifies countries 
according to the differences in financial reporting practices of companies whose financial 
reports are made available to the public. It is, however, unnecessary for a set of companies 
operating in a particular country to have similar patterns of financial reporting practices at a 
given date. Second, it is very difficult to isolate the effects of institutional factors on the 
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outcomes of financial reporting. For example, Haw et al. (2004) highlight the role of an 
effective tax enforcement system in restraining the private control benefits enjoyed by 
insiders (managers and controlling shareholders), and thus enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting in the country. Third, Nobes proposed a dichotomous classification of accounting 
systems (Class A and B), which is based on two types of financing systems (strong equity-
outsider and weak equity-outsider). However, a particular country might have some elements 
of both systems, and lie somewhere on that continuum between the two. For instance, in 
Japan, which is a country with a strong equity market, the majority of public companies’ 
shares are controlled and concentrated in the hands of a few banks (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Finally, Nobes claims that the objects of his classification are not countries but accounting 
systems. However, it appears that Nobes’s dichotomous classification was based on 
structural differences, which exist between national financial systems. 
 
Despite all the criticisms that have been brought against Nobes’s classification technique, it 
was suggested that the two-group classification of national accounting systems (Anglo 
versus Continental European) is still valid in the post-IFRS era (Nobes and Kvaal, 2010; 
Nobes, 2008, 2010, and 2011). Nobes (2008) investigated whether the previous classification 
of accounting systems could have predicted and can explain differences in the way in which 
countries have reacted to IFRSs. He provides anecdotal evidence that countries under the 
Continental European model, in which tax considerations largely drive accounting practices, 
have less propensity to allow the use of IFRSs for unconsolidated statements, and do not 
achieve convergence with IFRSs as quickly as possible. 
 
Using the 2005/2006 IFRS annual accounts of the largest 232 companies listed on the major 
stock exchanges of five largest IFRS countries (Australia, France, Germany, Spain and the 
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UK), Nobes and Kvaal (2010) examined whether IFRS accounting policies vary 
significantly in practice across countries. They compared accounting practices in the pre-
and post-IFRS period and found that firms, in the absence of strong incentives to do 
otherwise, tend to implement IFRSs in a manner that was predominantly followed in their 
pre-IFRS national practices if, and only if, that is possible or allowed within IFRSs. These 
results can help to explain (or predict) why firms or, at least, certain firms, in a particular 
country, pursue a particular pattern(s) of accounting and reporting practices, even when all 
firms in that country are required to report under IFRSs. For example, Australian and UK 
firms are expected to exercise IFRS options in a similar manner, as opposed to Continental 
European firms. It was evident that Australian and UK firms are apt to show net assets in 
their statements of financial position. 
 
Nobes (2011a) extended the previous study by using the 2008/2009 data that covered 261 
IFRS financial statements in eight countries (three further countries were added, including 
Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden). The purpose of the study was to assess whether the 
classification of accounting systems into Anglo-Saxon and Continental European is still 
discernible in the context of IFRS, and applies equally to the measurement and disclosure 
subsets of accounting practices. Nobes found that the split of eight countries by their IFRS 
practice confirms the same two-group model (Anglo versus Continental European) of 
national accounting practices drawn up in 1980.This implies that countries seem adamantly 
opposed to altering their accounting and reporting systems, despite 30 years of international 
harmonisation. Finally, Nobes concluded that accounting practices remain deeply rooted in 
the fundamental differences in country-specific factors, which have resulted in a number of 
differences in the implementation and compliance with IFRS standards. 
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3.6.3.2 Ex-ante Classification 
According to Nobes (1998), the single most important factor that has caused variations in 
national accounting practices is the significance of different sources of finance, which is 
more relevant and more conclusive than other factors, such as a country’s legal system, in 
classifying financial reporting and disclosure systems. Nobes proposed a binary 
classification of countries based on the relative importance of their sources of finance. The 
first type is equity-based countries, in which companies use more equity and less debt to 
finance their investment-decision making, and the second category comprises credit-based 
countries, in which companies rely more on debt (i.e., bank loans and bonds). Sellhorn and 
Tomaszewski (2006) discuss the adequacy of the traditional typology of financing systems, 
and suggest that the primary criterion for classification of countries is “the degree of public 
accountability to outside investors, that is, whether or not a firm is publicly traded” (p. 188). 
This criterion, which can overwhelm other factors such as culture and type of legal system, 
will determine the properties of accounting system in the country. 
 
La Porta et al. (2000), however, voiced scepticism and concern about the usefulness of 
classification of countries on the basis of their source of finance. One reason for this concern 
is that equity and debt are not substitutes for one another. La Porta et al. (1997) found that 
countries with strong equity-outsider markets have, on average, higher levels of private debt 
(measured as a percentage of their GDP). Another reason is that the classification of 
certain29countries according to their financial structure is neither straightforward nor 
particularly useful. While it is (relatively) easy to categorise Germany as a credit-based 
country where the majority of German companies are owned/controlled by few large banks, 
                                                          
29 This is particularly true since stock markets have become an increasingly important source of finance in 
many countries, especially those formerly centrally-planned economies, e.g. the Czech Republic and China 
(Choi and Meek, 2011).   
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it is difficult to categorise a country like Japan, which has a highly-developed equity market, 
as well as powerful banks that often wield their influence over companies via equity and 
debt shareholdings. La Porta et al. conclude that the legal approach30can provide a more 
useful way to categorise countries as opposed to the conventional distinction between equity 
and debt financing. 
 
Moreover, La Porta et al. (2000) emphasise that country diversity in financial structure will 
largely depend upon the legal protection of investors for at least two reasons. First, the legal 
rules protecting outside investors were developed before the establishment of stock markets. 
In that regard, La Porta et al. (2000, p. 9) wrote that “because legal families originated before 
financial markets had developed, it is unlikely that laws have been drafted primarily in 
response to market pressures. Rather, the legal families appear to shape the legal rules, which 
in turn influence financial markets”. Coffee (2001), however, suggests that the reverse also 
seems true, because stronger securities markets can come first, and demand stronger and 
better legal protection for investors. Second, a firm’s choice of a particular financing pattern 
depends on the degree to which a country’s laws protect minority shareholders’ rights against 
expropriation of managers and/or dominant shareholders, because investors and creditors 
will not be willing to finance firms if they do not feel that their rights are well protected. 
This explains why firms in different countries have different financing patterns. In reaching 
this conclusion, La Porta et al. (1997) empirically examined whether a relationship may exist 
between the origin of a country’s legal system and the development of its stock markets. 
Their findings show that among the four types of legal origin (British, French, German, and 
Scandinavian), English common-law countries provide the best protection for their 
                                                          
30 It should be noted that the legal approach here refers to the extent to which the legal rules protect the rights 
of minority shareholders and hence the degree to which these rules on the books are actually enforced. 
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investors, and have more well-developed and widely-held stock markets. Countries with 
French civil law, however, have the weakest protection of investors’ rights, and have the 
least-developed equity markets,  
 
Ball et al. (2000) provide another framework to classify financial reporting and disclosure 
systems on the basis of differences in legal and political systems between countries, rather 
than their methods and sources of financing. They argued that the demand for public 
disclosure and financial reporting is highly heterogeneous across countries with different 
legal systems. This demand is endogenously determined by the degree of the political/market 
influences on the system of corporate governance. The classification of countries into 
common versus code-law has been used as a proxy for the political influence on financial 
reporting practice. In common-law countries, wherein the shareholder model of corporate 
governance is more dominant, ownership is largely separated from management and widely 
dispersed among a large number of individual or institutional shareholders on an arm’s 
length basis. Accordingly, the problem of information asymmetry between insiders and 
outside investors will be mainly resolved through the public provision of high-quality 
financial reporting and disclosure. 
 
Ball et al., on the other hand, suggest that the politicisation of accounting (setting and 
enforcing accounting standards) in code-law countries has also led to the adoption of a 
stakeholder model of corporate governance, in which all of a firm’s capital, including both 
debt and equity, is supplied through banks with a close relationship to the firms in which 
bankers are represented on the board of directors along with other stakeholders including 
main customers and suppliers, employees and governments. Unlike the shareholder model, 
the problem of information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders is more 
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effectively resolved through private communication and thus much less resolved through 
timely public disclosure of accounting numbers, which are in part determined by the payouts 
preferences of stakeholder representatives contacting with their firm. Under the stakeholder 
governance model, accounting earnings are commonly viewed as a pie to be divided among 
different groups of stakeholders. The firm will pay taxes to governments, dividends to its 
shareholders, and bonuses to managers and employees. 
 
Ball et al. (2000) were among the first who empirically tested the reliability and validity of 
the two-group classification in an attempt to find out whether there is a link or association 
between this classification and a particular type of accounting practices. Their sample 
included countries with common-law systems namely Australia, Canada, the UK and the 
US, known as the G4+1 group of Accounting Standards Setters (except New Zealand), and 
countries with code-law systems, namely France, Germany and Japan. Their results showed 
that firms in common-law countries tend to report more conservative (accounting) income, 
and publicly report economic losses in a more timely fashion (than economic gains), when 
compared to their counterparts in code-law countries.31The authors, therefore, conclude that 
common-law countries have earnings figures that are volatile, more difficult to predict, and 
paradoxically more informative. 
 
In order to determine whether their results can be generalised across other common-law 
countries, Ball et al. (2003) replicated their previous study in other contexts, including 
                                                          
31 Bushman and Piotroski (2006) suggest that these results have to be seen conditional on other institutional 
factors, such as state’s involvement, that affect the demand for conservative accounting income. It was evident 
that highly state-owned firms residing in common-law countries are more likely to accelerate the recognition 
of good news (i.e. report gains too early) and defer the recognition of bad news (i.e. report losses too late) 
relative to their counterparts in code-law countries. 
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countries from the East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) 
whose legal systems are based on English common-law and have accounting standards that 
are similar to those found in other common-law countries. The authors, however, failed to 
find evidence that Asian countries tend to report economic losses in a more timely fashion 
than code-law countries. This suggests that despite the fact that the four East Asian countries 
were formerly under British colonial influence and had inherited parts of common-law 
institutions; their earnings figures do not have properties similar to those exhibited by UK 
or US firms. 
 
These latest results appear contradictory to the results obtained in their early study. One 
possible reason is that the study was subject to a selection bias, because most countries in 
the sample have higher levels of economic development compared to the East Asian cluster 
of countries. Therefore, the results can be significantly affected by cross-country differences 
in the level of economic development and the economic growth rate. For example, a number 
of researchers have documented that rich countries have better institutions, better 
enforcement, better markets, better economy, and better financial reporting (La Porta et al., 
1998, and 1997; Leuz et al., 2003; Leuz, 2010; Sunder, 2011). Another related reason is that 
it is still unclear which aspect(s) of common-law institutions have caused the properties of 
accounting earnings to vary between these two clusters of countries. Since a country’s 
institutions do not exist in isolation from one another, it becomes difficult, or even 
impossible, to disentangle the effects of the legal system itself from the effects of interacting 
with other institutional mechanisms (Leuz, 2010; Pope and McLeay, 2011; Sunder, 2011). 
Consistent with this view, Wysocki (2011, p. 316) states, “It is unclear which, if any, of the 
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institutions from successful common-law economies can be transplanted to other economies 
to achieve similar efficient economic outcomes”.32 
 
Besides a country’s origin of legal system, Leuz et al. (2003) provide another framework to 
identify clusters of countries based on the observed similarities and/or differences in nine 
institutional variables drawn from La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998). Unlike other studies, 
which relied on an explicitly predetermined classification of countries, Leuz et al. perform a 
k-means clustering across 31 countries and identify three clusters of countries that display a 
particular bundle of institutional traits. The first cluster, comprising countries from common-
law systems (except Norway), corresponds to outsider economies with well-developed stock 
markets, low concentration of outside ownership, better investor protection, and strong law 
enforcement. The second cluster contains countries from code-law systems, except for 
Ireland and South Africa, whereas the third cluster consists of countries from both common- 
and code- law systems. Countries in the second and third clusters share a certain set of 
institutional characteristics that are typical of insider economies with less-developed equity 
markets, high ownership concentration, and weak investor protection with the distinction 
that countries in the second cluster have a higher quality of legal enforcement as opposed to 
countries in the third cluster. This suggests that classification of common-law versus code-
law countries only matters when the quality of legal enforcement is relatively high (as in the 
first and second clusters). Overall, the results shed some light on the existence of 
complementarities/interdependencies among a country’s institutional arrangements. 
 
                                                          
32 In his discussion of the possibility of transferring accounting skills from Anglo-American to non-Anglo 
countries, Perera (1989) wrote: “the skill[s] so transferred from Anglo-American countries may not work 
because they are culturally irrelevant or dysfunctional in the receiving countries’ context” (p. 52). 
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Leuz et al. (2003) also investigated whether there are differences in the level of earnings 
management across these three institutional clusters, and found strong evidence that 
countries in the third cluster display the highest level of earnings management, followed by 
countries in the second and first cluster. Earnings management seemed more pronounced in 
countries with relatively small stock markets, highly concentrated ownership, weak 
protection of outside investors, and lax legal enforcement.33This is because in these 
countries, insiders find it far less difficult and less expensive to expropriate firm resources, 
and conceal private benefits of control. Insiders can, for instance, use their accounting 
discretion to smooth earnings by creating cookie jar reserves in good years to offset losses 
in bad years.  
 
Seven years later, Leuz (2010) decided to extend the previous study by increasing the 
number of countries in the sample (from 31 to 49) and by using an updated set of institutional 
factors drawn from (La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2008). Two further variables were 
included in the cluster analysis: (1) the CIFAR disclosure index constructed by the Centre 
for International Financial Analysis and Research, which captures the quantity of disclosure 
that firms provide in their annual accounts, and (2) an updated version of the earnings 
management index developed by Leuz et al. (2003), which represents an average score of 
four individual earnings management measures, such as earnings smoothing and 
manipulation of accruals. Leuz provides strong evidence in favour of the existence of 
                                                          
33 In an intuitive sense, the results appear to be somewhat contradictory to the work of Lang et al. (2006), who 
concluded that non-US firms whose shares are listed on the US stock exchanges, but their country of domicile 
is characterised by weak investor protection, have stronger incentives to manage earnings, less propensity to 
report losses in a timely manner, and generally lower association between earnings and share price compared 
to US-domiciled firms. One possible way to solve this dilemma is to argue that the quality of a company’s 
earnings is more likely to be associated with the characteristics of the company’s home country than the host 
country. 
94 
institutional clusters, which correspond fairly well but not perfectly with the three types of 
clusters proposed by Leuz et al. (2003). These include (1) outsider economies (e.g. the UK 
and US), (2) insider economies with strong legal enforcement (e.g. Austria and Germany), 
and (3) insider economies with weak legal enforcement (e.g. Brazil and India). These three 
clusters are similar to those categorizations that have been extensively used in the literature 
to describe cross-country differences (or similarities) in institutions, such as legal system, 
cultural attributes, geographical setting, and wealth.  
 
Similar to prior studies (Djankov et al., 2008, La Porta et al., 1997, 1998 and 2006), Leuz 
(2010) found that a particular set of countries share a similar set of institutional 
characteristics. That is, countries that score high on one institutional variable tend to score 
high on the other variable. For example, common-law countries obtained relatively higher 
scores than others on all institutional variables with the exception of public enforcement of 
self-dealing regulation and the rule of law index, for which German and Scandinavian 
countries had the highest scores. Furthermore, Leuz found a statistically significant 
difference (at the 10% level) in the average CIFAR disclosure and earnings management and 
opacity scores across all clusters (i.e., 1, 2, and 3). Countries in cluster 1, on average, had 
the highest scores on both measures of transparency, followed by countries clusters 2 and 1. 
Overall, the results suggest that financial reporting tends to be more transparent in countries 
characterised by strong regulation in the securities market (both in terms of rules and in terms 
of enforcement), and strong investor protection against self-dealing transactions. 
 
It has, however, been argued that many accounting classifications have become blurred, 
particularly in recent years, for several reasons.  
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Firstly, Chand et al. (2008) demonstrate that the classification of countries into accounting 
clusters is highly misleading and incomplete, partly due to the concerted efforts which have 
been made to harmonise accounting standards globally. 
 
 Secondly, Nobes and Parker (2010) suggest that accounting classifications that were based 
on observing a country’s most important institution(s), may come to different conclusions, 
because of the lack of agreement about which of these institutions are regarded as the single 
most influential factor that led to a great deal of variations in accounting practices across 
jurisdictions. 
 
 Thirdly, institutional differences still exist, and always will exist between countries within 
the same cluster. For example, the US is commonly regarded as more litigious than any other 
country in the Anglo-American world (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Coates, 2007; Jackson, 
2007). 
 
 Finally, Doupnik and Salter (1995) argue that although classification studies proved to be 
useful for establishing some connection between a particular set of institutional factors and 
accounting practices, many of them have failed to provide or develop a theoretical 
framework that explains how these factors could influence the global compliance with 
accounting standards. Instead, those studies have managed to provide an accurate description 
of what the world looks like. It has, therefore, been suggested that country-type variables 
might work better than country-type classification at explaining the diversity in accounting 
and reporting practices worldwide, since institutional similarities and/or differences between 
countries are endogenously determined (Ball, 2006). Nevertheless, Ball did not reach a 
conclusion that will make it easier for a researcher to choose one approach over the other. 
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He suggests, instead that researchers will be faced with the question of “which approach 
better explains international differences in financial reporting practice is an interesting and 
not fully resolved issue” (p. 19). 
 
3.7 The Study’s Theoretical Framework 
This study suggests that goodwill-impairment amounts are conceptually a function of factors 
underlying economic/reporting incentives, as well as the unique characteristics of the 
environment in which firms operates. The review of goodwill-impairment studies - Chapter 
2 is sufficient to show empirically that the impairment of goodwill is explained by 
company/industry level factors. Quite recently, a number of accounting researchers/scholars 
have, however, highlighted the need to embed the process of making goodwill-impairment 
decision and reporting within its cultural and institutional context (Kvaal, 2005; Ball, 2006; 
D'Arcy, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Van de Poel et al., 2009; Amiraslani et al., 2013; Glaum et al., 
2015). In particular, Kvaal (2005) pointed out that the impairment losses firms recognise 
actually reflect other factors than a reduction in the current value of an asset. This indicates 
a strong need for the inclusion of contextual factors in any regression model, because 
researchers are unable to completely undo the effects of the environment in which 
accounting choices are made (Fields et al., 2001).  
 
In favour of this notion, D'Arcy (2006) asserted that “the comparability of accounts is 
impaired because of different accounting practices – not only due to diversity in international 
accounting regulations, but also and more prominently as a result of national peculiarities. 
The impact of accounting rules for goodwill varies significantly due to different 
environmental factors” (p. 2). 
 
Using Germany and the UK as an example, Nobes (2006) states: 
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“In some areas, the tax-driven accounting choices of the unconsolidated statements might flow through 
to consolidated IFRS statements. For example, asset impairments are tax deductible in Germany (but 
not in the UK), so there is a bias in favour of them. They might survive into IFRS consolidations in 
Germany, given the room for judgment in IFRS impairment procedures” (p. 235). 
 
In his 2005-PD Leak lecture, Professor Ray Ball explains when considering pros and cons 
of IFRSs from the investor’s perspective: 
“Consider the case of IAS 36 and IAS 38... Do we seriously believe that managers and auditors will 
comb through firms’ asset portfolios to discover economically impaired assets with the same degree of 
diligence and ruthlessness in all the countries that adopt IFRS…? In the event of a severe economic 
downturn creating widespread economic impairment of companies’ assets, will the political and 
regulatory sectors of all countries be equally likely to turn a blind eye? Will they be equally sympathetic 
to companies failing to record economic impairment on their accounting balance sheets, in order to 
avoid loan default or bankruptcy” (Ball, 2006, p. 17).  
 
A careful review of the relevant literature shows that AT/PAT are the most often/widely 
used theories, which have been adopted by many accounting researchers to explain different 
national different patterns of goodwill-impairment practice within-and-between firms. 
However, based on the previous discussions, this study developed a theoretical framework 
(see Figure 3.1), which takes into consideration the influence of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
factors, rightfully allowing the process of making goodwill-impairment decisions to be 
placed in its environmental context.  
 
As shown in Figure 3.1, three variables are identified: (i) Goodwill-Impairment Losses; (ii) 
Economic/Reporting Incentives variables; and (iii) Cultural/Institutional variables that might 
affect the relationship between the first two. Figure 3.1 shows that goodwill-impairment 
losses can be directly affected by economic/reporting incentives, and cultural/institutional 
factors (relationships 1 and 2 in Figure 3.1). I address relationship (1 in Figure 3.1) by 
analysing the direct impact of economic factors (Goodwill, Market-To-Book Ratio, Market 
Capitalization, Operating Cash Flow, Sales, Return on Assets, Standard Deviation of EPS, 
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Price Volatility, Industry Median Return on Assets, and GDP) and managerial reporting 
incentives (Debt Ratio, Closely Held, Bath, and Smooth) on the amounts of impairment 
losses recognised on goodwill (relationship 1). Simple indicator variables are used to control 
for country effects. Next, I address relationship (2 in Figure 3.1) by analysing the direct 
impact of cultural/institutional variables on goodwill-impairment amounts (along with 
proxies for economic and managerial reporting incentives).  
Figure 3.1 Determinants of Goodwill-impairment Losses (amended from Glaum et al. 2013, p. 175)
Note: The figure shows the theoretical model comprising variables that capture economic/reporting incentives 
and countries’ cultural/institutional characteristics that affect the association between firms’ goodwill-
impairment losses and their economic/reporting incentives. 
Figure 3.1 also shows that goodwill-impairment losses are indirectly affected by country-
specific variables (relationships 3 and 4). That is, country-specific variables may function as 
moderators that affect the strength and/or direction of the relationship between the first two 
variables (relationship 3 in Figure 3.1), and at the same time they may act as mediators in 
the relationship between firm-specific variables and goodwill-impairment losses 
(relationship 4 in Figure 3.1). In other words, county-level institutions can directly, jointly 
99 
(moderation effect), and indirectly (partial or full mediation effect) affect the magnitude of 
goodwill-impairments. The direct effect of company-level variables on goodwill-
impairment amounts will be fully mediated by country-level variables, when the resulting 
parameter coefficients are insignificant (i.e., not statistically significantly different from 
zero). In the case of partial mediation, the existing relationship between goodwill-
impairment charges and company-level variables is reduced considerably in magnitude (i.e., 
weakened or attenuated), but remains significant.   
 
This suggests that the impairments of goodwill are not always a function of company-level 
variables, such as firm economic performance and discretionary behavioural indicators. For 
example, firms that are believed to performing badly do not always recognise impairment 
losses in their goodwill. However, firms domiciled in countries with strong institutions are 
likely to report impairment losses following deterioration in their economic performance. In 
such a case, the significant correlation between goodwill-impairment losses and firm 
economic/discretionary indicators would be explained by the moderating effect as indicated 
by relationship (3) in Figure 3.1. Baron and Kenny (1986, pp. 1174-1178) define a moderator 
variable more specifically as follows:  
 “A qualitative…or quantitative…variable that affects the direction and/or strength of a relation between 
an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable…a basic moderator effect 
can be represented as an interaction between a focal independent variable and a factor (the moderator) 
that specifies the appropriate conditions for its operation…Moderator variables are typically introduced 
when there is an unexpectedly weak or inconsistent relation between a predictor and a criterion 
variable”. 
 
From this and other relevant literature, it can be postulated that there are six environmental 
factors, which are likely to affect the decision-making procedure of goodwill-impairment. 
These include (1) Culture; (2) Legal System; (3) Book-Tax Conformity; (4) Investor 
Protection; (5) Quality of Legality; and (6) Development of Equity Market. Some factors, 
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such as language, geography, colonial history, and religion, have been eliminated on the 
ground that they are no longer relevant in the IFRS context. Other factors cannot be reliably 
measured or even assessed, let alone refuted. Instead, I primarily focus on certain 
institutional/cultural factors that are likely to influence the way goodwill-impairment testing 
is performed across firms operating in different countries. 
 
3.8 Value Relevance- Theoretical Framework 
According to Beaver (2002), “value-relevance research examines the association between a 
security price-based dependent variable and a set of accounting variables. An accounting 
number is termed value relevant if it is significantly related to the dependent variable” (p. 
459). Barth (2006) attributes the inability to find a significant relationship between 
accounting information and the market value of equity to one or both of two reasons: lack of 
relevance and/or lack of reliability. That is, only accounting numbers that are significantly 
associated with a firm’s market value are considered relevant and at the same time 
sufficiently reliable.  
 
To evaluate the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment amounts, following (AbuGhazaleh 
et al., 2012) the present study employs Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model, in which a firm’s 
market value is a function of its book value, and net income (simply gains and losses). 
Ohlson (1995) derives the following valuation model, which determines the relative 
importance of book value and net income: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑡
𝑎+𝛼2 𝑣𝑡 ,         (3.1) 
where (using Ohlson’s notation), 𝑃𝑡 is the stock price at time t, 𝑦𝑡 is end-of-year book 
value of equity, 𝑥𝑡





This chapter explained the theoretical framework of the study. The purpose of this thesis is 
to investigate (i) the factors that influence the level of goodwill impairment for a sample of 
countries across a number of countries (or a group of countries) and the (ii) value relevance 
of impairment losses across a number of countries. 
 
In relation to the first objective, different theoretical frameworks were examined, which were 
used in the development of the theoretical framework. Given the international nature of the 
study (it covers companies from a number of countries) it was necessary to consider 
theoretical models which explain differences in accounting practices across countries. In 
addition, agency/positive accounting theory, which provides explanations of accounting 
choices at a firm level was also examined. The opportunistic and efficiency (along with 
information) perspectives of accounting choice, which emerge from agency/positive 
accounting theory, were also discussed.   
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4 Chapter 4: Hypothesis Development and Research Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is composed of two main sections. The first section is concerned with the 
development of research hypotheses, and the second one presents the research methodology 
utilised for the purpose of this study, as well as the data collection techniques employed in 
this study. 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
4.3 Determinants of Goodwill-Impairment Losses 
Drawing on the review of the literature in Chapter 2 and the theoretical debates in Chapter 
3, the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses is primarily associated with firm-specific 
factors as well as country-specific factors (Figure 3.1). On this basis, this section develops a 
number of hypotheses. These are categorised into groups: first, hypotheses relating to 
country related variables and second, hypotheses relating to firm-specific variables.  
 
4.3.1 Country-specific Factors 
Country relevant variables are related to culture and the country’s national institutions.  
 
4.3.1.1 Cultural Factors 
Based on Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture (uncertainty avoidance, individualism, 
power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation), five hypotheses are formulated. 
 
 H1 and H2: Uncertainty Avoidance   
The central issue underlying uncertainty avoidance is whether a society attempts to control 
the future, or simply let it happen (Hofstede, 1984).  Managers in uncertainty avoiding 
countries are more likely to intervene and manipulate the timing for recording goodwill-
impairment losses, in an attempt to increase their sense of control over future events and 
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their consequences. In comparison with their counterparts in uncertainty accepting cultures, 
they will be more inclined to choose income-increasing methods34 (i.e., report less 
impairment losses), in their attempt to avoid or reduce the negative effects that are likely to 
arise following the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses (e.g. violating debt covenants 
or falling short of analysts’ earnings forecasts) (Doupnik, 2008). Based on the above 
discussion, the following two hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1: Firms residing in countries with high uncertainty avoidance are more likely to report 
low amounts of goodwill impairment losses than firms in other countries. 
 
H2: Firms residing in countries with high uncertainty avoidance are more likely to report 
goodwill impairment losses that do not reflect the economic decline in the value of 
goodwill than firms in other countries. 
 
H3 and H4: Individualism 
Hofstede (1980) suggests that in low individualistic societies, (small) investors expect their 
firms to look after them from cradle to grave, much like an extended family, and to protect 
their interests. Managers will tend to adopt policies and practices that increase the welfare 
of investors, while at the same time increasing- or at least not reducing- their own welfare. 
This can occur, for example, when managers adopt income-increasing methods 35(Niehaus, 
                                                          
34 Culturally conservative countries (e.g. code law) do not necessarily report conservative earnings (i.e. their 
earnings are going to be less).   
35 One might think the opposite is true; that is managers from high individualistic countries are more likely to 
behave opportunistically and, therefore, report low impairment losses as such losses will affect the reported 
earnings. This is irrespective of any economic factors that influence goodwill. However, one can easily argue 
with this statement as opportunistic managers will not necessarily report low impairment losses, they may 
instead report high losses to take a big bath or smooth earnings. More importantly, individualism/collectivism 
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1989). As Fernando (2009) explains, investors are more notoriously interested in maximising 
short-term profits and will, therefore, tend to “approve policies and strategies that yield 
short-term gains” (p. 484). Reducing or avoiding recognition of potential goodwill-
impairment charges can be viewed as a way of meeting investors’ expectations. Hence, it is 
likely to be more common in highly-collectivistic countries. Consequently, managers from 
countries with relatively high levels of collectivism (i.e., low levels of individualism) are 
likely to use their impairment discretion opportunistically to manipulate the outcomes of 
goodwill-impairment testing. This, in turn, will result in a failure to report or disclose 
impairment losses that correctly reflect the economic substance of changes in the value of a 
firm’s goodwill. In the light of the above discussion, the following two hypotheses can be 
formulated:  
 
H3: Firms in countries with low levels of individualism are more likely to report low 
amounts of goodwill impairment losses than firms in other countries. 
 
H4: Firms in countries with low levels of individualism are more likely to report 
impairment losses that do not reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill than 
firms in other countries. 
 
H5 and H6: Power Distance 
According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), “In large-power-distance countries, accounting 
systems will be frequently used to justify the decisions of the top power holder(s): they are 
seen as the power holder’s tool to present the desired image, and figures will be twisted to 
                                                          
deals with “I” or “We”. That is, in collectivistic societies, managers’ choices will depend on the interests of 
investors and the interests of their own (i.e. the common interest).  
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this end” (p. 259). If this is true, a negative relation should exist between power distance and 
the amounts and the quality of goodwill-impairment losses reported. In particular, managers 
from a high power distance culture might be more inclined to choose accounting methods or 
manipulate accounting numbers with the purpose that maximise their own profits. To do so, 
they will use their impairment discretion to understate the amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses, and thereby disclose impairment losses that seldom reflect economic reality and so 
lack relevance. The above discussion leads to the following two hypotheses: 
 
H5: Firms in high power distance countries are more likely to report low amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses than firms in other countries. 
 
H6: Firms in high power distance countries are more likely to report impairment-losses 
that do not reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill than firms in other 
countries.  
 
H7 and H8: Masculinity 
Masculinity stands for a preference in society for achievement, assertiveness, heroism, and 
material success. According to Hofstede and Hofstede (2005), in more masculine societies, 
accounting systems “stress the achievement of purely financial targets more than in more 
feminine societies” (p. 257). The use of impairment discretion to meet financial targets is 
consistent with this emphasis. This should highlight the legitimacy of goodwill-impairment 
losses reported. In countries exhibiting high degrees of masculinity (i.e., low degrees of 
femininity), managers might be more inclined to perform the impairment test of goodwill, 
to achieve certain targets, such as avoiding a sharp drop in firm’s stock price, increasing 
CEO pay, or avoiding violation of debt covenants. To do so, firms in countries ranking high 
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in masculinity tend to deploy their impairment direction opportunistically, understating the 
amounts of goodwill-impairment losses reported. The above discussion leads to the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
H7: Firms in countries with high levels of masculinity are more likely to report low 
amounts goodwill-impairment losses than firms in other countries. 
 
H8: Firms in countries with high levels of masculinity are more likely to report 
impairment-losses that do not reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill. 
 
H9: Long-Term Orientation 
Managers in short-term-oriented societies are more interested in short-term profits 
maximisation at the expense of long-term profitability (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). In 
societies with short-term orientation, wherein the focus is on short-term profitability; there 
might be more use of impairment discretion to improve currently reported earnings by 
intentionally deferring the recognition of goodwill-impairment losses to future periods. In 
long-term cultures, however, managers prefer an accelerated pattern of goodwill-
impairments losses, in their attempts to plough back some (perhaps all) of the profit, rather 
than to give it out to the owners. This would, in turn, suggest an inverse relationship between 
the long/short term orientation of a country and the quality of goodwill-impairment losses 
reported. In the light of the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H9: Firms in countries with a short-term orientation are more likely to report low amounts 
of goodwill-impairment losses than firms in other countries. 
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4.3.1.2 Institutional Factors 
Drawing on the review of literature in Chapter 2 and the theoretical debates in Chapter 3, 
the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses is primarily associated with company-and-
industry-specific factors as well as country-specific factors that potentially affect the 
relationship between the first two variables. In other words, the relationship between a 
company’s goodwill-impairment amounts on the one side, and its underlying economic 
attributes and managerial reporting incentives on the other side, is conditional on country-
specific factors, such as the quality of a country’s overall governance system, and level of 
investor protection. Therefore, monitoring the association between goodwill-impairment 
amounts and the firm’s economic and financial performance measures is the concern (of 
standards setters, regulators, investors, etc.) that the impairment of goodwill might reflect 
managerial opportunism rather than the actual decline in the firm’s economic value of 
goodwill (Brütting, 2011). However, the association between goodwill-impairment losses 
and micro-and-macro-specific economic and financial conditions will differ according to 
differences in institutional conditions.  
 
For example, companies operating in countries with high levels of corruption are likely to 
exhibit a weak association between the amounts of goodwill-impairments and their 
underlying economic performance, alternatively implying that goodwill-impairments may 
have a greater association with proxies for managerial opportunism and thus do not reflect 
fairly faithfully the decline in the economic value of goodwill.  
 
Under the impairment standard, companies are required to impair their goodwill if they 
observe a reduction in the value of goodwill below its carrying value. However, in the 
absence of proper enforcement machinery with adequate powers, the impairment standard 
will continue to remain on paper, suggesting that companies may report or may not report 
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an economic impairment if the management of the company has explicit or implicit reporting 
incentives to do so (Riedl, 2004).  
 
H10: Legal System  
According to Leuz (2010), legal origin, along with geography and country wealth, are 
“powerful summary variables that conveniently capture many institutional similarities and 
differences” (pp. 246). La Porta et al. (1998) compared the quality of accounting systems in 
different countries and legal traditions, and found that common-law countries have in general 
better accounting systems than their civil-law counterparts. Past research (Ball et al., 2000; 
Guenther and Young, 2000; Jaggi and Low, 2000) provides evidence suggesting that firms 
in common-law countries have a higher level of disclosure quality, and recognise economic 
gains and losses in a more timely fashion, compared to their counterparts in code-law 
countries. Nonetheless, one could easily argue that a country’s type of legal system is not as 
relevant, given that many countries now use IFRSs (which were largely derived from UK, 
US GAAP).  
 
However, Soderstrom and Sun (2007), argue that “the legal system is…very important in 
determining accounting quality under situations that are not prescribed under IFRS and need 
an interpretation of the principles” (p. 690). In common-law countries, the interpretation of 
accounting rules seems to lean heavily/strongly towards a true and fair presentation of the 
company’s financial position results of operations, and changes in financial positions, as 
they would be perceived from an investor perspective, even if the legal form is not to be 
strictly adhered to (i.e., substance over form36). In contrast, the interpretation, in code-law 
                                                          
36 Although the principle of substance over form is not explicitly mentioned in the IASB’s conceptual 
framework as a fundamental characteristic of accounting information, it is inherently part of the characteristic 
of faithful representation (Alexander et al., 2008). 
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countries, is expected to satisfy the demands of certain stakeholder groups (e.g. banks) at the 
expense of others (i.e., stakeholder-oriented) (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Lhaopadchan, 
2010). To keep their creditors satisfied, firm managers may choose conservative or 
aggressive interpretation of accounting rules, for example, by advancing the timing of the 
recognition of asset impairments, in order to reduce the payment of dividends (conservative 
measurements ensure that prudent amounts are distributed), and therefore ensure sufficient 
funds are available to pay the debt’s obligation.  
 
Choi and Meek (2011) also support this view as they suggest that fair presentation dominates 
the orientation of financial reporting practices in common-law countries. In these countries, 
financial reporting and related disclosures tend to be more oriented towards providing 
accurate and useful information to individual investors (i.e., shareholder/investor-oriented). 
Investors want this information to help them determine the present and possible future 
economic value of their investments. In code-law countries, however, accounting is legalistic 
in orientation. In these countries, financial accounting practices are not primarily oriented 
towards the information needs of outside investors, but rather designed to fulfil the 
government’s requirements, 37such as calculating taxes and ensuring compliance with the 
national government’s macroeconomic policies/strategies.  
 
It is still not clear, however, why fair presentation continues to dominate accounting practice 
in most common-law countries, despite the fact that all listed companies in code-law 
                                                          
37 Nobes (2011a) argues that the opposite is also true. For example, in response to the desire of French financial 
institutions, the French government persuaded the European Commission to draft a further carve-out from IAS 
39, which allows reclassification of any financial assets from the available-for-sale category to the held-to-
maturity category on the basis that they would realise more cash by holding the asset and it would not be valued 
at fair value.   
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countries follow a non-legalistic approach to the preparation and presentation of their 
consolidated financial statements (since they now use IFRS, which is aimed at fair 
presentation). In order to answer this query, it is necessary to differentiate accounting 
practice at the national level from that at the ‘international’ level. As Choi and Meek (2011) 
explicate that in code-law countries, the preparation of individual company accounts will 
probably be highly legalistic in orientation, whereas the company’s group accounts will be 
oriented towards a fair presentation and substance over form. Under this scenario, 
“consolidated statements…inform investors while individual-company accounts satisfy 
legal requirements” (p. 41). The orientation of legal compliance can still, however, affect the 
parent’s company accounts indirectly through its influence on the preparation of the parent 
company’s individual accounts (which must be published as part of the group accounts). In 
the light of the above discussion, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H10: Firms in common-law countries are more likely to report impairment losses that 
reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill than firms in other countries. 
 
H11 and H12: Book-Tax Conformity 
The alignment between tax and financial accounting rules (IAS/IFRS) has the potential to 
directly affect the level and quality of accounting information firms disclose. In certain 
countries, such as Germany and France, wherein there is a close alignment between taxable 
income and accounting income (i.e., taxable income and accounting income have to be the 
same), expenses may only be claimed as a tax deduction (i.e., tax-deductible) if they are 
contained in the profit and loss account. Thus, their financial reporting is driven by their 
need to minimise taxes (Jindrichovska, 2004; Clatworthy, 2005; Alexander et al., 2007; 
Hitchner, 2011). A contemporary example is that “asset impairments are tax deductible in 
Germany (but not in the UK), so there is a bias in favour of them” (Nobes, 2006, p. 235). 
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Therefore, one can expect that German firms may have greater incentives to recognise more-
than-necessary impairment losses, in their attempt to legally reduce the amount of taxes, as 
opposed to British firms that may take advantage of their impairment discretion, allowing 
them to avoid (or at least reduce) impairment loss recognition. In order to provide empirical 
evidence for this proposition, Kvaal (2005) compared the impairment patterns between 
German and British firms, and found that German companies have generally recognised 
more impairment losses, when compared to their British counterparts.  
 
Guenther and Young (2000) hypothesise that the level of alignment of financial and tax 
accounting within a country will have an impact of the association between accounting 
earnings and economic events that underlie those earnings. They found strong evidence that 
firms in high book-tax alignment countries generally report earnings figures that are less 
reflective of their economic attributes. In these countries, firms have an economic incentive 
to reduce their tax burden by knowingly adopting income-decreasing approaches in selecting 
accounting methods, resulting in earnings figures that are biased downwards, and thereby 
less reflective of firm economic performance. However firms in low book-tax alignment 
countries generally report earnings figures that contemporaneously reflect their economic 
attributes. In countries in which there exists a low degree of book and tax conformity, “firms 
are able to simultaneously use financial reporting rules to meet the information needs of 
investors and tax accounting rules to minimise payments to the government” (p. 58). 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that influence of tax regulations on financial statements has 
become weaker over time, particularly during the last twenty-five years (Paananen, 2008).38 
                                                          
38 Today, corporations can choose to prepare up to three different financial statements (i.e. the corporate income 
tax statements, the individual financial statements according to either local GAAP or IFRSs, and the group’s 
consolidated financial statements according to IFRSs) (Zinn, 2012). Watrin et al. (2012) explain how these 
three statements can be linked to each other. (1) One-book system in which companies are specifically required 
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Yet, according to Professor Stephen Zeff, the book-tax conformity played a dominant role 
in determining preferred accounting practice in many continental European countries until 
very recent times, and it will likely linger for years to come (Zeff, 2007). The higher the 
degree of book-tax conformity firms face within a country, the more likely they are to select 
accounting methods that decrease the base on which taxes are calculated, even though those 
acceptable or mandatory (as stipulated in an accounting standard) methods may not reflect 
as accurately and fairly as possible the underlying economic reality of the situation. For 
example, in order to maximise their tax depreciation allowances, firms traditionally prefer 
an accelerated pattern of depreciation (or rapid asset write-offs), even if their measure of 
depreciation may not fairly (not legally) correctly reflect the pattern wherein the asset’s 
economic benefits are expected to be consumed (Guenther and Young, 2000; Zeff, 2007; 
Nobes and Parker, 2010). 
 
However, it is still not well understood how tax-planning strategies may affect the 
company’s consolidated financial statements, which are mainly prepared to inform investors 
and other potential users outside the company (i.e., external users). This is particularly true 
since there is no formal link between the group’s consolidated earnings and corporate taxable 
income. (Zinn, 2012). The tax incentives (or motivations) are only likely to have a direct 
                                                          
to use one set of accounting standards in the preparation of all three financial statements. In this scenario, the 
amount of the corporate income tax is actually directly calculated using accounting income contained in the 
accounts of the individual company (i.e. not the group), which, alongside the company’s group accounts, have 
to be prepared under IFRSs (i.e. the tax statements are also based on IFRSs). (2) Two-book system in which 
companies are allowed, or even, required to use two different sets of accounting standards. Here there are two 
possibilities (low and high book-tax conformity). The first is that companies prepare their own group and 
individual accounts using IFRSs, while they use local Tax GAAP to prepare the tax statements. The second is 
that IFRSs is only required for the consolidated statements, and local GAAP in the individual financial 
statements as well as the tax statements. (3) Three-book system in which companies use three different sets of 
accounting standards for all three statements (IFRSs in the consolidated statement, local GAAP in the 
individual financial statements and ‘Tax GAAP’ in the tax statements). 
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effect on the individual company financial statements. In response to these concerns, a 
number of researchers (e.g. Nobes, 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Atwood et al., 2010; 
Watrin et al., 2012) have indicated various channels through which the effects of taxation 
are indirectly transmitted to the group’s consolidated financial statements prepared in 
conformity with IFRSs.  
 
Due to the link between the parent company’s group accounts and individual financial 
statements via the consolidation process, the accounting standards applied in the parent’s 
separate financial statements could affect the choice of financial reporting practices that 
managers follow in their preparation of the consolidated financial statement (Watrin et al., 
2012). For example, in situations wherein publicly traded companies are allowed to use 
IFRSs in their individual accounts -alongside their group accounts- and therefore as a starting 
point in the calculation of taxable income, managers may take advantage of all of the options 
available to them to hide profit and avoid taxes (where scope for it exists), given the 
possibility that IFRSs require the exercise of discretion and independent judgement 
customarily and regularly (Nobes, 2006). However, in situations wherein individual 
financial statements and tax statements are required to be prepared in accordance with the 
company’s home country GAAP, companies will have little incentives to report higher 
income or lower losses in their individual or separate financial statements, which will later 
be combined or consolidated at the business group level. In other words, companies will 
primarily seek to minimise rather than maximise their reported income by adopting 
conservative accounting methods, which can help them avoid or at least reduce their tax 
payments (Watrin et al., 2012). Thus, their financial statements tend to be biased towards 
minimising income and taxes, and then the bias (tax minimising) will feed through to their 
IFRS consolidated financial statements. In this respect, Nobes (2006) wrote: “the tax-driven 
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accounting choices of the unconsolidated statements might flow through to consolidated 
IFRS statements” (p. 235).  
 
Recent empirical studies shed more light on in this area to resolve this issue. Atwood et al. 
(2010) examined the effects of the newly developed measure of required book-tax 
conformity (i.e., the extent to which managers are allowed to report accounting income that 
differ from taxable income) on the quality of (consolidated) earnings reported to investors 
(defined as earnings persistence and the relationship between currently-reported earnings 
and future cash flows). Their results showed that firms that operate in countries with high 
levels of book-tax conformity report accounting earnings that are less persistent and less 
closely associated with future cash flows. The overall results suggest that increasing the 
required conformity between accounting income and taxable income will reduce the quality 
of information available to investors and other users of financial statements. Using a sample 
of European-based companies for the years 2004 to 2009, Watrin et al. (2012) examined 
empirically the effects of book-tax conformity on earnings management in consolidated 
statements and found that companies based in countries with a one-book system have a 
higher level of discretionary accruals in their consolidated statements compared to those in 
countries with a two-book system. Overall, these results indicate that consolidated earnings 
tend to be more heavily managed in countries in which there exists a high degree of book 
and tax conformity. Based on the above discussion, the following two hypotheses are 
proposed: 
 
H11: Firms in countries with a high level of book and tax conformity will record large 
amounts of goodwill-impairment losses.  
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H12: Firms in countries with a high degree of book and tax conformity will report 
impairment losses that less likely to reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill. 
 
H13: Investor Protection 
It has been emphasised in many earlier studies (Guenther and Young, 2000; Leuz et al., 
2003; Lang et al., 2006; Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Houqe et al., 2012) that the level of 
investor protection within a country has had, and will continue to have, a profound impact 
on the quality of financial reporting of its listed companies. As Leuz (2010) explains, 
differences in shareholder protection across nations “continue to shape firms’ reporting 
incentives” (p. 250). 
 
One way to understand the effect of investor protection laws is that it makes expropriation 
practices less efficient (La Porta et al., 2000). A weak39legal framework to protect minority 
or outside shareholders creates incentives for insiders to intentionally manipulate reported 
earnings, in their attempts to disguise firm true performance and hide their private control 
benefits from the outsiders (Van Frederikslust et al., 2007; Tourani-Rad and Ingley, 2011). 
However, the ability of insiders to expropriate a private benefit from control is limited by 
the strength of legal institutions that protect the rights of outside investors (i.e., outsiders are 
less exposed to expropriation40by insiders). Thus, one can expect that in countries where the 
                                                          
39 In the absence of legal protection of outside investors, not only can the insiders manipulate profits, they can 
actually “steal a firm’s profits perfectly efficiently” (La Porta et al., 2000, p. 6). 
40 Insiders can expropriate outsiders in a variety of ways. La Porta et al. (2000) describe several means by 
which insiders can siphon off investors’ funds. “In some instances, the insiders simply steal the profits. In other 
instances, the insiders sell the output, the assets, or the additional securities in the firm they control to another 
firm they own at below market prices. Such transfer pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution, though often 
legal, have largely the same effect as theft. In still other instances, expropriation takes the form of diversion of 
corporate opportunities from the firm, installing possibly unqualified family members in managerial positions, 
or overpaying executives” (p. 4). 
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rights of shareholders are effectively protected by the law, firms are less likely to be engaged 
in unacceptable and illegitimate earning management practices that undermine investors’ 
confidence in the quality and integrity of financial reporting. This is particularly the case 
since the amount of insiders’ private control benefits is lower in countries with strong 
investor protection than it is in countries with inferior investor protection, and this in turn 
reduces insiders’ incentives to manage accounting reports of firm performance, as insiders 
have little to disguise from outsiders (Leuz et al., 2003).  
 
Nenova (2000) empirically examined the role of investor protection on the amount of private 
benefits of control across countries, and found that the benefits that insiders extract from the 
firms they control are significant in magnitude and tend to vary systematically across 
countries. The results showed that more than 70% of cross-country variation in the value of 
private benefits is explained by the quality of investor protection laws and their enforcement. 
Specifically, managers from countries with a complete lack of investor protection, on 
average, could enjoy a control value up to 51%, while a maximal improvement in a country’s 
degree of investor protection shed 11% off their private benefits of control. Another study 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2004) reported that better legal protection of outside investors seems to 
be associated with a lower level of private benefits of control. These results indicate the 
emphasis that “when investor protection is strong, insiders enjoy fewer private control 
benefits and consequently incentives to mask firm performance are moderated” (Van 
Frederikslust et al., 2007, p. 640). 
 
In 2003, Leuz et al. examined the relationship between the strength of countries’ institutions 
and their levels of earnings management, and found a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the level of earnings management and the quality of a country’s 
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investor protection laws (and their enforcement).  More precisely, their results revealed that 
cross-country variation in investor protection laws explained 39% of the variation in 
earnings management. These results suggest that investor protection is a primary 
determinant of systematic earnings management practices across countries. More or less 
similar results were also observed by Lang et al. (2006), who found that companies that are 
cross-listed in countries with relatively weak local investor protection exhibit more evidence 
of earnings management, a lower association with share price and less evidence of timely 
loss recognition. 
  
In line with previous findings, it appears that cross-country differences in earnings quality is 
endogenously determined by changes in the level of investor protection. Guenther and 
Young (2000) point out that firms in countries with strong investor protection generally 
report accounting earnings that are expected to reflect more accurately changes in real 
economic conditions under which firms operate. Hung (2001) studied the effect of 
shareholder protection on the relationship between the use of accrual accounting and the 
value-relevance of accounting information. Hung found evidence that the accrual accounting 
negatively affected the value-relevance of accounting performance measures. This negative 
effect, however, was only relevant for firms domiciled in countries with weak legal investor 
protection; signifying that “strong shareholder protection attenuates the negative impact and 
increases the value-relevance” (p. 418). Houqe et al. (2012) also found evidence that earning 
quality increases in countries that offer a relatively strong protection for their investors.  
 
Based on the theoretical discussion and the empirical evidence derived from published 
literature, I argue that in countries with weak investor protection, managers are more likely 
to act opportunistically in crafting the disclosure of goodwill-impairment losses and timing 
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their release. According to Houqe et al. (2012, p. 8), “lower investor protection breeds 
managerial discretion within the organization, which impedes production of high-quality 
accounting numbers.” Existing research on the disclosure of goodwill-impairment under 
IFRS showed that firms operating in countries with a high level of investor protection tend 
to be more inclined to disclose more information on their impairment test (Paananen, 2008; 
Verriest and Gaeremynck, 2009). Since the impairment standard was written in a way that 
provides a playing field for potential financial manipulation and earnings management, the 
degree of managerial opportunism is exacerbated by the lack of legal or institutional investor 
protection arrangements. Without adequate protection for investors, it is often difficult to 
effectively thwart illegitimate manipulation of goodwill-impairment charges. However, in 
countries with a full and perfect protection for their investors, managers have neither the 
opportunity nor the incentive to manipulate the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses. 
Even under circumstances where there are strong economic incentives to manipulate 
earnings via the timing of impairment loss recognition, strong investor protection will 
prevent, or at least attenuate, such opportunistic behaviour. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H13: Firms domiciled in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to report 
goodwill impairment losses that reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill than 





H14: Effectiveness of Legal Institutions (Quality of Legality)41  
The quality of investor protection laws is considered necessary, but not sufficient, to 
overcome the agency conflict between insiders and outsiders, which centres on the potential 
for managers and controlling shareholders to extract private control benefits at the expense 
of minority shareholders. As Kothari (2000) explains, “If enforcement of shareholder 
rights… is weak, then the quality of disclosure tends to be poor, regardless of the disclosure 
standards” (p. 95). It has also been suggested that without effective enforcement 
mechanisms, even the most comprehensive and well-defined investor protection laws 
become only a mere paper tiger, which looks good from the outside but is actually weak on 
the inside, and their constitutional recognition rarely become anything more than cheap talks 
or dead letters (Krivogorsky and Grudnitski, 2010). 
 
 In testimony to the US Senate on September 9, 2004, Sir David Tweedie, Chairman of the 
IASB, announced, “A sound financial reporting infrastructure must [have] an enforcement 
or oversight mechanism that ensures that the principles as laid out by the accounting and 
auditing standards are followed”. Similarly, Ken Wild, Deloitte’s Global Leader of IFRS, 
remarked, “You do need enforcement. You do need to make sure that people are not lying. 
You do need to make sure that people, although not lying, are not misleading” (Wild, 2010, 
p. 258).  To put it in a nutshell, investor protection laws are bound to remain largely 
ineffective in limiting42 managers’ opportunistic behaviour, unless these statutes are 
                                                          
41 Following Berkowitz et al. (2003), I use the term legality to capture the broad meaning of the effectiveness 
of all legal institutions that work to enforce the laws, rather than the quality of legal enforcement, especially it 
“takes different forms in different countries” (Cai et al., 2008, p. 8). 
42 An efficient enforcement mechanism can only limit managerial discretion to the advantage of shareholders, 
but cannot eliminate the discretion built into or tolerated in the accounting rules. As Leuz (2010) explains, 
“Even in a hypothetical world with perfect enforcement, observed reporting behaviour will differ as long as 
firms have different reporting incentives and the accounting standards offer discretion” (p. 249). 
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successfully enforced or implemented. Going back to Pound’s (1917) famous identification 
of the gap between “the law in the books and the law in action” (p. 158), legal scholars have 
long observed that the quality of laws on the books does not guarantee that the laws will be 
actually enforced, despite the fact that “supplying the right laws on the book will enhance 
legality”43 (Berkowitz et al., 2003, p. 1).   
 
Following in the footsteps of legal scholars, accounting scholars (e.g. Ball, 2006; Leuz, 
2010), who have also inspired young researchers to follow suit, repeatedly demonstrated that 
adopting the highest-quality accounting standards does not necessarily lead to high-quality 
of financial reporting, unless these latter standards are themselves vigorously and 
consistently enforced across adopting nations. Gibson (2012) clearly suggests that “in the 
absence of a reliable enforcement mechanism, even high-quality accounting standards can 
yield low-quality financial reporting” (p. 21). The de facto quality of financial reporting 
depends upon more than the underlying financial reporting standards firms claim to follow. 
In particular, “the perceived vigour of enforcement over financial reporting plays a 
substantial role” (Epstein, 2009, p. 29). High-quality accounting standards are only one piece 
of the financial reporting jigsaw and, therefore, are not sufficient in their own but needed 
(i.e., necessary) to produce financial reports that contain good-quality information to 
investors (Fearnley et al., 2011). This is particularly the case since the world accounting 
                                                          
43 There has been some criticism of the IASB/FASB’s principle-based approach to accounting standards, an 
approach that gives more discretion to management compared with the rule-based approach, which often leaves 
far too little room for judgement (Jones, 2011). These financial reporting principles make the enforcement 
process either impossible, or at best, difficult and costly (i.e. making the cost of complying with these standards 
are more expensive than not complying), and this will in turn “increase the incidence of fraud and misconduct” 
(Nwogugu, 2009, p. 1). Leuz (2010) suggests therefore that “reporting rules cannot be designed without 
considering enforcement, and vice versa” (p. 235). 
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governing body (IASB)44, which is in charge of issuing IFRSs, possesses no power to 
enforce its standards in practice, and instead has relied on national regulatory bodies to 
ensure that firms traded in their jurisdictions comply with IFRSs (Schipper, 2005; Ball, 2006; 
Nobes, 2006; Alexander and Archer, 2011). 
 
 The lack of a uniform enforcement mechanism at the world level could result in different 
patterns of compliance in the countries where IFRSs are adopted. This could occur because 
similar firms that operate in different countries will face different types (private/public) and 
degrees (strong/weak) of enforcement mechanisms, and are therefore likely to have different 
reporting incentives (Leuz, 2010). These latter arguably “dominate accounting standards in 
determining accounting quality” (Christensen et al., 2008, p. 3). Accordingly, inter-country 
differences in the quality of enforcement mechanism will play a key role in determining the 
patterns of accounting/reporting practices that all firms in a particular country will follow. 
 
Many empirical studies (e.g. Hope, 2003b; Leuz et al., 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Cai et 
al., 2008) have produced evidence consistent with the claim that the lack of effective 
oversight and enforcement of financial reporting standards does not provide proper 
incentives for managers to constantly improve the quality of company disclosure, but rather 
provides them with “undue discretion and ultimately allows for incomplete and biased 
financial reporting” (Glaum et al., 2013, p. 164). 
 
Hope (2003b) investigated the impact of variations in the level of annual report disclosure 
and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards internationally upon the accuracy of 
                                                          
44 Unlike the governing body of world football, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 
the IASB is often regarded as a toothless tiger. 
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financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, and found evidence that strong enforcement is 
associated with higher forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
by constraining potential abuse of accounting discretion through an accounting method 
choice, strong enforcement mechanisms successfully encourage (or force) consistent 
implementation of the accounting standards over time. In turn, this definitely helps reduce 
the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting, and thereby increase the reliability and 
accuracy of financial reports so that financial analysts face less uncertainty about which 
accounting methods are used in arriving at reported earnings numbers. A lower degree of 
uncertainty will inevitably reduce error and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. In fact, forecast 
error and dispersion are likely to be lower when analysts have access to high-quality 
accounting information (Preiato et al., 2013). 
  
Most importantly, Burgstahler et al. (2006) provided evidence that earning management is 
more pronounced in countries where law enforcement is weak. The authors interpreted their 
findings as suggesting that managers, on average, exploit lax enforcement mechanisms to 
use the accounting discretion afforded to them in an opportunistic manner to the detriment 
of shareholders. By contrast, strong legal enforcement can make it harder and more costly 
for managers to engage in opportunistic earnings management, and instead provide them 
with the proper incentives to report earnings that accurately reflect economic performance. 
Using over 100,000 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2006 across thirty-two countries, 
Cai et al. (2008) examined the impact of the adoption of IFRSs and their enforcement on 
earnings management. The results clearly show that the strength or reliability of countries’ 
enforcement mechanisms were negatively associated with earnings management, 
confirming that strong enforcement mechanisms reduce earnings management practices, and 
thereby improving financial reporting quality in the country. 
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In the context of goodwill-impairments, Glaum et al. (2013) reported that a higher degree of 
disclosure compliance with the requirements of IAS 36 appears to be positively associated 
with the country’s level of public enforcement. The finding lends support to the view that 
“stricter and more rigorous national enforcement systems promote higher levels of 
compliance” (p. 190). As law enforcement varies significantly across countries, one can 
postulate to observe uneven level of compliance in different countries. 
 
 To illustrate, Amiraslani et al. (2013) propose that country diversity in the quality of 
enforcement of laws will lead to corresponding diversity and disparity in the speed of 
economic loss recognition (i.e., timeliness of loss recognition) as well as the quality of 
financial disclosure. Their test results provide clear evidence that the level of impairment-
related disclosure appears to be of higher quality in countries with stringent, strictly enforced 
laws. More specifically, their results show that in countries that tend to have relatively strong 
enforcement, companies were found to recognise goodwill-impairment losses in a more 
timely manner compared to their counterparts in other countries perceived to have weak or 
lax enforcement. To sum up, the quality of accounting reports and enforcement are positively 
related. In countries with well-functioning legal institutions, managers and auditors come 
under heavy pressure to ensure compliance with the accounting standards in a comparable 
and consistent manner, which reflect the economic reality of the situation (i.e., not a 
company’s preferred view of what the economic reality should be). One the basis of the 
above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
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H14: Firms domiciled in countries with better legality are more likely to report goodwill 
impairment losses that reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill than firms in 
other counties. 
 
H15: Development of Equity Markets 
In 1997, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny published a seminal paper in 
which they find evidence of an association, (but not causation)45, between securities market 
development and laws, especially the degree to which a country’s laws protect investors 
from expropriation. Investor protection does not only include the rights written into the laws 
(de jure), but also the efficacy of the enforcement of these rights (de facto) (La Porta et al., 
2000). 
 
 La Porta et al. (1997) hypothesised that enforced outside investors’ rights should directly 
encourage the development of arm’s length financial markets, as measured by the number 
of listed companies and the total market value of all companies listed on the market. They 
find evidence consistent with their hypothesis. Specifically, they find that countries with 
poor investor protection laws and poor enforcement of these laws have smaller and narrower 
securities markets, while countries whose laws and law enforcement offer strong protection 
for their investors have both high valued and broader equity markets. In order to gain in 
depth and breadth, equity markets must therefore rely on impartial and potent legal rules that 
can protect the interests of investors and sustain their confidence. 
  
                                                          
45 In contrast, Coffee (2001) argues that the reverse does seem to be true: “strong markets do create a demand 
for stronger legal rules” (p. 80). For example, the federal securities laws enacted by the U.S. Congress in the 
1930s and the Companies Act passed by the British Parliament in the late 1940s were both adopted in response 
to this demand. 
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La Porta et al. (1997) argue that the willingness of any firm to go public and raise external 
finance depends on the terms at which the firm can obtain external finance. When investors 
are effectively protected against expropriation, they are willing to buy a small fraction of 
total equity and pay more (i.e., a premium) for a firm’s equity shares, inducing more firms 
to go public and sell more shares. The combination of more firms going public, and selling 
larger fractions of equity stakes at a higher price will result in larger and more valuable 
equity markets (Draho, 2004). 
 
 This also helps explain the association between ownership concentration and stock market 
development (La Porta et al., 1998, and 2000; Coffee, 2001), and in particular, why corporate 
ownership tends to be highly concentrated in countries with poor investor protection (or what 
makes investment in equity far less attractive to small investors). According to La Porta et 
al. (1998), “with poor investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for 
legal protection” (p. 28). When investors’ rights are poorly protected, investors will only feel 
assured of earning an appropriate return on their investment if they hold blocks of shares 
sufficiently large to provide a meaningful degree of control over the firms they invest in 
(Baker and Anderson, 2010).  
 
Several accounting scholars (Alexander and Nobes, 2010; Nobes and Parker, 2010; Choi 
and Meek, 2011; Deegan and Unerman, 2011) argue that countries with strong equity-
outsider markets (e.g. US and UK), where companies are widely-held by arm’s length 
investors, who have no access to internal information, there is a great demand for high levels 
of public disclosure. This higher demand by external investors for financial data must be met 
by the supply of higher disclosure levels. In countries where stock markets play an important 
role in financing, extensive public disclosures are therefore considered necessary. In 
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contrast, in countries with weaker equity-outsider markets (e.g. Germany and France), where 
large banks have historically been the dominant suppliers of finance, there is less demand 
for accounting information, because banks can directly access the internal information of 
companies they are lending.  
 
The argument thereof was briefly summarised by Ball et al. (2000) as follows: “Demand for 
public disclosure is high in the case of diffuse ownership corporations, whereas demand for 
disclosure is muted in the presence of concentrated ownership” (p. 99). These differences in 
the demand for public disclosure by external investors and, in turn, differences in market 
development, are likely to affect the level (i.e., quantity) and quality of accounting 
information (Ball et al., 2000, and 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Frost et al., 2006). The higher the 
level of demand for public disclosure, the higher the incentives to improve the quality of 
accounting information actually reported (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). Ali and Hwang 
(2000) empirically investigated the value-relevance of financial reports across different 
countries and found that countries with low demand for public disclosure adopt accounting 
practices that produce less relevant accounting data. In such countries, firms are likely to 
adopt conservative accounting practices to maintain lower levels of earnings (hence pay less 
or no dividends) (Choi and Meek, 2011). 
 
 Moreover, Burgstahler et al. (2006) studied the direct impact that the strength of a country’s 
securities market may have on the quality of corporate reporting, in particular, the 
informativeness of earnings, and found evidence that publicly-traded firms engage in less 
earning management when they operate in countries with larger and more active markets in 
which investors are more willing to participate. The authors interpreted their findings to be 
the result of the combined effects of both arm’s length financing and the development of 
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securities markets in “either… providing incentives to make earnings more informative 
or…screening out firms with less informative earnings in the going public process” (p. 3). 
In addition, Frost et al. (2006) examined the associations between the disclosure level of 
stock exchange and financial market development, and found a strong evidence suggesting 
that the level of stock exchange disclosure has been consistently and positively associated 
with measures of stock market development, even after controlling for other institutional 
factors. 
  
Glaum et al. (2013) empirically examined the association between measures of stock market 
size46and the level of disclosure of listed companies, and found that higher levels of 
compliance/disclosure tend to be found in countries with large equity markets. Glaum and 
his colleagues attributed their finding to the presence of (i) strong competition between 
companies to attract and retain investors’ funds, (ii) regular or continuous monitoring of 
company management, and (iii) strong demand for high-quality accounting information. In 
the light of the above discussion, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H15: Firms in countries with well-developed equity markets are more likely to report 
goodwill impairment losses that reflect the economic decline in the value of goodwill than 
firms in other countries. 
 
4.3.2 Economic/Reporting Incentives Variables  
These factors are categorised into economic factors and managerial reporting incentives. The 
first category is made up of those factors intended to capture the current decline in the 
                                                          
46 According to Anderson (2004), a large stock market is synonymous with a developed stock market. Thus, a 
large stock market is one in which a large number of firms list their shares for trading (high stock market 
capitalisation), and a large volume of trading of these shares takes place (high stock market turnover). 
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economic value of goodwill. The second category consists of those factors intended to 
capture the opportunistic managerial exercise of discretion in determining the amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
4.3.2.1 Economic Factors 
According to Wilson (1996), the credibility of the results of assets write-offs studies depends 
partly on whether or not the analysis controls for the actual decline in the economic value of 
an asset. A proxy for unbiased expectations of the economic performance of CGU(s) 
containing the goodwill would be an ideal economic factor. Unfortunately, managers’ 
expectation cannot be observed in the required sense, empirical proxies for economic factors 
are therefore often employed to capture the actual or economic impairment of the whole part 
of the company’s goodwill (i.e., firm-wide goodwill) (Riedl, 2004).  
 
By the same token, Sellhorn (2004), cited in Brütting (2011, p. 59), suggests that the 
impossibility, or at least the extreme difficulty, of separating goodwill-impairments into 
discretionary and non-discretionary elements has made it difficult to model the economic 
impairment that actually do reflect changes in the firm’s goodwill value. Therefore, proxies 
for economic impairment are often used to encapsulate firm-specific changes in economic 
performance prior to the occurrence of goodwill write-downs. The objective is to identify 
whether the underlying economic events motivate the occurrence, timing and the amount of 
impairment loss recognised. “In general, economic events precede accounting recognition; 
an event occurs and then it is disclosed” (Elliott and Shaw, 1988, p. 91). For goodwill write-
downs, this sequence implies that goodwill has suffered a decrease in value that management 
has not yet captured. Once management realises that decline in the value of goodwill, they 
create an accounting entry to record the impairment of goodwill. 
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Despite being measured at the macro- and micro-levels, proxies for economic (actual) 
impairment can only attempt to capture the decline in the value of firm-wide goodwill, i.e., 
not the value of goodwill allocated to its CGU (Riedl, 2004). In identifying the gaps and 
limitations in prior studies of goodwill-impairment, Brütting (2011) argued that these 
limitations result, at least in part, from using variables measuring the economic performance 
of companies and linking them to goodwill-impairment, without regard to the underlying 
causes of the company’s deteriorating financial conditions. This is partly true because 
companies do not have to make any of their financial information, which relates to such 
CGU(s), publicly available unless it can stand alone as an independent economic unit 
(Ahmed and Guler, 2007; Abughazaleh, 2011). 
 
The decomposition of economic factors into microeconomics and macroeconomics 
conforms closely, if not exactly, with those proposed by the impairment standard (IAS 36, 
2008, Para. 12), which identified two main sets of impairment indicators based on the source 
of information: internal and external. The two sets of indicators are often considered relevant 
for determining whether an asset is or is not impaired. An example of internal indicator might 
include “evidence…available from internal reporting that indicates that the economic 
performance of an asset is, or will be, worse than expected” (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 12, and 
(g)). An external indicator occurs when “significant changes with an adverse effect on the 
entity have taken place during the period, or will take place in the near future, in the 
technological, market, economic or legal environment in which the entity operates” (IAS 36, 
2008, Para. 12, (b)). 
 
 In studies of asset write-offs and goodwill-impairment, macro-level factors, however, have 
been almost entirely ignored by most researchers for a technical reason. For example, the 
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country’s GDP is more often dropped from the equation and analysis on the ground that the 
variable does not vary across entities operating in the same country, and hence does not 
provide value for explaining changes in goodwill-impairment losses. According to Walker 
(1999), regression analysis allows a researcher to examine the percentage change in the value 
of independent variable(s) corresponding to the percentage change in the value of dependent 
one. This means that, if the independent variable remains unchanged while the dependent 
variable does, establishing a relationship based on that change becomes difficult. 
 
As in the previous studies which I mentioned in Chapter 2 (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Beatty 
and Weber, 2006; Zang, 2008), this study employs ten empirical proxies, which attempt to 
capture the actual decline in the economic value of firm-wide goodwill. My selection of the 
ten chosen proxies is based on the premise that impaired goodwill is associated with the 
firm’s poor performance (and risk level), declining industry trends, and the country’s overall 
economic decline. These variables attempt to capture not only the firm’s prior performance 
but also the increase or decrease (i.e., change) in performance relative to the previous year’s 
performance, industry norms, and the overall business cycle. These economic factors were 
deemed by management to (collectively and/or individually), have constituted triggering 
events necessitating an evaluation of goodwill for impairment. It is therefore suggested that 
firms experiencing economic difficulty are likely to report large amounts of goodwill-
impairment as part of management responses to worsening economic circumstances. Elliott 
and Shaw (1988) find that “the write-offs occur during a period of sustained economic 
difficulty” (p. 114).   
 
H16: Size of Goodwill   
The relative size of goodwill on the balance sheet (GW) is measured as the opening balance 
of carrying value of goodwill in the current year divided by total assets at the end of a prior 
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period. The size of the firm’s goodwill represents one of the main characteristics of goodwill 
(the importance of goodwill) and serves as a proxy for the actual impairment of goodwill 
(Zang, 2008; Abughazaleh, 2011). Prior studies (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Zang, 2008) 
argue that companies with material amounts of goodwill on their balance sheet are more 
likely than others to disclose material charges for impairment of goodwill, since large 
amounts of goodwill can be exposed to impairment-testing. Thus, based on the above 
discussion following hypothesis can be proposed: 
 
H16: Firms with higher amounts goodwill will record higher impairment losses. 
 
H17: Market-To-Book Ratio 
The firm’s market-to-book ratio (M/B) is measured as the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity (adjusted for goodwill write-offs) at the end of t. This variable is 
intended to proxy for a company’s growth potential. High growth companies tend to have 
high market-to-book ratios. Beatty and Weber (2006) argue that companies with high growth 
potentials are often less likely to impair their goodwill. “Probably they have less of a reason 
to do so since their market value is high” (Verriest and Gaeremynck, 2009, p. 18). The 
variable also attempts to capture the intensity of goodwill-impairment losses (Beatty and 
Weber, 2006; Ahmed and Guler, 2007). According to the impairment standard (IAS 36), 
goodwill should be tested for impairment immediately, when certain triggering events or 
changes in circumstances occur. One of the main events and circumstances, which could 
potentially lead to the recognition of impairment loss, occurs when “an asset’s market value 
has declined significantly more than would be expected” (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 12, (a)), or 
when “the carrying amount of the net assets of the entity is more than its market 
capitalisation” (IAS 36, 2008, Para. 12, (d)).  
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Since the impairment test of goodwill is performed at the level of CGUs (i.e., not at the asset-
specific level), companies are required to determine the recoverable amount of CGUs to 
which goodwill is assigned and compare it to the CGU’s carrying amount. When the carrying 
amount is being valued at more than the recoverable amount, it is inferred that goodwill has 
been impaired and must be written down. However, the information about the market/book 
value of CGUs is not publicly available, making it difficult to compare the two values and 
arrive at an accurate conclusion about the impairment of goodwill (Riedl, 2004). Researchers 
treat the whole firm as one cash-generating unit by assuming that the carrying value of CGUs 
is equal to the book value of equity, and the recoverable value of CGUs is equal to the market 
value of equity (Abughazaleh, 2011). Therefore, researchers often turn to the firm’s own 
market-to-book ratio (M/B) as a potential indicator of the impairment of goodwill (i.e., 
whether a firm is more or less likely to impair). 
  
Trading at a market value that is below book value (a firm’s market-to-book ratio less than 
one) is often interpreted as an indication that goodwill will be tested for impairment. Testing 
goodwill for impairment does not necessarily lead to recognition of an impairment loss but 
does present the possibility of incurring such a loss. Therefore, one must not only consider 
the decline in the market value below book value, but also the “duration and severity of 
difference” (Jacobs, 2008, p. 64). Therefore, it is suggested that the larger and more sustained 
the deviation between the book value and market value, the more likely it is that an interim 
test of impairment is appropriate. Francis et al. (1996) justified their use of the mean change 
in the firm’s book-to-market ratio over the five years preceding the year of the write-off, on 
the grounds that “impairment may not occur at a discrete point in time, but may follow a 
more general decline in firm performance” (p. 1222). In lights of the above discussions, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
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H17: Firms with higher M/B ratios will record lower amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses. 
 
H18: Growth of Market Capitalisation 
The growth of the company’s market capitalisation (ΔMRKT_CAP), also known as the 
market value of equity, is measured as the difference between market value at the end of the 
current fiscal year minus market value at the end of the previous year, scaled by lagged 
market value. In testing goodwill for impairment, the company’s market capitalisation is 
often considered relevant. The decline in the stock price is believed to affect corporate 
decisions on goodwill-impairment (Verriest and Gaeremynck, 2009). Hence, when share 
prices fall, a company should consider whether this is a trigger event for goodwill-
impairment test. In his speech delivered December 2008, Robert G. Fox III, the SEC’s Chief 
Accountant, made it very clear that “goodwill-impairment…requires the use of judgment. 
For many…this judgment may be more challenging in the current environment due to recent 
market declines that indicate that a potential impairment exists” However, a falling stock 
price in itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for the recognition of goodwill-impairment. 
However, a company should evaluate market capitalisation over a reasonable period of time 
and consider other factors such as the duration and severity of the stock price decline. One 
should expect to see large amounts of goodwill-impairment as a consequence of a sustained, 
prolonged and significant decrease in the company’s market capitalisation. The above 
discussion results in the following hypothesis: 
 
H18: Firms with higher market capitalisation growth will record lower amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses.   
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H19: Growth in Sales 
The change in sales (ΔSALES) is measured as the difference between the firm’s sales at the 
beginning and end of the period divided by the total assets at the beginning of the period. 
The variable is intended to capture accrual-related performance attributes and represents a 
“gross measure of firm performance, which reflects more of the recoverability of an asset’s 
value” (Riedl, 2004, pp. 831). Prior studies (e.g. Riedl, 2004) predict that reporting goodwill-
impairment losses is negatively associated with a change in sales. They found evidence that 
impairing firms exhibit worse financial performance relative to non-impairing firms. More 
specifically, Abughazaleh (2011) found that the impairing firms had a significantly lower 
median change in sales than non-impairing firms.  Ahmed and Guler (2007) also found that 
the mean and median change in sales were considerably lower among firms reporting 
impairment losses. In the light of the above discussions, the following hypothesis can be 
formulated: 
 
H19: Firms with higher sales growth will record lower goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
H20: Change in Operating Cash Flows 
The change in operating cash flow (ΔOCF) is measured as the difference between the firm’s 
cash flow from operating activities (or operating profit) at the beginning and end of the 
period deflated by one-year lagged total assets. The variable captures the cash-related 
attributes, and represents a net measure of firm performance (Riedl, 2004). Under the 
impairment standard (IAS 36), companies are required to calculate the recoverable amount 
of CGUs to which goodwill belongs and compare it to the carrying amount to determine 
whether an impairment loss has taken place. The recoverable amount is the higher of fair 
value less costs to sell and value in use. In practice, making a reliable estimate of fair value 
less costs to sell of an asset is not always possible, especially if there is no active market for 
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the asset, so that companies use the asset’s value in use as its recoverable amount. The asset’s 
value in use involves calculating the present value of its future cash flows. However, 
understanding the past and current cash flows can help managers in forecasting future cash 
flows expected to be received from the asset and hence, determine its value in use.   
 
Similar to Riedl (2004), it seems most appropriate to use a backward-looking measure of 
cash flows (i.e., the previous year’s cash flows), because managers’ best estimate of future 
cash flows is presumably conditioned on information available to the managers at the time 
they evaluate an asset for impairment. Therefore, the variability of a firm’s cash flows (over 
the period proceeding and/or leading up to the reporting of goodwill-impairment) is the 
overall key driver that determines the amount of any impairment charge. This is because the 
change (increase or decrease) in the amount of cash flows is likely to affect the calculation 
of the asset’s recoverable amount materially, which pursuant to IAS 36, will be used to 
determine whether or not an impairment loss should be recognised. Thus, based on the above 
discussion following hypothesis can be proposed: 
 
H20: Firms with higher cash flows from operating activities will record lower goodwill-
impairment losses. 
 
H21: Change in Return on Assets  
The change in the firm’s return on assets (ΔROA) is measured as the difference between the 
return on assets ratio at the beginning and end of the period. Return on assets is another 
measure of a company’s past performance. Prior studies suggest a negative correlation 
between a company’s pre-write-offs performance and the write-offs of goodwill. This 
indicates that the poorer the company’s past performance, the greater the likelihood and 
magnitude of impairment losses reported would be (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). 
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Chalmers et al. (2011) also indicate, “better-performing firms are less likely to experience 
events giving rise to goodwill-impairments” (p. 652). In lights of the above discussions, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
 
H21: Firms with a higher return on assets will record lower goodwill-impairment losses.  
 
H22 and H23: Firm Risk 
In order to capture the risk level of the firm, I include the standard deviation of the earnings 
per share (EPS) over the seven-year period (Earn_Volt) and a measure of the fluctuations in 
the market price of security (Price_Volt). “The greater the distance between a stock’s 
averages…high and low prices, the greater is its volatility—and the greater is the short-term 
price risk in owning the stock” (Lofton, 2007, p. 280). Beatty and Weber (2006) propose a 
positive association between the firm’s level of risk and the amounts of impairment losses 
recognised on goodwill. They acknowledged that “riskier firms should write off a larger 
percentage of their goodwill” (p. 272). In lights of the above discussions, the following two 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
 
H22: Firms with higher earnings volatility will record higher amounts of goodwill-
impairment losses.  
 
H23: Firms with higher price volatility will record higher amounts of goodwill-
impairment losses.  
 
H24: Industry-specific Performance 
To capture the economic performance of the industry within which companies operate, I 
include a firm’s industry-adjusted rate of returns on assets (ΔIndMd_ROA). Previous studies 
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(e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004) hypothesised that companies in a declining industry 
may suffer an impairment in their goodwill, and will therefore report higher amounts of 
goodwill-impairment charges. In contrast, firms in a fast-growing industry are often less 
likely to experience impairment in their goodwill. If a firm’s return on assets outperforms its 
industry peers, the firm’s goodwill is less likely to have been impaired. Based on the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
 
H24: Firms operating in well-performing industries will record lower goodwill-
impairment losses.   
 
H25: Macroeconomic Performance 
According to the impairment standard (IAS 36), the occurrences of adverse changes in the 
business cycle may qualify as triggering event for goodwill-impairment testing (Para. 12 
(b)). To capture the potential impact of the overall business cycle, I include the percent 
change in a country’s GDP (ΔGDP) from t-1 to t.  Riedl (2004) argues that “negative changes 
in GDP are indicative of overall economic decline,” implying that “firm assets may suffer 
concurrent reductions in value” (p. 830). Similarly, Van de Poel et al. (2009) argue that other 
things being equal, a fall in a real GDP growth rate will negatively affect the fair values of a 
firm’s cash-generating unit(s). During periods of economic stagnation or decline, asset 
values tend to be lower. This may likely lead to the carrying value of the assets increasing 
more than their recoverable amount, and create the need to write down their book values. 
Based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 




4.3.2.2 Managerial Reporting Incentives  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature review showed a number of variables drawn from 
AT that will explain the level of goodwill impairment losses.  
 
H26: Financial Leverage47  
The task of outlining the empirically observed or theoretically plausible relationship between 
goodwill-impairment charges and the amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure is likely to 
be difficult for at least two reasons. First, the existence of two opposing viewpoints (both 
have theory and evidence in their favour), concerning the impact that firm debt financing 
has on managers’ discretionary accounting decisions (i.e., downward vs. upward earnings 
management). Second, the problem created by using debt ratios, rather than the actual debt 
covenants,48to measure a firm’s closeness to its potential debt covenant constraints (the 
higher the debt/equity ratio, the closer the firm is to violate its debt constraints), leading to 
inconsistent results.  
 
Several researchers (e.g. Fields et al., 2001; Riedl, 2004; Georgiou, 2005) have raised serious 
concern about the validity of debt ratios as a proxy for the firm’s proximity to violating its 
debt covenant limits. According to Georgiou (2005), “firm leverage is a relatively noisy and 
poor proxy for closeness to covenant limits” (p. 326). Though, a number of alternative 
measures have been suggested. For example, Riedl (2004) argued that private debt seemed 
                                                          
47 Under the current impairment standard, goodwill-impairment losses are no longer charged against equity. 
They are instead charged directly against income of the period in which incurred. Similar to (Abughazaleh, 
2011; Amiraslani et al., 2013), I use debt-to-asset ratio, rather than debt-to-equity ratio. This suggests that an 
increase in the amounts of goodwill-impairments will directly lead to an increase in the firm’s debt-to-asset 
ratio, due to the decrease in the total assets. 
48 Since the information on the actual debt covenants is not readily accessible, especially for private debt 
agreements, debt ratios (debt-to-equity and debt-to-asset ratios) are often used as an adequate proxy to test for 
the debt-covenant hypothesis (Brütting, 2011).  
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more appropriate as a proxy, because “private debt is more likely to have financial covenants 
than publicly issued debt” (p. 833). In light of these constraints, an attempt is made to suggest 
a tentative relationship between goodwill-impairment amounts and the degree of financial 
leverage. 
 
Financial leverage is often used to examine the debt-covenant hypothesis, under which a 
highly leveraged firm is likely to make income-increasing accounting decisions to avoid a 
violation of its debt agreements (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). On the basis of this 
hypothesis, one would expect to observe two things. First, firms with higher levels of debt 
financing are positively associated with higher likelihood of debt covenants violation. 
Second, managers of highly-leveraged firms tend to engage in the upward management of 
earnings to relax debt covenants (Alsharairi, 2012). Research in the area of asset write-downs 
has already provided some useful insights into accounting-based debt covenants. Riedl 
(2004) found evidence that the impairments of long-lived assets were negatively associated 
with the presence of private debt. The evidence was in favour of the proposition that “private 
debt is more likely to have covenants affected by write-offs” (p. 833-834).  
 
Beatty and Weber (2006) also provide additional evidence indicating that managers of firms 
with tight debt covenants appeared to have recorded lower amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses. Similarly, Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008) report that firms with higher levels of debt 
financing than their industry peers have incentives to record relatively smaller TGIL. Zang 
(2008) also found consistent evidence that firms with higher levels of financial leverage 
report lower goodwill-impairment losses. One would therefore expect that “non-impairers 
to be more leveraged than impairers, because only the moderately leveraged firms could 
afford an impairment loss” (Kvaal, 2005, p. 38).  
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The above discussion suggests the likely plausibility of a negative relationship between the 
firm’s financial leverage and the amounts of goodwill-impairment losses reported. If this 
scenario governs goodwill-impairment decisions, it will then become possible to predict that 
firms with higher debt levels are likely to report goodwill-impairment losses that are of low 
quality (i.e., discretionary, or biased), in the sense of being unfaithfully representative of the 
current decline in the value of the CGUs to which goodwill is attributable (Kvaal, 2005). 
Consistent with this view, Feltham et al., (2007) found that during a period of poor 
performance, managers of highly levered firms have incentive to produce less accurate and 
biased information in order to minimise the likelihood of both violating debt covenants and 
detecting bias in financial reports. 
 
Despite the wealth of theoretical models and empirical evidence supporting the so-called 
debt-covenant hypothesis, the question is not unambiguous. There is also theoretical reason 
as well as empirical evidence opposing this hypothesis, by arguing “investors take larger 
debt levels as a signal of higher quality” (Harris and Raviv, 1991, p. 311). From an agency 
theoretical point of view, debt can be seen as an internal control mechanism able to monitor 
the performance of management to verify that managers use their own competence and the 
firm’s resources in the best possible ways.  
 
In reference to the resurrection of what he called active investors, Jensen (1993) argues that 
large debt holders, like large shareholders, have large investment in the firm, and therefore 
may attempt to monitor management actions in an unbiased way. However, this is not 
necessarily true. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) emphasise that large debt holders, particularly 
banks, have the power not only to view firm management and policies from a monitoring 
point of view, but also to interfere in the strategically important decisions of the firm. “Their 
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power comes in part because of a variety of control rights they receive when firms default 
or violate debt covenants”. Along a similar line, Harris and Raviv (1990) study the role of 
debt on investors’ information and their ability to oversee management, and reported that 
high levels of debt act as a disciplining device and generate useful information that can be 
used by investors to monitor and if necessary restrain managerial opportunism. 
 
In the context of asset write-downs, several researchers (Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliott and 
Shaw, 1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992) report that write-off firms tend to have higher levels 
of debt ratios. In the light of this, it is quite plausible to suggest a positive relationship 
between firm leverage and asset impairments. The literature also suggests the plausibility of 
a positive relationship between firm leverage and the quality of impairment disclosure. In a 
more recent study, Amiraslani et al. (2013) find evidence that firms with high levels of debt 
have high-quality impairment reporting. This result, however, left us with the question of 
why a positive relationship is sometimes found between financial leverage and the quality 
of impairment disclosure. A possible explanation for this finding could be that firms with 
higher degrees of debt ratios will have their asset values under increasingly close scrutiny 
by debtholders, who suffice themselves as being able to constrain managers’ opportunistic 
reporting choices and therefore “force the recognition of existing impairments that reflect 
the underlying performance of the firm” (Abughazaleh, 2011, p. 174). Alsharairi (2012) also 
highlight the role that debt holders can sometimes play in restricting managers from using 
their accounting discretion to manage earnings opportunistically, thereby improving the 
credibility of the company’s financial reports. 
 
Based on the opposing viewpoints and conflicting evidence regarding the role of debt on 
managers’ choices to report goodwill-impairment losses, this study investigates the 
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association between goodwill-impairment amounts and the degree of financial leverage, but 
makes no explicit prediction about the direction of relationship. In light of the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H26: There is a significant association between the level of leverage and goodwill-
impairment amounts. 
 
H27: Concentration of Outside Ownership49   
When ownership (widely dispersed among individual shareholders) and control (in the hands 
of management) is separated, as is usually in widely held (or management-controlled) 
corporations, a conflict of interest (or agency problem) is likely to arise between managers 
and corporate shareholders. Several studies (e.g. Dhaliwal et al., 1982; Niehaus, 1989; Hart, 
1995), suggest that in companies with a wide dispersed ownership pattern, managers have a 
reasonable degree of discretion over the choice of accounting methods.  
 
In contrast, “managerial discretion is likely to decrease as the concentration of outside 
ownership increases” (Niehaus, 1989, p. 270). Concentrated ownership by large 
                                                          
49 Similar to Amiraslani et al. (2013) and Glaum et al. (2013), this variable is measured at the firm level (the 
number of closely held shares/the common shares outstanding) rather than at the average country level. The 
reason is fourfold. First, the goal is to understand the effect of the ownership structure of firms on the amounts 
of goodwill-impairment losses firms report. The unit of analysis is, therefore, (or should be) the individual 
firm, especially because firms are the ones perceived to have large shareholders (not the countries). Second, 
there is no need for aggregating individual-level data to the country level, because firm-level data on ownership 
concentration is readily available. Third, country averages eliminate all within-country variation in ownership 
concentration. Fourth, and most importantly, the aggregation bias (usually referred to as Simpson’s Paradox) 
is likely to arise, when country averages are used. The key point is whenever averages are composed of unequal 
numbers of observations, the correlation and regression coefficient will reverse sign between aggregate and 
individual data, implying that results at the aggregate level do not automatically carry over to the individual 
level (Holderness, 2008). 
143 
shareholders is likely to reduce the agency problem between managers and outside 
shareholders by increasing the level of monitoring (Levis and Vismara, 2013). This is 
because major shareholders owning large blocks of shares, have enough money at stake and 
the power to make it worthwhile to closely monitor managers and try to influence their 
decisions. However, when the ownership of a corporation is concentrated in the hands of 
few large shareholders (dominant shareholders), who exert full control over managers, as is 
the case in closely-held (or owner-controlled) corporations, the nature of the agency problem 
shifts away from the classic agency conflict between shareholders’ and managers’ interests 
to agency conflicts between minority shareholders and large controlling shareholders (Fan 
and Wong, 2002). As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) cautioned “Large investors may represent 
their own interest, which need not coincide with the interest of other investors in the firms” 
(p. 758). For example, dominant shareholders may use their control rights to extract private 
benefits at the expense of small shareholders (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). This problem is 
referred to as tunneling, a term coined by Johnson et al. (2000) to describe “the diversion of 
corporate resources from the corporation (or its minority shareholders) to the controlling 
shareholder” (p. 26). 
 
The nature or sign of the influence that a firm’s ownership may have on managers’ 
accounting choice(s) relating to goodwill-impairment (i.e., whether, when, and how much 
to impair) depends on the ownership control status of the firm (i.e., whether a firm is a 
management- or owner-controlled). In an early attempt to derive a positive theory of 
accounting, Watts and Zimmerman (1978) assume that firm managers do not select 
accounting methods in a random manner. They rather suggest that managers’ selection of a 
particular accounting method largely depends on its relative income effect. If this were true, 
then it would be expected that managers in firms with widespread ownership are more likely 
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to select accounting methods with different income effects than the accounting methods 
chosen by closely held firms.  
 
Dhaliwal et al. (1982) examine the relationship between the firm’s ownership control status 
and the accounting methods chosen by a firm, and find that widely held firms are more likely 
than closely-held firms to adopt accounting methods that lead to “high and/or early reported 
income” (p. 44). In doing so, managers maximise both their own utility and that of the 
dispersed owners, so that they can make (or at least keep) them satisfied and unwilling to 
support any hostile takeover attempts, and thereby secure their own reputation for 
excellence. 
 
 Astami and Tower (2006) provide empirical evidence showing that companies with lower 
levels of ownership concentration are more likely to pursue income-increasing accounting 
methods. In the context of the thesis’s objects of investigation, one would expect that 
managers of firms with a wide dispersion of ownership are likely to use the discretion 
available in the goodwill-impairment standard in order to manage the level and variability 
of reported earnings. Existing research on goodwill-impairment (Lapointe-Antunes, 2005) 
provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis. The evidence suggests that widely held 
firms tend to report relatively lower impairment losses in an attempt to avoid scrutiny and 
intervention from outside shareholders, who are unlike controlling shareholders, have no 
direct access to the information necessary to evaluate the performance of past acquisitions 
and consequently determine if the value of goodwill is impaired. 
 
On the other hand, Dhaliwal et al. (1982) suggest that managers of closely held firms do not 
have the same incentives to adopt income-increasing accounting methods as managers of 
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widely held firms do. It has been hypothesised that in closely held (i.e., owner-controlled) 
firms, managers will be more likely to adopt accounting methods, “which lower or delay 
reported income” (p. 44). This is because large shareholders are more likely to be concerned 
with deferring income and accelerating deductible expenses and losses in order to minimise 
their tax payments (Smith, 1976), and/or to keep dividend payments low or non-existent 
(large shareholders may use their controlling position in the firm to pursue strategies that 
may directly benefit them at the expense of small shareholders) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Fernando, 2009). Niehaus (1989) found evidence that ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
concentration of outside ownership will lead to an increase in the probability of choosing an 
income-decreasing method. In a recent study, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) also provide 
evidence suggesting that companies with a high level of institutional ownership report more 
conservative earnings. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis is derived: 
 
H27: Firms with a higher level of outside ownership concentration will record higher 
amounts of goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
H28: Big Bath and Earnings Smoothing 
A number of studies (e.g. Zucca and Campbell, 1992; Riedl, 2004; Zang, 2008; Van de Poel 
et al., 2009) reveal that asset write-downs are not always driven by the decrease in the assets’ 
economic value. Quite often asset write-offs are used as a vehicle to manipulate reported 
earnings by utilising what Warren Buffett referred to in his letter to the shareholders of 
Berkshire Hathaway (1988) as “white lie” techniques, such as big bath and earnings 
smoothing.  
 
In particular, it has been revealed that big bath and/or earnings smoothing are consistently 
more dominant in its association with asset impairments than economic factors are. On the 
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one hand, it has been hypothesised that firms with an impaired asset may attempt to record 
the loss in a period when earnings are lower than expected. When firm managers engage in 
this kind of behaviour, they are said to take a big bath, by shifting future impairment charges 
into the current accounting period, in their efforts to improve future earnings performance50, 
and send an optimistic message to investors that the worst was over and the bad times are 
behind us, good times will follow (Zucca and Campbell, 1992).  
 
The big bath hypothesis, therefore, predicts a positive51association between change in pre-
write-offs earnings and asset impairments. On the other hand, it has been hypothesised that 
managers may attempt to recognise higher-than-necessary impairment losses in periods 
when earnings are higher than expected. This helps managers to smooth out the 
fluctuations/variability in publicly reported earnings by creating large amounts of inflated or 
cookie jar reserves to be employed later to bolster future earnings (Zucca and Campbell, 
1992). Therefore, the income smoothing hypothesis predicts a positive association between 
change in pre-write-offs earnings and asset impairments.  
 
                                                          
50 This prediction, however, is inconsistent with Rees et al. (1996), who argue it is equally possible that 
managers in firms with large negative pre-write-offs earnings are more inclined to report a higher amount of 
impairment losses, not because of their attempt to improve future earnings, but because “managers are 
appropriately responding to decreases in the asset’s ability to generate income” (p. 168). From the researcher’s 
point of view, empirical results should not be interpreted in isolation but instead, should be considered along 
with other economic factors (i.e. whether big bath reporting behaviour has a greater association with asset 
impairments, than do economic factors have). Therefore, finding a statistically significant relationship between 
change in pre-write-offs earnings and asset impairment may not suffice in its own as evidence of taking 
excessive big bath impairment charges. Interestingly, Rees et al. found evidence consistent with the big bath 
hypothesis, which suggests that managers may be tempted to act with opportunism and take big bath charges 
in order to make future earnings look better at the expense of current earnings. The evidence showed that 
“write-downs tend to accentuate poor operating performance” (p. 168). 
51 Increasingly negative numbers are actually decreasing values because they are moving further to the left of 
0 on the number line. 
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Riedl (2004) find that assets write-offs reported under SFAS 121 (relative to those reported 
prior to the standard) were weakly associated with economic indicators (∆GDP, ∆INDROA, 
∆SALES, ∆E and ∆OCF), but strongly associated with proxies for reporting incentives 
(∆MGT, BATH, and DEBT). Lapointe (2005) also find evidence consistent with the big bath 
hypothesis suggesting that firms experiencing a change in CEO or director seemed to impair 
greater amounts of their goodwill, so all the blame for the past problems is on the shoulders 
of their predecessors.  
 
Similarly, Zang (2008) find that when a change in management takes place, firms tend to 
take a bath by deliberately writing off a large amount of their goodwill (i.e., overstate), in 
order to minimise the probability of any impairment loss recognition, and thereby report 
higher future earnings. Abughazaleh (2011) also found evidence supporting both the big bath 
and income smoothing hypotheses. The evidence showed that in the UK context, goodwill-
impairment losses reported under IFRS were strongly associated with ‘big bath’ and 
‘earnings smoothing’ reporting behaviour. In the EU context, Van de Poel et al. (2009) find 
that firms tend to impair their goodwill ‘more often’ when their reported earnings are 
unexpectedly low (i.e., take a big bath), or when their reported earnings are unexpectedly 
high (i.e., smooth earnings). 
 
To distinguish between the effects of big bath and earnings smoothing reporting behaviour, 
two separate proxies are used to capture when earnings are unexpectedly low, and when 
earnings are unexpectedly high. Similar to (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), Bath equals to 
the change in firm’s pre-write off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the 
end of t-1 (if the value of this variable is negative) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Smooth equals 
the change in firm’s pre-write off earnings from period t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the 
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end of t-1 (if the value of this variable is positive) and 0 otherwise. It should be born in mind 
that Bath and Smooth are both designed to capture any incremental effects that the change 
in return on assets might have on the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses (Riedl, 2004). 
 
For the reasons mentioned above, it can be expected that managers may deploy their 
direction opportunistically or cynically, overstating the amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses reported, if they have the incentives to do so (i.e., when earnings are low or high 
relative to their peers). In other words, in the presence of income-decreasing incentives (i.e., 
big bath and/or earnings smoothing), firms may attempt to disclose large goodwill-
impairment charges, which do not necessarily reflect the decline in the economic value of 
the firm’s CGUs to which goodwill has been allocated. 
 
 From earnings smoothing and the big bath syndrome, the following two inferences can be 
drawn. First, after controlling for economic factors, finding a statistically significant positive 
correlation between the amounts of goodwill-impairment losses and BATH variable 
suggests that managers exercise their accounting discretion to take a big bath and record 
excessive discretionary goodwill-impairment charges that will not be mainly explained by 
the change in the firm’s underlying economic performance. Second, finding any statistically 
significant positive correlation between goodwill-impairment amounts and the SMOOTH 
variable indicates that managers are using their accounting discretion for the purpose of 
smoothing the company’s reported earnings and record large amounts of goodwill-
impairment losses, which may not well correspond exactly to the change in the underlying 
economic characteristics of companies.  Thus, based on the above discussion, the following 
hypothesis can be proposed: 
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H28: Firms with unexpectedly high (or low) earnings are likely to record higher amounts 
of goodwill-impairment losses than other firms. 
 
4.4 H29: Value Relevance  
Past studies have shown that goodwill-impairment losses are value relevant. As the literature 
review showed, these studies (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et al. 2009; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2012) 
relate to particular countries. However, previous cross-country value relevance studies (e.g. 
Alford et al., 1993; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Hung, 2000) reveal that cross-country differences 
in the value-relevance of accounting numbers have mainly been explained in terms of cross-
country differences in institutional factors such as the quality of financial reporting 
standards, type of legal system, and implicitly by different reporting demands arising from 
different institutional arrangements. The argument, therefore, is that institutional differences 
across countries have an impact on the information content of earnings, which, in turn, 
results in different degrees of value-relevance of accounting data in countries with different 
institutional frameworks (Veith and Werner, 2014). 
 
One of the first cross-country studies was conducted by Alford et al. (1993) comparing the 
value relevance of accounting earnings in 17 countries (using the US as a benchmark) during 
the period 1983-1990. Their empirical results reveal that firms residing in Australia, France, 
Netherlands and the UK tend to publicly report accounting earnings that are more 
informative or more value-relevant than those reported by US counterparts, while firms 
residing in countries, such as Denmark, Germany, Italy, Singapore and Sweden, tend to 
report accounting earnings that are less informative or less value-relevant when compared 
to those reported by US counterparts. The authors explain cross-country differences in the 
value-relevance of accounting information by variations in accounting/disclosure practices, 
and corporate governance systems across countries. 
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Using the same set of countries as Alford et al. (1993) with a slightly different sample period 
from 1986 to 1995, Ali and Hwang (2000) provide further evidence for the fact that the 
value-relevance is higher in countries with market-oriented financial systems than in 
countries with bank-oriented financial systems, besides the value-relevance is higher for 
British-American model countries than for Continental model countries. Using 21 countries 
during the period 1991-1997, Hung (2000) investigated the impact of accrual accounting on 
the value relevance of accounting performance measures (earnings and ROE) for countries 
with different levels of shareholder protection, and found that accrual accounting has 
negatively affected the value relevance of accounting numbers, but only for countries with 
low anti-director rights scores. 
 
Based on the above discussion, one would expect that firms in countries with better 
institutional quality will report goodwill-impairment losses that are relatively more 
informative or more value-relevant in comparison to their counterparts from countries with 
inferior institutional quality. This suggests that the association between goodwill-
impairment amounts and share prices is expected to vary depending on the quality of a 
country’s institutions within which firms operate. Hence, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
 






4.5 Statistical Tests 
This section examines all possible regression models and determines the model which will 
provide the best fit to the observed data.  
 
4.5.1 Possible Regression Model(s) 
The correct estimation method is not a straightforward choice because we have panel data 
(across firms and over a sample period 2007-2013) constrained to be non-negative, i.e., left 
censoring at zero, as the dependent variable, goodwill impairment losses, can be zero (firms 
report zero goodwill impairment losses) or any other continuous number, but cannot be 
negative (firms cannot report negative impairment losses).  
 
4.5.1.1 OLS vs. Tobit 
The Tobit or censored regression model was originally developed by James Tobi (1958), the 
Nobel laureate economist, where observations on the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 are not observed, 
i.e., censored at a certain cut-off, so that values above (or below) the censoring point cannot 
be observed. While the dependent variable is censored, the corresponding values of the 
independent variables are still observable for all individuals (i). By contrast, in the truncated 
regression model, neither the dependent nor the explanatory variables are observed for 
individuals whose 𝑌𝑖 lies in the truncation region (Maddala, 1991; Baum, 2006; Brooks, 
2008). The Tobit regression model is effectively a combination of discrete and continuous 
distributions (Greene, 2012), for example, the binary choice to impair or not to impair, and 
the continuous response of how much to impair, conditional on choosing to impair. In 
essence, the Tobit model is a hybrid of truncated regression analysis and Probit analysis 
(sometimes referred to as Tobin’ Probit), it thus employs a maximum likelihood estimations 
(MLE) technique that combines the Probit and regression components of the log-likelihood 
function (Baum, 2006; Greene, 2012). Because of its ability to simultaneously estimate both 
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the censored and uncensored data, the Tobit model has gained considerable momentum. 
According to (Greene, 2012) “the Tobit model has become so routine and been incorporated 
in so many computer packages that despite formidable obstacles in years past, estimation is 
now essentially on the level of ordinary linear regression” (p. 850). 
 
The Tobit model seems to be a natural choice for the majority of write-offs studies (Francis 
et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Lapointe‐Antunes et al., 2008; Zang, 2008; Stokes and Webster, 
2010; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011; Chalmers et al., 2011), given that the values of the 
dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 are either zeros for non-impairing firms or any positive continuous 
number for those who chose to impair their goodwill. The logic behind their choice is that 
theoretically the dependent variable, which is the change in the economic value of goodwill, 
can take positive or negative values, i.e., firms report either decrease (write-offs) or increase 
(write-ups). The impairment standard (under IFRSs and/or US GAAP), however, does not 
allow for the recognition of any increase or upward revaluation of goodwill, i.e., goodwill 
can only be depreciated not appreciated. Hence, many firms, which experience an increase 
in the economic value of their goodwill, cannot record such increase, and they will instead 
report zero amount of goodwill-impairment loss (the observed values of the dependent 
variable are either non-negative or are clustered at zero.), suggesting that such increase is 
unobservable or latent due to censoring mechanisms. “These unobservable increases 
constitute that portion of the distribution of the (censored) dependent variable, which the 
Tobit specification attempts to fill in” (Riedl, 2004, p. 828).  
 
Given many observations on the dependent variable stuck at zero, the use of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is not appropriate and is more likely to yield both downward biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates (i.e., a linear regression that ignores this feature of censored 
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data tends to be heavily skewed toward underestimating the actual slop of the data) 
(Dougherty, 2007; Gujarati, 2009; Greene, 2012).  An obvious but flawed way to get around 
this would be just to remove all of the zero observations altogether. By artificially 
eliminating all units of observations clustered at lower limit zero, the resulting data set may 
not be representative of its population. According to Dougherty (2007), in an OLS 
regression, where the entire sample or the subsample for which 𝑌𝑖 > 0 (i.e., the truncated 
sample with non-zero observations) is used, the slope coefficients tend to be underestimated 
and below the Tobit estimate. The degree of bias is empirically related to the proportion of 
censored data, for example, the size of the bias tends to increase with the proportion of 
constrained observations. By the same token, Greene (2012) points out: 
“Researchers often compute ordinary least squares estimates despite their inconsistency. Almost 
without exception, it is found that the OLS estimates are smaller in absolute value than the MLEs. A 
striking empirical regularity is that the maximum likelihood estimates can often be approximated by 
dividing the OLS estimates by the proportion of nonlimit observations in the sample” (p. 851). 
 
In theory, the Tobit regression model is only applicable in those cases wherein the latent 
variable can in principle take negative values and the observed values of zero are a 
consequence of censoring or non-observability. However, in actual practice, the Tobit model 
is normally employed when the values of the observed dependent variable are absolutely 
non-negative and are clustered at zeros, irrespective of whether any censoring has occurred 
(Sigelman and Zeng, 1999). As Greene (2012) states, “Many of the applications of the Tobit 
model in the received literature are constructed not to accommodate censoring of the 
underlying data, but, rather, to model the appearance of a large cluster of zeros” (p. 854). 
 
 Similarly, Maddala (1991) raised concerns about diversion or inappropriate use of the Tobit 
model in the literature: 
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“It is tempting to use the Tobit model every time one has a bunch of zero (or other limit) observations 
on y. This is clearly inappropriate. In fact, there are many more examples of the inappropriate use of 
the Tobit model than of its correct use. In the Tobit model, y* can be less than c, but these observations 
with y* < c are not observed because of censoring. The limit observations arise because of non-
observability”.  
 
In the context of goodwill-impairment, one could arguably accept that an impairment charge 
of goodwill can be, in principle, a negative number, which is unlikely to be observed or 
recognised (i.e., censored), and instead it is recorded as zero. However, this is only part of 
the story; the observed zero of goodwill-impairments is not necessarily a result of censoring 
(censoring is a problem with how the data were recorded, not how they were generated). For 
most companies, this figure will be exactly zero (i.e., companies choose not to impair their 
goodwill at all and, therefore, report no goodwill-impairment loss), but for those where it is 
not, the number will be less than zero and thus it would not be feasible. In this case, i.e., 
where the observed zeros are naturally occurring and relatively frequent in the data, the 
standard Tobit model is clearly inappropriate, and an alternative approach should be used. 
Therefore, it would make more sense if the underlying dependent variable is considered as 
a corner solution52 (i.e., not a censored variable).  
 
Unfortunately, this fundamental point has been routinely ignored. Riedl (2004) seriously 
questioned the conventional wisdom of applying the Tobit model in write-offs studies to the 
dataset for which it is inappropriate (as often occurs), although it looks like Tobit data, in 
that each consists of a cluster of zero values and a set of positive values. As Riedl (2004) 
explains, “Some or even all of these non-write-off observations may have true values of zero 
(reflecting no change in the value of assets), suggesting the distribution may not be censored” 
                                                          
52 A corner solution is defined as “a nonnegative dependent variable that is roughly continuous over strictly 
positive values but takes on the value zero with some regularity” (Wooldridge, 2012, p. 846). 
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(p. 828). It is therefore suggested that “when the data come from a generating process other 
than censoring…, the standard Tobit model can produce a poor fit to the data and can 
seriously bias parameter estimates. As a side note… the direction and degree of bias of OLS 
estimates on standard Tobit data no longer holds” (p. 180).  
 
In contrast, Wooldridge (2002) argued that OLS estimates will not be consistent when 
applied in both data censoring applications and corner solution applications, suggesting that 
“regressing 𝑌𝑖 on xi using all of the data will not consistently estimate β… so it would be a 
fluke if a linear regression consistently estimated β” (p. 525). Moreover, Wooldridge (2012), 
though, became more and more convinced that the standard Tobit specification is “explicitly 
design to model corner solution dependent variables” (p. 584). In summary, the Tobit is 
considered more appropriate in this study, because 85% of the study’s data are censored at 
zero.  
 
4.5.1.2 One-Tiered vs. Two-Tiered Model 
One main limitation of the Tobit model is that the decisions of (i) whether to impair goodwill 
or not; and (ii) how much goodwill is impaired are both determined by the same set of 
independent variables (i.e., the Tobit model will necessarily be mis-specified and the 
estimated relationship is statistically unreliable and invalid). To overcome this limitation, 
one might need to have two equations: one for the impairment decision (i.e., a firm’s decision 
to impair its goodwill or not) and one for the magnitude of goodwill-impairments, providing 
that the answer to the first equation is yes. This allows researchers to use different parameters 
(with the same or different regressors) to separately determine the probability of the discrete 
dependent variable being observed (i.e., whether to impair or not), as well as the magnitude 
of the continuous dependent variable (how much to impair). This is often called the hurdle 
model or Heckman two-tiered model, which has emerged as the de facto alternative to the 
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standard Tobit model, particularly when the observed values of the dependent variable are 
clustered at zero due to selection bias rather than mechanisms of censorship (Maddala, 1991; 
Sigelman and Zeng, 1999; Wooldridge, 2002; Wang, 2008; Greene, 2012).  
 
Very few researchers (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ahmed and Guler, 2007) have chosen 
to use mainly the two-tiered model (i.e., Probit and truncated regressions) in their analysis 
of the discrete and continuous choices related to the impairment decision (i.e., whether to 
impair or not) and the magnitude of goodwill-impairment losses (i.e., how much to impair). 
 
 The current study, however, will use a one-tiered model, instead of a two-tiered model, for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, it seems unlikely that the two decisions (i.e., whether to impair 
or not, and if yes, how much to impair) are uncorrelated (Greene, 2012). Secondly and 
relatedly, the two decisions are not necessarily sequential, but are rather made 
simultaneously. This is particularly true in the case of IAS 36, which required the use of a 
one-step approach (or single-step approach), as opposed to the two-step approach53 of SFAS 
142, to both determine if an impairment loss exists and measure the amount of the 
impairment loss. Hence, a joint decision model where the decisions of whether a firm to 
impair its goodwill or not, as well as how much to impair are jointly determined by the 
standard Tobit model (Maddala, 1991).  
 
Riedl (2004) was in favour of this view and wrote: 
“I could alternatively model this in a two-stage design, with the first stage capturing the decision to 
report a write-off, and the second capturing the amount. I choose not to do so, as I assume the two 
                                                          
53 It has been suggested that the alternative two-tiered model is more appropriate in the U.S context, with the 
first model capturing the binary (choice) decision about whether a firms to impair its goodwill or not using a 
probit or a logit regression, and the second model capturing the intensity of goodwill-impairments using a 
truncated regression analysis (Abughazaleh, 2009). 
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choices are simultaneous (and thus captured by the Tobit design) and not sequential (as implied by a 
two-stage design)” (p. 828).  
 
In conclusion one-tiered model is considered more appropriate than two-tiered, and it has 
been adopted by this study. 
 
4.5.1.3 Pooled vs. Panel  
There are three kinds of data that are generally available for empirical analysis: (1) cross-
sectional, (2) time series, and (3) panel or longitudinal data (Dougherty, 2007; Gujarati, 
2009). A panel of data combining the features of cross-sectional data and time series data; 
consist of repeated observations on the same elements (individuals, firms, countries, etc.) 
through time. Unlike pooled data, in a panel data set, the matching cross-sectional units are 
studied over a given time period (Wooldridge, 2012). One should not be confused with an 
unbalanced panel, in which each individual may be observed different numbers of times (i.e., 
the number of observations differs among panel members). However, if each individual has 
the same number of times, then such a dataset is called a balanced panel (Greene, 2012). 
This study uses seven-year (2007-2013) unbalanced54 panel data for 2,466 firms entering 
and exiting the data set. I only include firms with non-zero positive goodwill amounts. 
However, firms that impair the whole amount of their goodwill in a given year will be 
                                                          
54 If I constrain analysis to a balanced panel, by eliminating all individuals with missing observations, the 
resulting sample may suffer from a form of a selection bias known as survivorship bias (Baum, 2006). For 
example, the S&P COMPUSTAT database of U.S. firms contains 20 years of annual financial statement data. 
The set of firms is thus unrepresentative in omitting start-ups (even those of age 19) and firms that were taken 
over during that time. If the sample is unrepresentative, then the inferences drawn from it are not on solid 
footing and are more likely to be erroneous. In the real world, most panel data are unbalanced, i.e. different 
individuals may have different patterns of observed data. Individuals are divided into groups according to their 
data patterns. 
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excluded in that year, with the possibility to be included in the next year, following mergers 
or acquisitions.  
 
A panel dataset offers many advantages over cross-sectional data, or even pooled cross-
sectional data. 
 
 First, it allows for control of unobserved individual- and/or time-specific heterogeneity. It 
has therefore been suggested that panel data enables us to “identify and measure effects that 
are simply not detectable in pure cross-section or pure time-series data” (Baltagi, 2008, p. 
6). When the error or disturbance term, which represents the unexplained variation in y, is 
correlated with any of the independent variables, the estimates of the regression coefficients 
of y on x will be subject to omitted variable bias in the least square estimator of the 
misspecified equation (Dougherty, 2007; Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2003; Greene, 2012).  For 
example, firms’ accounting practice will almost certainly vary across countries (i.e., one is 
interested in testing whether the parameters of the equation predicting the pattern of 
accounting practices vary from one country to another). Hence, not accounting for country 
heterogeneity (or individuality of the country in which firms operate) may cause serious 
misspecification and lead to bias in the resulting estimates or misleading inferences.  
 
Second, pooling time series of cross-sections adds “more informative data, more variability, 
less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” 




Third, the analysis of panel data allows the tracking not only the patterns of change, but also 
the direction of change (i.e., dynamics of change) at both individual and aggregate levels 
(e.g. industry, country, region, etc.) (De Vaus, 2001; Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Fourth, panel data helps to eliminate, or at least reduce, aggregation-based bias by using 
panel data gathered at micro-level, which is believed to be more accurately measured than 
macro-level data (Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2003). 
 
 Fifth, by tracking the temporal sequence/order in which events occur, panel data can be 
more useful than purely cross-sectional data55in drawing causal inferences in situations 
where inferring causality would be very difficult if only a single cross section were available. 
This is a necessary but not sufficient condition56for establishing a cause-and-effect 
relationship, in which the cause is succeeded or followed by its effect (i.e., the cause must 
precede its effect in time) (De Vaus, 2001; Wooldridge, 2012).  
 
Despite the many advantages thereof, panel data is unfortunately marred by a number of 
limitations and problems. Panel data cannot be expected to be panacea for all types of 
problems that cross-sectional or time series data cannot handle alone (Baltagi, 2008); rather 
                                                          
55 One also has to be careful in using time series data to establish causality, because some series contain a time 
trend. Ignoring the fact that two series are trending in the same, or opposite directions can lead to a false or 
misleading conclusion (i.e. spurious association) that one variable causes a change in another variable. In many 
cases, however, the two variables appear to co-vary because they co-occurred over space and time for reasons 
related to other unobserved (i.e. not included in the analysis) factors that actually explain both the cause and 
its effect (De Vaus, 2001; Wooldridge, 2012). 
56 Hair et al. (2010) Suggest that causality can only be supported when certain conditions are met. These 
conditions include the following: (i) Systematic covariance (correlation) between the cause and its effect, (ii) 
The cause must occur before its effect, (iii) Non-spurious association must exist between the cause and its 
effect, and (4) Theoretical support exists for the relationship between the cause and its effect. 
160 
it has been to suggest that panel data has the “potential to exhibit all the problems associated 
with cross-sectional and time series data in addition to problems that are unique to the panel 
data” (Howard, 2009, p. 97). 
 
 First, in panel studies, wherein the same individual is observed or measured at different 
points in time, the observations of one individual over time will not independent of one 
another. It is suggested that individuals who take on extreme values in their initial 
observation will tend to take on less extreme values in their successive or subsequent 
observations. In general, “high scores will tend to get lower and low scores will tend to get 
higher”57 (De Vaus, 2001, p. 135). This phenomenon is referred to as the “regression towards 
the mean”. The word regression was first used by Sir Francis Galton in his well-known 1886 
article, “Regression towards Mediocrity in Hereditary Stature”, in which Galton examined 
the relationship between parents’ height and their children’s height, and showed that tall 
parents, who are above average in height will tend to have children who are shorter than 
their parents, whereas short parents, who are below average in height will tend to have 
children who are taller than their parents (Galton, 1886).  
 
Second, another major problem in panel studies is the loss of cases over time (attrition or 
dropouts). The longer the time spans of a panel study, the greater the chances of attrition. 
Hence, there is always a possibility that the final sample will become composed increasingly 
of different individuals from those who were initially observed when the panel was first 
                                                          
57 In the context of goodwill-impairments, companies that decided to impair their goodwill 
aggressively/excessively after the first year(s) of their acquisition, will tend to impair less in subsequent years, 
since goodwill amounts that are subject to impairment-testing will be smaller. The opposite is also true, 
companies with large amounts of goodwill in their asset portfolio, and chose not to impair or impair less of 
their goodwill, are likely to incur more impairment losses in successive year(s), since goodwill amounts that 
are subject to impairment-testing will be greater (Zang, 2008). 
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recruited (De Vaus, 2001; Baltagi, 2008). However, the sample bias, which is caused by 
attrition, can only be problematic, if attrition does not occur at random, i.e., when certain 
types of individuals are more likely to drop out from the panel than are others (De Vaus, 
2001). Furthermore, the attrition bias only matters at the descriptive level, but not at the 
explanatory level. 
 
 As De Vaus (2001) explains, 
“If, for example, a panel study is biased because of disproportionate dropouts of younger people, this age bias 
only matters if age is linked to the variables that are being examined. If X affects Y, regardless of age, then the 
age bias due to attrition does not matter” (p. 136).   
 
i) Assessing the appropriateness of pooled OLS and panel estimations 
In general, there are three main models for analysing panel or longitudinal data sets: the 
pooled regression model, the fixed-effects (FE) model, and the random-effects (RE) model. 
Econometrically, panel data regressions are different from time-series/cross-sectional 
regressions in that it has a double subscript on its variables. 
Yit =  α + βXit + εit ,   (4.1) 
where 𝐘𝐢𝐭  is the dependent variable, α is the intercept term, 𝐗𝐢𝐭  are the observed explanatory 
variables, 𝛆𝐢𝐭is the disturbance term, the index 𝐢𝐭 refers to the unit of observation and the 
time period respectively. 
 
The simplest way to deal with cross-section and time series data is to estimate a pooled 
regression model (the most restricted model), in which all observations are pooled together 
and estimated by a single equation using OLS, assuming that (1) the regression coefficients 
are constant both cross-sectionally and over time; and (2) unobserved sources of variations 
across individuals is absorbed by the error term. In other words, it often overlooks 
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individual- and/or time-specific effects that exist among cross-sectional and time series units 
by treating all the observations for the all of the time periods as a single sample (Brooks, 
2008; Gujarati, 2003). The pooled OLS, however, is only appropriate if the model is 
correctly specified (the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term) in the sense that the 
observed variables control for all the relevant characteristics of individuals, i.e., there will 
be no unobserved individual characteristics (Dougherty, 2007). If this is not the case, i.e., if 
the unobserved effect is correlated with any of the regressors, the use of pooled OLS is likely 
to yield biased and inconsistent estimators, resulting in an omitted variable bias.  
 
To test for the poolability hypothesis of the data (i.e., the absence of individual-specific 
effects), the study’s data was tested using the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, developed by 
Breusch and Pagan (1980), which allows us to test for the validity of the pooled OLS model 
against the random-effects model, under the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional variance 
components are zero. If the null is not rejected, the pooled OLS is unbiased and consistent; 
if the null is rejected, the random-effects model should be preferred to the pooled OLS. The 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test rejected the null hypothesis (chi2 = 271.40 with a p-value of 
0.0000) that there was no significant difference across firms (i.e., no panel effects), which 
confirms the presence of individual effect in the data. Therefore, for the purpose of this study 
pooled data is not appropriate.  
 
ii) Assessing the appropriateness of fixed-effects and random-effects estimations 
The result of Breusch and Pagan’s test indicates that panel estimation techniques are more 
appropriate than pooled OLS method. In order to account for individual-specific effects (here 
firm-specific effects) or unobserved heterogeneity, two methods of panel data estimations 
are used. These are named as fixed-effects and random-effects estimations. In principle, the 
random-effects models provide more efficient coefficient estimates than do the fixed-effects 
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models, if certain assumptions/preconditions are met (Dougherty, 2007). This is particularly 
the case since random-effects specifications save more degrees of freedom and 
accommodate time-invariant regressors (Greene, 2012). However, if one of the assumptions 
for using random-effects is violated, fixed-effects specifications should be used instead to 
avoid the problem of omitted heterogeneity, or the bias resulting from not being able to 
include certain important explanatory variables in the regression model.  
 
One assumption is that the units of observation in the panel data can be described as drawn 
randomly from a given population, i.e., a random sample (Dougherty, 2007). The other 
assumption is that the population distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity is 
conditionally independent of the observed covariates 𝑋𝑖 (Greene, 2012; Gujarati, 2003).  
 
The fixed-effects estimators are most likely to be consistent when unobserved individual-
specific characteristics are time-invariant (i.e., fixed) and correlated with the regressors, 
whereas the random-effects specification will produce efficient estimates under the null 
hypothesis that those unobserved individual-specific factors are orthogonal to the regressors 
included in the model (Morgan, 2013). Thus, there is a trade-off between consistency and 
efficiency when making a decision between the two models. Thus, an additional test is 
required to find out whether or not the orthogonality assumption actually holds. Therefore, 
using the study’s data a comparison was undertaken between the parameter estimates 
obtained under the fixed-effects and random-effects models using Housman’s (1978) 
specification test. The Hausman test statistic of 214.00 with a p-value of 0.000 provides 
strong evidence that the null hypothesis of orthogonally is rejected, implying that: (i) fixed-
effects and random-effects estimators are statistically significantly (p-value is essentially 
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zero) different from each other, (ii) random-effects estimates are not consistent, and (iii) 
fixed-effects specification is clearly more appropriate. 
 
Another important assumption behind the use of random-effect models instead of fixed-
effects models is that a random-effects approach is more appropriate when making 
inferences about the population from which the sample was randomly drawn, whereas fixed-
effect models are more appropriate when the inferences apply only to the cross-sectional 
units in the sample. In other words, random-effects analyses allow the inference to be 
generalised to the population from which the subjects were selected (Maddala, 1987; Hsiao, 
2003). Given the significant result of the Hausman specification test and the fact that the 
selection of countries and firms was made according to selected criteria relevant to the focus 
of the analysis, random-effects estimates are rejected in favour of fixed-effects estimates. 
 
4.5.2 The Choice of the Study’s Regression Model 
The above discussion shows that: i) a fixed-effects model is preferred to random-effects; and 
ii) the Tobit model is more appropriate than OLS specification. However, some argue that 
Tobit panel estimation (which is appropriate for this study) with fixed-effects may be 
considered inappropriate. In short wide panels (i.e., panels with a large number N of cross-
sectional units observed over short time periods T), a fixed-effects model with limited 
dependent variables will give rise to biased and inconsistent estimates due to the problem of 
incidental parameters (an increase of the number N of cross-section units provides no 
additional information about µ) which the number of parameters goes to infinity while the 
number of time periods is fixed (Wooldridge, 2002; Hsiao, 2003).  
 
However, Greene (2004) has expressed an entirely different view on the Tobit estimation. 
According to him, “the incidental parameters problem is more varied and complicated than 
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the received literature would suggest” (p. 127). Green (2004) presented statistical evidence 
indicating that in a model with continuous variation in the dependent variable, the problem 
of incidental parameters only affects the variance parameters. In particular, the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the variance parameters in the presence of fixed-effects (MLE/FE) 
are biased downward, whereas the MLE/FE of slope coefficients in the Tobit model are not 
systematically biased either upward or downward. He concludes, “The incidental parameters 
problem persists, though not where one might have expected it” (p.127). Moreover, the 
downward bias in the standard deviation of MLE/FE is not innocuous, because this bias will 
diminish fairly rapidly with increasing T. With T=5, the estimators of the disturbance 
variance appear to be only slightly affected by the incidental parameters problem. With T > 
5, the estimators appear to be essentially unbiased.  
 
This argument provides acceptable resolution to the dilemma of choosing between OLS and 
Tobit estimates. Because the dataset contains a large number of left-censored values 
(approximately 85% censoring) and T =7, the Tobit model with fixed-effects will be used to 
meet the stated purpose of the study.  
 
4.5.3 Empirical Models 
On the basis of the above discussion the study develops a fixed-effects Tobit model, which 
allows for censoring of impairment losses at zero, and controls for time-invariant industry 
and country-specific characteristics. I adopt a stepwise regression where I first regress 
goodwill-impairment amounts on the economic and managerial reporting incentives, after 
controlling for all possible time-specific, country-specific, and industry-specific factors that 
may affect the reporting of goodwill-impairments. The following model is developed: 
 Model (1) 
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𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +   𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  +
𝐵10∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +




18 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ,   (4.2)  
   
 
 
I then include all cultural and institutional variables (except book-tax conformity), because 
this variable is not available for Poland and I wanted to include all the countries.  
 
Model (2a) 
 𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +   𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  +
𝐵10∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝛽11𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽15𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝛽26𝐿𝐺_𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑖   +
25
18
 𝛽27𝑃𝑤𝑟_𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽28𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽29𝑀𝑠𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 +𝛽30𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑦_𝐴𝑣𝑑𝑖 +
𝛽31𝐿𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽32𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽33𝑄𝑙𝑡𝑦_𝐿𝑔𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖  + 𝛽34𝐸𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑣𝑙𝑝𝑖   +
𝜀𝑖𝑡   ,                                                  (4.3)                    
 
I then include book-tax conformity, along with all of the variables in the Model (2a), 
(therefore Polish firms were excluded), and the following model is developed:  
 
Model (2b) 
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  +
𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +   𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  +
𝐵10∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝛽11𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽15𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝛽26𝐿𝐺_𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑖   +
25
18
 𝛽27𝑃𝑤𝑟_𝐷𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽28𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽29𝑀𝑠𝑐𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 +𝛽30𝑈𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑦_𝐴𝑣𝑑𝑖 +
𝛽31𝐿𝑛𝑔𝑇𝑟𝑚_𝑂𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽32𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽33𝑄𝑙𝑡𝑦_𝐿𝑔𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖  + 𝛽34𝐸𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑣𝑙𝑝𝑖   +
𝛽35𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   ,           (4.4)        
 
Furthermore, I employ interaction terms between firm-and-country-specific variables to 
investigate the moderating impact of country-specific variables on the relationship between 
firm-specific characteristics and goodwill-impairment losses. 
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4.5.4 Measurement of Variables  
Table 4.1 lists all the variables of interest along with their measures, predicted sign and source of data. These are categorised into economic, 
managerial incentives, cultural, institutional, and control variables.  
Table 4.1 Dependent and Independent Variables: Definition, Predictions, and Data Sources 
Variable Group of Variable Definition Sign Source of Data 
𝑰𝑴𝑷𝒊𝒕 Dependent Firms’ reported goodwill-impairment losses divided by total 
assets at the end of t-1 
 Worldscope 
 
𝑮𝑾𝒊𝒕 Economic Firms’ opening balance of goodwill divided by total assets at 





 Economic Firms’ market value of equity divided by book value of equity 





 Economic Firms’ percent change in market value of equity from t to t-1 - Worldscope 
 
∆𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒊𝒕 Economic Change in operating cash flow from t to t-1 divided by total 








𝜟𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 Economic Change in return on assets from t to t-1 - Worldscope 
 
𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏_𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒕𝒊 Economic Standard deviation of Earnings Per share + Worldscope 
𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆_𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒕𝒊 Economic  A measure of a stock’s average annual price movement to a 
high and low from a mean price for each year 
+ Thomson Financial 
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∆𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒕  Economic Percent change in Gross Domestic Product from t to t-1. - Worldscope 
 
∆𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕_𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 Managerial Incentive
58 Change in the firm’s debt-to-assets ratio from t to t-1 ? Worldscope 
 
𝑶𝑾𝑵𝒊  Managerial Incentive The average of the percentage of shares held by insiders 





𝑩𝑨𝑻𝑯𝒊𝒕 Managerial Incentive This variable is equal to the change in firm’s pre-write off 
earnings from period t to t-1, divided by total assets at the 
end of t-1, when this change is below the median of non-zero 
negative values, and 0 otherwise 
+ Worldscope 
 
𝑺𝑴𝑶𝑶𝑻𝑯𝒊𝒕 Managerial Incentive The variable is equal the change in firm i’s pre-write-off 
earnings from t to t-1 divided by total assets at the end of t- 
1, when this change is above the median of non-zero positive 
values; and 0 otherwise 
+ Worldscope 
 
𝑷𝒘𝒓_𝑫𝒔𝒕𝒊 Cultural Hofstede’s power distance scores - The Hofstede centre 
(geert-hofstede.com) 
𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒗𝒅𝒔𝒎𝒊  Cultural Hofstede’s individualism scores + The Hofstede centre 
(geert-hofstede.com) 
                                                          








 Cultural Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance scores - The Hofstede centre 
(geert-hofstede.com) 
𝑳𝒏𝒈𝑻𝒓𝒎_𝑶𝒓𝒏𝒕 Cultural Hofstede’s long-term orientation scores 
 
+ The Hofstede centre 
(geert-hofstede.com) 
𝑳𝑮_𝑺𝒚𝒔
𝒊   
 
 
Institutional A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm i’s 
country’s legal structure is based on the English common-
law and 0 otherwise 
? Djankov et al (2008) 
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒔𝒕𝒓_𝑷𝒓𝒕𝒄𝒕𝒊 Institutional The principal component of: (1) Revised anti-director rights 
index; (2) Anti-self-dealing index; (3) Strength of investor 






 Institutional The principal component of: (1) Regulatory quality index; 
(2) Corporate ethics; (3) Strength of auditing and reporting 
standards; (4) Efficacy of corporate boards; (5) protection of 
minority shareholders; and (6) Regulation of securities 
Exchanges 
? Appendix (3) 
𝑬𝒒𝒕𝒚𝑴𝒓𝒌𝒕_𝑫𝒗𝒍𝒑
𝒊   
 Institutional The principal component of: (1) the ratio of the number of 
domestic firms listed in a given country to its population; (2) 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP); and 
(3) Stock market total value traded to GDP 
? Appendix (3) 
𝑩𝒐𝒐𝒌_𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊 Institutional A measure of book-tax conformity, which represents the 
amount of variation in current tax expense that cannot be 
explained by the variation in pre-tax earnings, income from 
foreign operations, and dividends 
+ Blaylock et al. (2012)  
170 
𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 Control The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of t-1 ? Worldscope 
 
𝑩𝑰𝑮𝟒𝒊 Control A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firm’s  auditor is 
one of the BIG4 Auditors (i.e., Deloitte, PwC; EY; and 
KPMG) and 0 otherwise 
? Worldscope 
 
𝑪𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒊𝒔𝒕 Control A time dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the years 
during the crisis period (2007-2009) and the value of 0 in the 
years after the crisis period (2010-2013) 
?  
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀 Control Firms’ major industry affiliation ? Worldscope 
 
𝑪𝑶𝑼𝑵𝑻𝑹𝒀 Control Firms’ country of origin ? Worldscope 
 
Note: This table lists all the variables of interest along with their measures, predicted sign and source of data. These are categorised into economic, 
managerial incentives, cultural, institutional, and control variables. 
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4.5.4.1 The Dependent Variable  
This is defined as the firm’s amount of goodwill-impairment losses over its prior year’s total 
assets. This is considered more appropriate for impairment losses reported under IFRS 
regime which uses a one-step approach59, and not a two-step approach which US GAAP 
requires60. In a two-step approach, the impairment decisions (i.e. whether to impair or not, 
as well as how much to impair) are taken sequentially, whereas in a one-step approach, the 
impairment decisions are taken simultaneously or jointly. Therefore, it can be argued that 
under the latter scenario (which applies to this study’s sample), it is more appropriate to 
consider the goodwill-impairment amounts rather than only the goodwill-impairment 
decision, which Glaum et al (2015) used. 
 
Due to the difficulty of separating goodwill-impairment losses into discretionary and non-
discretionary elements, almost all goodwill-impairment studies (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 
2004; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Zang, 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011) employ the 
recorded impairment of the firm-wide goodwill divided by prior year’s total assets. 
 
4.5.4.2 Economic Factors (H16-H25)  
The first economic variable (GWit ), the relative size of goodwill, is meant to proxy for the 
characteristics of goodwill (the importance of goodwill). Companies with large amounts of 
goodwill in their asset portfolio are likely to incur more impairment losses, since the relative 
amount of goodwill exposed to the impairment-testing will be greater (Lapointe-Antunes et 
al., 2008; Zang, 2008; AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011).  
                                                          
59 A one-step approach compares the carrying amount of a CGU (including goodwill) to its recoverable amount. 
When the carrying amount of a CGU is greater than its recoverable amount, an impairment loss is recognised. 
60 An impairment loss is recognised when the carrying amount of the reporting unit (including goodwill) is 
greater than its fair value (Step 1) and the carrying amount of goodwill is greater than the implied fair value of 
the reporting unit goodwill (Step 2). 
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The next five variables (M/Bit  , ∆MrktCapit , ΔSALESit , ∆OCFit  , ΔROAit), controls for 
firm-level performance. The poorer the firm’s performance, the more likely that firm is to 
report larger goodwill-impairment amounts (Francis et al., 1996, Lapointe-Antunes et al., 
2008).  
 
Two more variables (Earn_Volti ,Price_Volti) were included in the analysis. In addition, this 
study included other two variables (∆IND_ROAit ,∆GDPit), to capture changes in the 
underlying economics of industry-specific, and macroeconomic effects respectively. As 
illustrated in the development of the related hypotheses, I predict a negative association 
between goodwill-impairments and these two variables. Companies in badly-performing 
industries may record more impairments, while those in well-performing industries may 
record less write-offs (Francis et al., 1996, Riedl, 2004). Negative changes in GDP are, 
however, indicative of the overall economic decline, implying that firm’s assets may have 
suffered concurrent reductions in their values (Riedl, 2004).  
 
4.5.4.3 Managerial Reporting Incentives  (H26-H28) 
A further five variables (, ∆Debt_Ratioit , OWNit , BATHit ,SMOOTHit), were included in the 
regression analysis to capture reporting incentives that may exist for managers to manipulate 
the reporting of goodwill-impairments. Managers may or may not report the economic 
(actual) impairments of goodwill, if they the incentives to do so. They may face reporting 
incentives to decrease or increase the amounts of goodwill-impairments, which in turn 
affects the inferred precision of recorded impairment losses. 
 
 The first two variables (∆Debt_Ratioit , OWNit ) attempt to control for the financial 
structure (the proportion of debt in the capital structure relative to total assets) and ownership 
structure (the percentage of closely-held shares) respectively. Finding a relationship (either 
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positive or negative) between the amounts of goodwill-impairment losses firms report and 
their financial and/or ownership structure suggests that those reported impairment losses are 
biased because they reflect something that is not a reduction of the current value of goodwill 
(Kvaal, 2005). The other two variables (BATHit ,SMOOTHit) control the change in pre-write-
offs earnings. When earnings are unexpectedly low or high, managers will have incentives 
to increase the amounts of goodwill-impairment losses (i.e., take a bath or smooth earnings). 
 
4.5.4.4 Cultural/Institutional Variables (H1-H15) 
All Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions were included in the analysis namely, Power 
Distance (Pwr_Dst), Individualism (Indvdsmi), Masculinity (Mscntyi), Uncertainty 
Avoidance (Uncrtnty_Avdi), and Long-Term Orientation (LngTrm_Ornti).  
 
Another five institutional variables were also included in the analysis namely, Legal System, 
(LG_Sysi   ), Book-Tax Conformity (Book_Taxi), Investor Protection (Invstr_Prtcti), 
Quality of Legality (Qlty_Lglty), and Development of Equity Markets (EqtyMrkt_Dvlp). 
These variables are intended to capture the efficiency of country-level institutions in 
reducing the incentives for opportunism and self-serving behaviour of managers. The latter 
three institutional variables, Investor Protection (Invstr_Prtcti), Quality of Legality 
(Qlty_Lglty), and Development of Equity Markets (EqtyMrkt_Dvlp), were estimated by the 
author and constitute one of the study’s original contributions to the literature61. Appendix 
(3) shows the country scores for each of these variables. For example, a Greek firm will have 
a value of 3.6 for investor protection, while a French firm will have a value of 7.27. In order 
                                                          
61 Therefore, the study extends Glaum et al. (2015) who have examined the impact of the strength of national 
auditing and accounting enforcement, by only considering the proxy developed by Brown et al. (2014), without 
taking into consideration the impact of other national institutions.   
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to obtain these measures, a lengthy procedure was followed involving exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis. This procedure is explained in the Appendix (1). 
 
4.5.4.5 Control variables 
Finally, five control variables are included in the models, namely: firm size, auditor type, 
crisis period, industry, and country. 
 
Firm size seems able to accommodate various seemingly conflicting aspects of goodwill-
impairment losses. It can be a proxy for political cost as larger firms are subject to more 
scrutiny by the regulations and the public. It can also be a proxy for discretionary impairment 
charges. Large firms –in general- engage more frequently in mergers and acquisitions 
activities (Zang, 2008). This, in turn, may mean that they will be more likely to “impair 
goodwill associated with prior unprofitable acquisitions as the decrease in the carrying value 
of goodwill will be offset by the additions to goodwill” (AbuGhazaleh et al., 2011, pp. 183). 
However, from the informational efficiency point of view, firm size can proxy for an 
economic impairment. Large firms are generally followed by many analyst and thereby 
receive more public scrutiny. This results in “more efficient processing of accounting 
information for these firms and fewer incentives for their managers to manipulate [goodwill-
impairment losses]” (Zang, 2008, p. 49). 
 
Several researchers also argue that auditors can play a private role by assisting public 
authorities in ensuring initial compliance with accounting standards. However, not all 
auditors will necessarily play a greater role in monitoring compliance, DeAngelo (1981) 
found that larger, globally-operating audit firms have particularly strong reputation-based 
incentives to provide higher audit quality, when compared to their smaller, regionally-
oriented counterparts. Francis and Wang (2008) suggest that BIG4 auditors have as strong 
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an incentive to enforce (or impose) a higher level of earnings quality so as to preserve the 
reputation of the firm, and thereby avoid costly litigation. In contrast, non-BIG4 auditors, 
that oversee company’s accounts, are motivated by the desire to maximise their own returns. 
They would, therefore, be likely to keep their mouth shut and turn a blind eye to earnings 
misreporting in order to avoid dismissal by their clients. Based on the above discussion, one 
can expect that firms, which are audited by one of the BIG4 auditors, will record impairment 
losses that better reflect the economic decline in goodwill value. 
  
The study also controls for the effects of the global financial crisis by including an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 in the years during the crisis period (2007-2009) and the 
value of 0 in the years after the crisis period (2010-2013). This is consistent with the view 
of several researchers (e.g. Anand et al., 2013; Dimpfl and Peter, 2014; Aizenman et al., 
2015; Thakor, 2015), who generally agreed with the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) (2010) that the financial crisis technically began in the last quarter of 2007, and 
continued through the end of 2009. It differs, however, from Glaum et al. (2015), who 
defined the pre-crisis period from 2005 to 2007, the crisis-period from 2008 to 2009, and the 
post-crisis period from 2010-2011. 
 
Industry and country dummies are also included to control of industry-specific, and country-
specific characteristics.  
 
4.5.5 Cluster Analysis 
An additional test was carried out using K-means cluster analysis, in order to compare the 
relative magnitude of coefficient estimates (resulting from regressing the impairment losses 
on the economic/reporting incentives) across institutional and cultural clusters of countries. 
Using equation (1) with no country dummies, I first test whether the within-cluster 
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regressions produce slope coefficients that are negative and statistically different from zero. 
Then, I test whether these estimated coefficients differ considerably across country clusters, 
both in terms of their magnitude and their statistical significance. Since the predicted signs 
for all economic impairment proxies are negative within each cluster, a cluster with 
regression coefficients that are negative, significant and larger in absolute value would 
suggest that goodwill-impairment amounts have greater correlations with economic factors, 
in comparison to the other cluster.  
 
4.5.6 The Value Relevance- Model (3) 
Following Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2009) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012), the Ohlson’s 
valuation model -introduced in Chapter 3- was altered by separating goodwill and its 
impairment losses from income and book value of equity. Goodwill is an operating62asset 
that provides returns for investors. The act of writing off goodwill signals to investors that 
management has lost confidence that the assets, which are being written-off, will provide 
higher returns in the future. Impairments of goodwill reduce a company’s stock market 
value. That is, when management records goodwill impairment, it reveals important 
information about its assessment of the value of goodwill assets and expected return on those 
assets. Impairments have a negative relationship with corporate performance, which 
suggests that, once goodwill is written off, it does not continue to produce operating income. 
 
Accordingly, firms reporting impairment losses negatively associated with the market value 
of their own equity, really have a high degree of value-relevance goodwill-impairments. 
According to Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2009), the negative association between firms’ 
                                                          
62 Goodwill makes the whole company worth more than its individual parts. It allows a company to earn above 
average profits with its identifiable net assets. 
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goodwill-impairment losses and their market equity values is consistent with “investors 
perceiving losses as being sufficiently reliable measurements of a reduction in the value of 
goodwill to incorporate them in their valuation assessments” (pp. 56). 
 
The following ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) is used to evaluate the value-
relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. 
𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡 +𝛽2 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐵4 𝐺𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡+𝜀 ,         (4.5) 
 
where  MVit = Market value of firm i’s equity at the end of the year wherein goodwill is 
tested for impairment. 
BVit = Value of firm i‘s equity at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for 
impairment, minus goodwill’s carrying amount at the same year-end. 
NIit = Net income at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for impairment, plus the 
amount of goodwill-impairment losses reported at the same year-end. 
GWAit = Goodwill’s carrying amount at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for 
impairment, plus the amount of goodwill-impairment losses reported at the same year-end. 
GILit = Goodwill-impairment losses reported at the end of t.   
 
Following Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2009) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012), all the variables 
included in the regression model are deflated by the number of common shares outstanding. 
Following Isidro and Raonic (2012), I exclude all observations that do not lie within the 1st 
and 99th percentile of the pooled distribution, and to facilitate the estimation of the pooled 
OLS model (firms are not comparable to others in the pooled sample and/or in the cluster). 
To compare the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses across companies that 
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belong to different country clusters, I need to figure out which of these two clusters has a 
high absolute value for the slope coefficients63of goodwill-impairment loss (β_4), and 
whether that value is negative and statistically significant. Firms within the cluster with a 
significantly larger negative slope (β_4) will have more value-relevant goodwill-impairment 
losses compared to the other cluster.  
    
4.5.7 Data and Sample Selection 
Table 4.2 reports the number of countries included in the study. 
Table 4.2 Selection of Country Sample 
Population of countries 174 
(-) Countries for which IFRS is not permitted, permitted or required for some 
companies 
(82) 
Countries for which IFRS is required for all their domestically-listed companies 92 
(-) Countries that have adopted or intend to adopt IFRS after 2006 on a 
mandatory basis (i.e., late adopter countries)64 
(9) 
Countries that have adopted IFRS for annual reporting periods prior to 2006  83 
(-) Countries with insufficient country/firm data (66) 
Country Sample 17 
Note: This table shows the number of countries in the study’s sample. The sample is restricted mainly to 
countries where IFRSs have been adopted since 2006 on a mandatory basis, and countries with sufficient data.  
The following procedures were used to select the study’s sample. First, I initially included 
countries that meet the following three criteria: 
                                                          
63 From an estimated slope coefficient, one can know: (i) the direction of the impact (positive/increase or 
negative/decrease) that an independent variable may have on a dependent variable, and (ii) by how much the 
dependent variable changes (value or magnitude) when the independent variable increases or decreases 
(Pedace, 2013). 
64 Unlike Glaum et al. (2015), I have only included countries mandating the use of IFRSs for all their domestic 
listed companies. Although Glaum et al. (2015) claimed to analyse the determinants of goodwill-impairment 
decisions for firms that are mandatorily applying IFRSs, they actually included firms domiciled in countries 
for which IFRSs have been adopted on a voluntary basis, such as Israel, New Zealand, and Switzerland. Israel 
and New Zealand, for example, mandated the use of IFRSs for public companies starting 1 January 2008 and 
1 January 2007 respectively (Deloitte, 2015), whilst Switzerland, required IFRS only for certain listed 
companies, as registrants at the main board of the Swiss Exchange are required to use either IFRS or US GAAP 
(PwC, 2014; Deloitte, 2015). 
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(i) Countries for which IASs/IFRSs are required65for the consolidated statements of all 
listed companies prior to 200666. Accordingly, countries where IFRSs are 
prohibited, permitted and required for some domestically-listed firms are excluded.  
 
(ii) Since the availability of a country’s institutional data also limited the selection of 
countries, I included only the ones that were included in Djankov et al. (2008) study, 
and Blaylock et al. (2012).  
 
(iii) Since the number of firms varies considerably across countries, because of 
differences in the size of the country itself, and the size of a country’s equity markets, 
as well as the availability of complete data, it was decided to screen the country 
samples with regard to the total number of firms with goodwill for each country. If 
the number of firms with goodwill was less than 30 for any country, the firms of that 
country were dropped from the empirical analysis. I use this restriction to “avoid 
lopsided representation of countries in the study” (Jaggi and Low, 2000, p. 504), and 
to “increase the homogeneity of the sample and the comparability of the results 
across countries” (Hung, 2001, p. 411). 
 
 As a result of non-availability of country/firm data, 66 countries were dropped from the 
sample, resulting in a sample of 17 countries (A full list of excluded countries is provided 
in Appendix 6).  
 
                                                          
65 According to Francis et al. (2005), “voluntary disclosure incentives appear to operate independently of 
country-level factors” (p. 1125). 
66 Detailed information about the adoption of IASs/IFRSs by country can be found in the publications of (PwC, 
2013; Deloitte, 2015; IFRS, 2015). 
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Table 4.3 reports the number of companies included in the study (2, 466). 
Table 4.3 Description of the sampling procedures 
Population of Companies  7,802 
(-) Companies operating in financial industries (1,739) 
Non-financial companies 6,063 
(-) Companies with non-positive (i.e., negative and zero) goodwill for any 
year in the 2006-2012 period 
(2,356) 
Companies with positive Goodwill during  the 2006-2012 period  3,707 
(-) Foreign Companies  (201) 
Domestically-listed companies 3,506 
(-) Companies that do not use IFRS from 2006 onwards67 (1,040) 
Sample Companies 2,46668 
Note: This table shows the number of companies in the study’s sample. The sample is mainly restricted to non-
financial companies, and companies with positive goodwill over the period 2006-2012. 
The following selection criteria were used. The total number of companies for the 17 sample 
countries was 7,802. From this number the following types of companies were excluded: 
(i) Subsidiaries of foreign companies or foreign companies listed on local exchanges 
are excluded for two reasons. First, these companies might be subject to different 
rules. For instance, non-EU companies listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange 
can apply Japanese, US or Canadian GAAP. Second, a foreign corporation will also 
be subject to a different taxation system.  
 
(ii) As in prior goodwill-impairment studies (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; 
Abughazaleh at al., 2011; Amiraslani et al., 2013), companies in the financial 
services industry, i.e., those with four-digit Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB) codes between (8000) and (8995), were excluded from the sample, as certain 
                                                          
67 In order to ensure that all sample firms are applying IFRSs, I only include those firms with a Worldscope 
accounting standard followed code equal to 23 (IFRS). To check for the validity (i.e. accuracy) of this indicant, 
a manual check on a random sample of firms’ annual reports has been performed.  
68 If I excluded firms that did not use IFRS from 2005 onwards, I would end up with only 1,615 firms that have 
adopted IFRS from 2005 onwards. 
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regulatory provisions (or specific disclosure requirements) normally apply to these 
companies, and thereby creating different incentives/opportunities from those in 
non-financial industries to manage accounting figures (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). I, 
therefore, restrict the sample to non-financial industries to increase the sample 
homogeneity and comparability of research findings. 
 
(iii) Non-IFRS companies that do not use IFRSs as the framework for preparing their 
consolidated financial statements.69In addition, I exclude: (i) Firm/Year-
observations with negative book value of equity, negative goodwill/impairment; and 
 
(iv) Firm/Year-observations with missing data.  
 
The final sample is 2,466.  
 
The data were obtained from Thomson Financial’s Datastream and Worldscope databases. 
The dataset contains accounting/financial data on publicly-listed companies across 
economies which use different currencies. I convert the data from local currency to the 
United States Dollar (USD) using Worldscope currency.  
 
4.5.8 The Study’s period 
This study restricts the sample period to (2007-2013) to ensure that only mandatory adopters 
of IFRSs are included in the sample. Consistent with prior research (e.g. Isidro and Raonic, 
2012; Amiraslani et al., 2013), I exclude any observations falling within the first year of 
                                                          
69 On this point, I am truly indebted to Professor Donna Street, whose insightful comments and constructive 
suggestions have helped me to think more carefully, critically, and precisely about this issue.    
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mandatory adoption of IFRSs (i.e., 2005). IFRSs had become mandatory in Europe 
(EU/EEA) and many countries (e.g. Australia and South Africa) for accounting periods 
beginning on or after 1 January 2005. Hence, theoretically, 2005 denotes the first year in 
which ‘all’ publicly-listed companies would generally prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in compliance with the requirements of IFRS standards. This, however, is only 
true for companies with fiscal year ending on 31 December 2005. As Glaum et al. (2013) 
state, “Companies with year-ends earlier than 31 December tended to postpone IFRS 
adoption until 2006” (p. 197). Isidro and Raonic (2012) also suggest that “for certain firms 
with fiscal year end different from 31st December, the adoption of IFRSs occurs only in year 
2006” (p. 28).  
 
One way of solving this problem is by dropping companies with year-end earlier than 31 
December 2005 (or companies using other than FRS after 2005).  This particular solution, 
which is adopted by Glaum et al. (2013) and André et al. (2015), will not be without cost, 
however, since it reduces the number of firms included in this study by 1891 firms. In order 
to avoid loss in sample firms, I have adopted a more ‘practical’ solution, excluding the 
observations of the year 2005. This solution also resembles the procedure adopted by Isidro 
and Raonic (2012). This is unlike Glaum et al. (2015), who included 2005 observations in 
their study. 
 
In addition to the above, excluding 2005 has several advantages. First, it will alleviate the 
effect of an early adoption of IFRSs. This is discussed in detail below. Second, because the 
analyses contain variables measured using lagged data, this restriction procedure will “avoid 
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intermingling financial data from both regimes within a single observation, 70and should 
result in a better specification for my analyses” (Riedl, 2004, pp. 835). Third, given the 
impairment standard was published in 31 March 2004, and IFRS has become effective for 
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005, firms had relatively little time to adapt their 
accounting systems when implementing IFRS 3 and IAS 36 in their first IFRS financial 
statements (Riedl, 2004; Glaum et al., 2013). Thus, it may take several years before these 
firms can fully understand the disclosure requirements associated with impairments of 
goodwill.71As Nobes (2011a) asserts, firms adopting IFRSs for the first time are more likely 
to continue with their previous accounting policy choices, wherever possible, resulting in a 
lower level of compliance with IFRSs in the first year(s) after the transition to IFRS 
standards. It is more likely that consistency in the application of goodwill-impairment testing 
will increase over time between countries. This phenomenon is known as regression to the 
mean, mediocrity, or the catch-up effect. Countries can imitate and learn from other leading 
countries, i.e. knowledge spill-over. There will be a consistent diminution of variance not 
among the mean groups but among individual enterprises/countries.   
 
4.6 Summary 
Based on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, testable hypotheses were 
developed to answer the research question of what events and circumstances induce firms, 
which operate in different countries, to report impairment losses of high quality. Taking into 
account the national environment within which firms operate, I hypothesised that the 
                                                          
70 Consistent with this view, Abdul Majid (2013) wrote, “There was an information gap concerning the opening 
goodwill balance at the initial year of the implementation of FRS 3 provided by Datastream… the database did 
not provide an opening goodwill balance in 2006 on the new basis” (p. 147, emphasis added). 
71 Untabulated results indicate that no additional significance is added to the model when an indicator variable 
was added to capture whether the firm has adopted IFRS for annual periods beginning before 2006. 
  
184 
impairments of goodwill are conceptually a function of factors underlying the economic 
performance of firms, and managers’ reporting incentives, as well as the constraints that are 
placed upon them. This is particularly true since the impairment standard (IAS 36) is written 
in a way that encourages, if not necessitates, the exercise of managerial judgements (for 
example, identifying possible triggering events that lead to the impairment of goodwill, 
allocating goodwill to CGU(s), estimating the future cash flows, and choosing the discount 
rate). 
 
 Whether or not managers use their own judgement efficiently to report impairment losses 
that are more dominant in their association with economic factors than reporting incentives 
will depend upon the differing constraints imposed on them. These constraints include a 
variety of factors that are typically outside the control of firms (i.e., external), including legal 
and tax system, investor protection, quality of legality and stock market development. 
Therefore, it is more likely that the quality of impairment losses will be high when companies 
have BIG4 auditors, and operate in countries characterised by Common-law judicial system, 
low book-tax alignment, strong investor protection laws and enforcement, and equipped with 
more developed equity markets. The chapter also outlines the research design, country 
selection/sampling, specific data collection methods, and finally methods and processes of 
analysis.
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5 Chapter 5: The Determinants of Goodwill-impairment Losses 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the empirical results with respect to the first research question of the 
study, i.e., to investigate the factors that influence goodwill-impairment amounts. It is 
structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients 
for the variables used in the regression analysis. Section 5.3 presents the results of the 
multivariate Tobit analysis relating to the determinants of goodwill-impairment amounts 
(after controlling for country, industry and firm-specific characteristics), as well as the 
results of alternative model specification variable definitions. In this section, I also 
investigate the direct and indirect impact of institutional factors on abnormal goodwill-
impairment amounts. 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 shows the total number of firm-year observations per country over the sample 
period (2007-2013).  
The number of observations per country ranges from 217 for Portugal to 2,961 for Australia. 
As can be seen from the table, Australia and UK had both a higher representation (17.15% 
and 14.92% respectively), followed by those firms operating in France and Germany, which 
comprised 12.53% and 10.50% respectively, which are much higher than the overall mean 
proportion amounted to approximately 6% of the sample observations. These four countries, 
together, comprise more than 55% of the sample observations. This is not surprising since 





Table 5.1 The distribution of the Sample by Country 
Country Freq. Percent Cum. 
Australia 2,961 17.15 17.15 
Austria 245 1.42 18.57 
Belgium 406 2.35 20.92 
Denmark 441 2.55 23.48 
Finland 609 3.53 27.01 
France 2,163 12.53 39.54 
Germany 1,813 10.5 50.04 
Greece 560 3.24 53.28 
Italy 1,029 5.96 59.25 
Netherlands 371 2.15 61.39 
Norway 497 2.88 64.27 
Poland 840 4.87 69.14 
Portugal 217 1.26 70.4 
South Africa 959 5.56 75.95 
Spain 497 2.88 78.83 
Sweden 1,078 6.24 85.08 
United Kingdom 2,576 14.92 100 
Total 17,262 100  
 In contrast, firms operating in Portugal, Austria, Netherland, Belgium, and Denmark have 
a lower presentation within the research sample, comprising approximately 1.26%, 1.42%, 
2.15%, 2.35% and 2.55% of the sample observations respectively. While the rest of the 
17,262 sample observations were somewhat evenly divided between countries; relatively 
higher numbers are found in Sweden, Italy, South Africa, and Poland. The remaining 
observations were Finland, Greece, Spain, and Norway. These indicate that the sample 
observations used in this study to run the tests were not equally distributed among countries. 
This is despite the fact that the companies have been selected without prejudice.   
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Table 5.2 shows the total number of firms reporting goodwill impairment losses, by country, 
over the sample period (2007-2013), on an annual basis. 
Table 5.2 The Number of Firms Reporting Goodwill-Impairment Losses by Year and Country 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Australia 34 49 79 50 65 65 46 388 
Austria 9 10 12 9 6 6 5 57 
Belgium 8 10 5 9 6 5 3 46 
Denmark 9 15 19 6 6 4 2 61 
Finland 11 19 20 12 10 13 12 97 
France 44 65 74 58 65 58 42 406 
Germany 30 51 59 32 33 32 36 273 
Greece 3 2 6 7 13 3 1 35 
Italy 13 22 18 19 26 13 7 118 
Netherlands 10 16 13 8 15 12 3 77 
Norway 11 16 15 11 12 3 5 73 
Poland 7 8 9 11 8 11 3 57 
Portugal 2 5 7 6 11 5 4 40 
South Africa 27 29 34 35 35 31 34 225 
Spain 5 8 9 12 17 7 11 69 
Sweden 13 19 24 20 22 12 14 124 
United Kingdom 42 63 69 52 56 40 46 368 
Total 278 407 472 357 406 320 274 2,514 
As can be seen, France, Australia, UK, Germany and South Africa have a greater number of 
impairment observations during the sample period, indicating that firms operating in those 
countries seem to impair their goodwill more often, when compared to their counterparts in 
countries such as Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Austria, Poland, and Denmark. This may be 
true only for some countries, but not for all.  
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By taking the total number of observations per country into consideration, it shows that firms 
operating in Greece, Poland, and Belgium are less likely to report goodwill impairment 
losses. Greek firms have fewer observations of impairment losses (35 out of 560), implying 
that Greek firms seemed reluctant to impair their goodwill. Interestingly, the impairments of 
goodwill occur more frequently in South African and Austrian firms (23.46% and 23.27% 
respectively). In addition, the last row of the table shows that firms, regardless of their own 
jurisdiction, have been found to recognise goodwill-impairments more frequently during the 
global financial crisis period (2008-2009) than any other period of the study. This is not 
surprising, since firms that report goodwill-impairment losses during a crisis period will be 
judged less harshly than firms doing so during a normal period. However, the pre-crisis 
period (2007) and the post-crisis period (2012-2013) have both witnessed a significant 
decrease in the number of firms recording goodwill-impairments. 
 
Table 5.3 displays the total amount of goodwill-impairment losses (in USD million) for each 
country during the study period (2007-2013). 
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Table 5.3 Total Amounts of Goodwill-impairment Losses (in USD million) per Country 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Australia 50.95 6,502.93 1,530.26 1,269.67 9,737.40 10,999.11 4,874.41 34,964.73 
Austria 38.54 119.61 683.02 197.09 419.96 39.05 79.87 1,577.14 
Belgium 73.65 596.29 54.59 26.81 20.22 200.54 477.67 1,449.77 
Denmark 552.34 977.17 161.81 72.94 92.02 1.93 39.34 1,897.55 
Finland 1,066.60 975.38 1,508.55 163.07 1,586.35 1,251.30 565.21 7,116.46 
France 1,012.78 8,996.51 4,436.11 2,799.46 7,368.32 5,461.82 2,456.89 32,531.89 
Germany 1,583.64 5,136.73 6,759.39 808.83 4,536.38 4,962.75 863.21 24,650.93 
Greece 11.10 27.64 3.38 35.98 369.43 11.44 19.58 478.55 
Italy 67.75 416.47 516.54 1,207.60 12,277.28 10,862.20 33.96 25,381.80 
Netherlands 41.21 3,187.40 848.87 30.19 1,453.16 1,289.36 149.85 7,000.04 
Norway 653.43 640.40 490.58 131.80 327.37 774.55 89.75 3,107.88 
Poland 4.22 15.23 80.02 31.29 10.64 91.90 1.93 235.23 
Portugal 0.41 32.10 45.13 38.75 128.31 14.74 9.10 268.54 
South Africa 93.15 517.76 178.43 574.44 341.21 1,760.27 308.81 3,774.07 
Spain 68.39 129.42 117.59 327.10 1,108.50 669.74 3,128.00 5,548.74 
Sweden 416.58 313.29 338.99 839.34 945.36 98.68 103.27 3,055.51 
United Kingdom 23,547.76 12,775.63 14,982.22 5,300.38 19,609.64 14,956.69 17,002.78 108,175.10 
Total 29,282.50 41,359.96 32,735.48 13,854.74 60,331.55 53,446.07 30,203.63 261,213.93 
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Figure 5.1 shows the goodwill impairment amounts by country as percentage of the total of 
all countries’ goodwill impairment losses. 
Figure 5.1 Total Goodwill-impairment Losses in Percentage 
 
   Note: This figure shows the goodwill impairment amounts by country as a percentage of the total of all       
countries’ goodwill impairment losses. 
As shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1, the hardest hit counties in terms of actual dollar 
impairment losses were the UK, which accounted for almost 41% of the goodwill-
impairment recognised, followed by Australia, France, Italy and Germany (despite higher 
presentation of firm sample, German companies tend to report lower amounts of impairment 
losses but higher frequency compared to their Italian counterparts), which accounted for 
between 13% and 9% of the total goodwill-impairment losses. Poland, Portugal, Greece, 
Belgium, Austria (although Austrian firms seemed to have recorded more frequently but 
smaller amounts of impairment losses) and Denmark registered the lowest goodwill-




































Clearly, from the table above, it can be seen that there was an almost fourfold increase in the 
impairment losses recognised between 2010 and 2011. In total, $60.33 billion of impairment 
losses were recognised in 2011, amounting to approximately 23% of the reported goodwill-
impairment. Comparatively, the 2010-period saw the lowest level of total impairment losses, 
which accounted for only about 5% of companies’ total impairment losses. 
 
 Overall, goodwill-impairment continued to decline across a number of countries throughout 
the remainder of the study period. This downward movement represents a continuation of 
the trend in 2012-2013, when fewer companies took less goodwill-impairment charges 
compared to 2011. In 2008, there was, however, an approximately 41.24% increase in the 
total amount of impairment losses incurred in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
Goodwill-impairment losses surprisingly decreased by more than 20.85% in 2009 over 2008, 
in spite of the increase in the number of impairment observations from 407 to 472. This was 
surprising because impairment losses were supposed to not only increase in frequency, but 
also in terms of actual dollar amounts72, particularly in the later recession period. When the 
impairment of goodwill occurs more often but in lower amounts during crisis periods, in 
which companies are not only expected to record impairment losses more frequently but also 
in greater amounts; then companies can send a –misleading- massage to regulators, 
investors, and auditors that they adhere to the impairment standard, and the resultant 
impairment losses are incurred in response to deteriorating economic conditions under which 
companies operate.
                                                          
72 According to Barth et al. (2008), “higher quality accounting results in a higher frequency of larger losses” 
(pp. 477).  
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Table 5.4 provides information concerning the cultural and institutional characteristics for the countries sample. 
























Australia English Common 8.7 141.03 11.91 0.243 51 90 36 61 21 
South Africa English Common 10.27 232.95 12.24 0.131 49 65 49 63 34 
United Kingdom English Common 11.04 144.36 11.5 0.415 35 89 35 66 51 
Belgium French Code 8.22 76.73 11.22 0.231 94 75 65 54 82 
France French Code 7.27 95.69 11.12 0.581 86 71 68 43 63 
Greece French Code 3.6 56.89 9.52 0.579 100 35 60 57 45 
Italy French Code 6.68 42.95 8.28 0.534 75 76 50 70 61 
Netherlands French Code 4.71 100.78 11.54 0.575 53 80 38 14 67 
Portugal French Code 6.82 53.44 10.07 0.671 99 27 63 31 28 
Spain French Code 6.35 110.52 9.74 0.785 86 51 57 42 48 
Austria German Code 5.37 46.11 11.43 0.77 70 55 11 79 60 
Germany German Code 5.82 60.67 11.46 0.123 65 67 35 66 83 
Poland German Code 6.26 46.02 9.49 . 93 60 68 64 38 
Denmark Scandinavian Code 7.63 83.35 11.78 0.399 23 74 18 16 35 
Finland Scandinavian Code 7.08 100.71 12.18 0.604 59 63 33 26 38 
Norway Scandinavian Code 7.56 81.09 12.04 0.126 50 69 31 80 35 
Sweden Scandinavian Code 6.78 126.88 12.47 0.424 29 71 31 5 53 
Note: The table shows the cultural and institutional characteristics of the 17 countries included in the study’s sample.
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As can be seen from the table, stronger institutions have been found in countries whose legal 
origins are English and Scandinavian. The table visually summarises the main findings, 
where dark (light) grey areas represent high (low) values for investor protection, 
development of equity market, and quality of legality, but low (high) book-tax conformity 
(Book-Tax). As Table 5.4 illustrates, countries differ considerably in terms of their 
underlying institutional and cultural structures. This does not, however, rule out that a robust 
pattern in institutional/cultural characteristics exists across certain countries. The table 
clearly shows that many of these institutional/cultural characteristics are interrelated. The 
high concentration of dark cells in the upper and lower part of the table suggests that the 
variables are not independent. 
 
That is not surprising. Many scholars in the fields of accounting and finance (e.g. La Porta 
et al., 1997, 1997, and 2006; Djankov et al., 2008; Leuz, 2010; Nobes and Parker, 2010; 
Choi and Meek, 2011) documented that English-law origin countries tend to have a higher 
degree of investor protection, a relatively high quality of law enforcement and, consequently 
more developed equity markets. As Table 5.4 illustrates, grouping countries by legal origin 
produces similar results. English-law origin countries display the highest scores in almost 
all characteristics of institutions, and the lowest for book-tax conformity. The only exception 
is the quality of legality, for which Scandinavian countries tend to score higher. The table 
also reveals that English and Scandinavian countries may be contrasted with French 
countries on the one hand, and German countries on the other. In particular, English and 
Scandinavian countries are exhibiting relatively lower levels of power distance/uncertainty 
avoidance, relatively higher levels of individualism, and short-term orientation, in contrast 
with countries of French and German legal origin.    
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Table 5.5 displays a summary of descriptive statistics for all of the institutional and cultural 
variables included in this study, except for the legal system which is a categorical variable 
(common vs code law). 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics for Institutional and Cultural Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Invstr_Prtct 7.07 1.84 3.60 11.04 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp 94.13 48.36 42.95 232.95 
Qlty_Lglty 11.06 1.20 8.28 12.47 
Book_Tax 0.449 0.224 0.123 0.785 
Pwr_Dst 44 18 11 68 
Indvdlsm 66 17 27 90 
Msclnty 49 23 5 80 
Uncrtnty_Avd  66 25 23 100 
LngTrm_Ornt 50 18 21 83 
 As shown in the table above, there are considerable differences across countries in the 
degree of development of equity markets (EqtyMrkt_Dvlp). Therefore, international 
accounting standards setters and regulators should step up their efforts in the development 
of equity markets to narrow the differences and catch up. From the data in Table 5.4, it is 
apparent that South Africa, UK, Australia, and Sweden have relatively well-developed 
domestic equity markets compared to any other country in the sample. In particular, 
development of equity market has a score of 233 for South Africa, 144 for the UK, 141 for 
Australia, and 127 for Sweden. This indicates that development of equity markets can be a 
good proxy and less arbitrary than any other institutions, absorbing most of the institutional 
differences across countries. 
 
Relatively, quality of legality (Qlty_Lglty) and investor protection (Invstr_Prtct) both have 
lower standard deviation, 1.20 and 1.84 respectively, of which investor protection has the 
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lowest standard deviation (when compared to its mean σ/μ) and exerts the least influence on 
environmental differences across the 17 countries included in the sample. It also means that 
the environmental differences across the sample of countries are mainly represented in book-
tax conformity (Book_Tax), and EqtyMrkt_Dvlp, with little differences in Qlty_Lglty and 
Invstr_Prtct. 
 
Table 5.6 presents the summary of the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables for a pooled sample of 17 countries over the 2007-2013 period. 
Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics for Economic/Reporting Incentives Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IMP 17,142 0.005 0.031 0.000 0.860 
GW 16,477 0.154 0.166 0.000 0.969 
M/B 16,474 2.592 8.971 0.019 377 
ΔMrktCap 16,820 0.213 1.729 -0.982 105.690 
ΔOCF 17,134 0.005 1.256 -74.875 73.817 
ΔSALES 17,209 0.156 10.654 -783 1,038 
ΔROA 16,882 259 36,515 -184,763 4738041 
Earn_Volt 17,255 18.509 635.146 0.000 31,120 
Price_Volt 17,045 34.107 11.530 9.746 80.569 
ΔIndMD_ROA 17,262 -0.350 1.141 -3.105 3.440 
ΔGDP 17,262 1.004 2.734 -8.864 7.202 
OWN 17,017 43.587 23.219 0.046 99.500 
ΔDebt_Ratio 17,186 42.535 19,503 -1771451 1771378 
BATH 17,262 -0.203 12.120 -1,312 0.000 
SMOOTH 17,034 0.121 2.585 0.000 173.100 
SIZE 17,238 5.796 2.372 -4.605 12.894 
As can be seen, the amount of goodwill-impairment, on average, represents a small 
proportion (0.5%) of total assets, when taking into account both impairing and non-impairing 
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firms. Note that impairing observations represent roughly 15% of the total observations. If 
only observations that have impairment losses were kept, the average percentage of 
goodwill-impairments would increase to approximately 4% of total assets. The table also 
highlights the materiality of goodwill, which comprised, on average, over 15% of assets for 
the full pooled sample. 
 
5.3 Regression Analysis 
Since the reporting amounts of goodwill-impairment losses (i.e., the dependent variables in 
this study) are non-negative integers and they are censored at Zero, many econometricians 
(e.g. Gujarati, 2009) arguably suggest that the Tobit model is more appropriate than OLS. 
The use of OLS is, therefore, more likely to produce biased (downward) and inconsistent 
parameters estimators (i.e., linear regression that ignores this feature of censored data tends 
to be heavily skewed toward underestimating the actual slope of the data).  
 
5.3.1 Multicollinearity Analysis 
There are many ways to detect the multicollinearity problem among independent variables. 
One way is to examine the matrix of correlations for possible interactions among two 
independent variables. Another way to detect multicollinearity is to calculate the tolerance 
or its inverse (VIF), bearing in mind that if collinearity is present, STATA will automatically 
drop one of the regressors and indicate its coefficient value (dropped).   
 
5.3.1.1 Correlation Coefficients 
Before the regression model was run, data were checked for multicollinearity. Table 5.7 
presents the relationship between each pair of independent variables included in Model (1), 
as well as the dependent variable. These correlations are based on the pooled sample of firm-
year observations over the sample period (2007-2013). 
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The pairwise correlations table shows that almost all actual/economic (with the exception of 
ΔGDP) impairment proxies were correlated, in the predicated direction, with goodwill-
impairment losses (IMP). However, only three of them (GW, ΔMrktCap, and Price_Volty) 
were statistically significant at conventional levels. These three variables appear to be more 
important than any other single variable in the model (M/B, ΔOCF, ΔSALES, Earn_Volt, 
and). In particular, GW and Price_Volt were both positively and significantly correlated with 
IMP, corresponding to the predicted signs. ΔMrktCap was negative and statistically 
significant. Surprisingly, the table also shows that all reporting incentives proxies (OWN, 
ΔDebt_Ratio, BATH, and SMOOTH) failed to show statistically significant correlations 
with goodwill-impairment losses (IMP). This is because the bivariate partial correlations 
shown in Table 5.7 fail to take into account how multiple independent variables interact with 
each other and ultimately affect the dependent variable. This joint effect is considered in a 
multivariate analysis, but not in bivariate analysis. As Beierle and Cayford (2002) 
emphasise, the main advantage of multivariate over bivariate correlation is the ability to 




Table 5.7 presents the correlation coefficients for the variables of interest and their level of significance.  
  Table 5.7 Pairwise Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. IMP 1.000                
2. GW 0.1931* 1.000               
3. M/B -0.0280* -0.0260* 1.000              
4. ΔMrktCap -0.0305* -0.0186* 0.0499* 1.000             
5. ΔOCF -0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.0476* 1.000            
6. ΔSALES -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.1711* 0.1949* 1.000           
7. ΔROA -0.013 0.004 0.011 0.0177* -0.007 0.004 1.000          
8. Earn_Volt 0.003 0.013 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 1.000         
9. Price_Volt 0.1303* 0.0520* 0.0401* 0.0967* -0.001 0.0176* 0.010 0.003 1.000        
10. IndMD_ROA -0.015 0.0267* 0.0340* 0.0804* -0.001 0.009 0.005 0.001 -0.009 1.000       
11. ΔGDP 0.0240* -0.004 0.0348* 0.005 0.000 0.0158* 0.007 -0.015 0.1113* 0.3917* 1.000      
12. OWN -0.010 -0.1546* -0.0363* -0.010 0.009 0.002 -0.004 0.013 -0.007 0.001 -0.0299* 1.000     
13. ΔDebt_Ratio -0.002 -0.010 -0.014 -0.0379* 0.003 -0.001 -0.1289* -0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.000 1.000    
14. BATH 0.002 0.014 -0.008 -0.1062* 0.0873* -0.0465* 0.003 0.000 -0.0262* -0.0211* -0.009 0.000 -0.0767* 1.000   
15. SMOOTH -0.004 -0.0308* 0.0282* 0.0956* -0.002 0.0330* 0.3117* 0.001 0.0668* 0.0250* 0.0259* 0.011 -0.002 0.001 1.000  
16. SIZE -0.0733* 0.0228* -0.0628* -0.0988* 0.012 -0.0231* 0.0272* -0.014 -0.5666* -0.0282* -0.1531* -0.2160* -0.0250* 0.0584* -0.1217* 1.000 
The * denotes correlation coefficients with values greater than or equal to 5% significance level. 
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Diagnostic tests were further carried out to check for the problems of multicollinearity in the 
data. One of the rules of thumb to detect multicollinearity is that the pairwise correlation 
between two regressors is near or above 0.8 (Gujarati, 2009). A correlation higher than 0.7 
is considered strong, below 0.4 is weak, and between these thresholds is a moderate 
relationship. The table shows that the independent variables do not highly correlate with one 
another. The pairwise relationships between the independent variables are mostly very 
modest. The highest pairwise correlation coefficient is 0.57 between Price_Volt and SIZE, 
indicating that there is no sign of collinearity among the independent variables included in 
the empirical analysis. 
 
5.3.1.2 VIF 
 Another statistical method for detecting multicollinearity is VIF. However, VIF command 
does not work after running a Tobit model in STATA. In order to produce tolerance and VIF 
values, I ran OLS regression using all the variables included in the Model (1). Untabulated 
results showed that no variable in a VIF value more than the critical cut point of 10. The 
highest VIF values are 6.96 for ΔSALES, 4.74 for BATH, and 2.21 for ΔOCF. 
 
5.3.2 Heteroscedasticity 
 In order to check for the presence of heteroscedasticity, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
test was carried out in this study, and the null hypothesis (the error term is homoscedastic) 
was strongly rejected and the presence of heteroscedasticity is supported. To account for the 




5.3.3 The Normality Assumption 
 Since the residuals from the Tobit model are not well defined (i.e., residuals will not be 
normal because of censoring), testing the errors for normality does not apply to the censored 
regression model. Based on the central limit theorem, in a sufficiently large number of 
observations, residuals will be asymptotically normally distributed (Gujarati, 2009). 
According to Amemiya (1973), cited in Baltagi, (2008, p. 390), “the maximum likelihood 
estimate (MLE) is, in general, consistent, asymptotically normal and efficient”. This explains 
why the majority of on asset write-offs (and goodwill-impairment) studies have considered 
the Tobit model as the theoretically correct model to control for the censorship by including 




This study does not test for autocorrelation (error terms are correlated), since autocorrelation 
appear to be more common in macro panels with a long time series (20-30 years). In general, 
autocorrelation does not apply to micro panels (with very few years). Besides, many 
econometricians (e.g. Baltagi, 2008) suggest that autocorrelation is more likely to occur in 
time-series data rather than in cross-sectional data. 
 
5.4 Determinants of Goodwill-Impairment Losses: Empirical Analysis 
Table 5.8 presents results for the estimation of four model variants. In model (1), goodwill-
impairment losses are explained solely by micro/macro-economic factors and reporting 
incentives, after controlling for the effects of size, ownership structure, industry, country, 
and financial crisis. Model (2a) includes, in addition to the specified predictor variables, nine 
additional variables that capture the region-specific cultural, legal, institutional and 
governance arrangements. Model (2b) is a modified version of model (2a). It includes the 
201 
extent of book-tax conformity (Book_Tax) as an institutional variable, along with all of the 
variables in the model (2a), to capture the influence of book-tax alignment on goodwill-
impairment amounts. Model (4) employs interaction terms between economic factors and 
reporting incentives, as well as organisational/environmental constraints to understand more 
thoroughly how these factors jointly impact the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
All models are estimated using Stata (version 13). The coefficients in all models are jointly 
significant according to the F-test, suggesting that all models are well specified. The 
calculated F-statistic for model (2a), which entails all cultural and institutional variables 
(Book_Tax), is found to be higher than the F-statistic for the other models, indicating an 
improved overall goodness-of-fit. The high value of the F-statistic can be attributed to the 
lower number of variables. All models are estimated with robust errors, as the robust option 
produces standard errors that are asymptotically robust to panel heteroscedasticity. For all 
models, the default industry is utilities, and the default country is Australia. 
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Table 5.8 Determinants of Goodwill-impairment Losses 
Variable Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b Interaction 
GW 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.538*** 
 (12.096) (12.105) (12.182) (4.781) 
M/B -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.007 
 (-6.716) (-6.787) (-6.667) (0.673) 
ΔMrktCap -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.027 
 (-1.424) (-1.460) (-1.513) (-0.948) 
ΔOCF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.426* 
 (-0.524) (-0.539) (-0.463) (1.893) 
ΔSALES -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.016 
 (-2.040) (-2.042) (-1.996) (-0.272) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005 
 (-2.878) (-2.882) (-2.868) (-0.778) 
Earn_Volt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.299) (-0.252) (-0.283) (-0.997) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (7.168) (7.027) (7.000) (0.206) 
ΔIndMd_ROA 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.036** 
 (1.149) (0.796) (0.559) (2.106) 
ΔGDP -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (-1.089) (-0.360) (-0.404) (0.020) 
OWN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.758) (1.431) (1.628) (0.419) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002 
 (3.245) (3.135) (3.346) (1.028) 
BATH 0.059 0.059 0.058 0.530 
 (1.313) (1.301) (1.262) (0.762) 
SMOOTH 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.440 
 (2.987) (3.014) (3.024) (0.784) 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
203 
 (10.255) (10.511) (10.658) (6.053) 
BIG4 -0.006* -0.005* -0.007** -0.023 
 (-1.815) (-1.651) (-2.050) (-1.242) 
Crisis Period 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (3.336) (3.338) (3.079) (2.737) 
Basic Materials 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.010 
 (1.217) (1.221) (0.949) (1.355) 
Industrials 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
 (2.598) (2.716) (2.702) (3.297) 
Consumer Goods 0.016** 0.017** 0.018** 0.020*** 
 (2.152) (2.218) (2.372) (2.806) 
Health Care 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.000 
 (0.552) (0.649) (0.602) (0.008) 
Consumer Services 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (2.857) (3.040) (2.938) (3.369) 
Telecommunications 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
 (3.331) (3.476) (3.600) (4.062) 
Utilities 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 
 (3.159) (3.247) (3.161) (3.073) 
Technology 0.018** 0.019** 0.020** 0.022*** 
 (2.183) (2.418) (2.388) (2.809) 
Austria 0.009     
 (1.236)    
Belgium -0.031***    
 (-3.897)    
Denmark -0.009    
 (-1.207)    
Finland -0.009    
 (-1.358)    
France -0.016***    
 (-3.784)    
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Germany -0.016***    
 (-3.445)    
Greece -0.061***    
 (-6.142)    
Italy -0.036***    
 (-6.099)    
Netherlands 0.003    
 (0.390)    
Norway -0.013**    
 (-1.974)    
Poland -0.045***    
 (-6.182)    
Portugal -0.023***    
 (-2.673)    
South Africa 0.017***    
 (3.524)    
Spain -0.026***    
 (-3.767)    
Sweden -0.021***    
 (-3.346)    
United Kingdom -0.023***    
 (-4.889)    
Common Law  -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.067*** 
  (-3.193) (-3.255) (-2.653) 
Pwr_Dst  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* 
  (-5.162) (-4.544) (-1.724) 
Indvdlsm  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
  (3.874) (3.756) (0.861) 
Msclnty  0.000 0.000 0.000* 
  (0.757) (0.007) (1.667) 
Uncrtnty_Avd  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000* 
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  (4.964) (4.400) (1.653) 
LngTrm_Ornt  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (-1.340) (-1.383) (0.615) 
Invstr_Prtct  -0.001 0.000 0.015*** 
  (-0.465) (0.073) (2.739) 
Qlty_Lglty  0.004** 0.003 0.005 
  (2.075) (1.253) (0.770) 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
  (6.775) (6.327) (2.027) 
Book_Tax   -0.008 0.003 
   (-0.903) (0.089) 
BIG4#M/B    0.004* 
    (1.833) 
BIG4# ΔSALES    -0.023*** 
    (-2.699) 
BIG4#ΔROA    -0.002*** 
    (-4.230) 
BIG4#ΔGDP    -0.002* 
    (-1.767) 
BIG4#OWN    0.000* 
    (1.831) 
BIG4#BATH    0.136* 
    (1.649) 
BIG4#SMOOTH    0.267*** 
    (7.021) 
LG_SYS#GW    0.148*** 
    (4.246) 
LG_SYS#ΔOCF    -0.146** 
    (-2.569) 
LG_SYS#ΔROA    0.004*** 
    (3.013) 
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LG_SYS#Earn_Volt    0.001* 
    (1.831) 
LG_SYS#Price_Volt    0.001* 
    (1.908) 
LG_SYS#ΔDebt_Ratio    0.002** 
    (2.260) 
LG_SYS#BATH    -0.433*** 
    (-2.848) 
Invstr_Prtct#GW    -0.050*** 
    (-6.659) 
Invstr_Prtct#ΔOCF    0.030** 
    (2.271) 
Invstr_Prtct#Price_Volt    -0.000** 
    (-2.322) 
Invstr_Prtct ΔDebt_Ratio    -0.000* 
    (-1.710) 
Qlty_Lglty#M/B    -0.002*** 
    (-2.583) 
Qlty_Lglty#ΔOCF    -0.051*** 
    (-2.728) 
Qlty_Lglty#ΔIndMD_ROA    -0.004** 
    (-2.410) 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp#ΔROA    -0.000*** 
    (-3.162) 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp#ΔGDP    0.000** 
    (2.320) 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp#OWN    -0.000* 
    (-1.932) 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp#BATH    0.006*** 
    (3.510) 
Book_Tax#ΔOCF    -0.146* 
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    (-1.953) 
Book_Tax#ΔSALES    -0.048** 
    (-2.227) 
Constant -0.186*** -0.332*** -0.325*** -0.395*** 
 (-12.492) (-11.182) (-9.950) (-4.808) 
N 14,898 14,898 14,248 14,248 
F-statistics 8.74 10.22 9.81 5.80 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: All variables are defined in Table 4.1   
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5.5 Results- Tobit Model (1) 
Table 5.8 reports the results of the Tobit analysis relating to Model (1), and the discussion 
of the results is structured along the different types of variables tested (economic, managerial 
reporting incentives and control variables).  
 
5.5.1 Economic Variables 
The results show that the ratio of goodwill to total assets (GW) has a statistically significant 
and economically large positive effect on the amount of impairment losses (IMP). Holding 
everything else constant, a million-dollar increase in goodwill is associated, on average, with 
more than one hundred-thousand-dollar increase in the impairment losses. In this case, 
goodwill explains approximately 11% of the total variation in goodwill-impairment 
amounts.  
 
As expected, M/B is negatively and significantly associated with the amount of impairment 
losses recognised on goodwill, meaning that firms whose M/B ratio is higher appeared to 
impair less of their goodwill, compared to those with lower M/B ratios.  
 
ΔSALES and ΔROA were both negative and statistically significant. The results are 
consistent with a priori prediction based on prior research (e.g. Riedl, 2004) in the sense that 
impairing firms tend to perform poorly prior to the impairment recognition period (year t-
1). In particular, all other things being equal, a 100% decrease in sales is associated with an 
increase in the impairment loss by more than 2%. Consistent with Beatty and Weber (2006), 
a significant positive relationship was found between Price volatility (Price_Volty) and the 
average amount of impairment losses recognised on goodwill.  
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Following previous research (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004), an industry-adjusted 
measure was included in the model to compare a company’s performance to its industry 
norms. The change in industry’s median return on assets (ΔIndMD_ROA) is not statistically 
significant. This is generally consistent with Jaafar and McLeay (2007), who emphasise that 
country effects are considerably greater than industry effects. 
 
 As expected, the direct effect of the annual growth of GDP on goodwill-impairment 
amounts is negative, but it is not significant. This is not surprising because the country 
dummies are expected to absorb all country-specific factors affecting the amounts of 
goodwill-impairments.  
 
Considering the above statistics, it is possible to list the economic variables that have the 
greatest explanatory power in terms of predicting goodwill-impairment losses. In particular, 
the β values indicate that from the economic variables the value of goodwill upon which 
impairment is computed (GW) is the variable with the highest explanatory power followed 
by ΔSALES, and M/B. 
 
Similarly, untabulated test results show that the marginal effects are the same as the Tobit 
coefficients. The economic indicator with the biggest marginal effect is GW (dy/dx = 0.114) 
followed by ΔSALES (dy/dx = -0.019) and M/B (dy/dx = -0.007). Holding all other variables 
at their means, one million-dollar increase in goodwill will lead to more than one hundred-
thousand-dollar ($114,000) increase in the impairment losses. That is, GW, continues to be 
the best predictor of IMP, explaining about 11% of the variations in goodwill-impairment 
losses. Overall, the results show that the variables are significant both in a statistical and in 
an economic sense. 
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5.5.2 Managerial Reporting Incentives 
Interestingly, results showed that firms that experienced increases in their debt ratio appeared 
to significantly record greater amounts of goodwill-impairment losses than their 
counterparts. This finding confirms the influential role of debtholders in constraining 
managers’ ability to improperly use their impairment discretion, and thereby forcing the 
recognition of existing goodwill-impairments. Previous studies reported mixed results on 
this issue. Some of them are consistent with the finding of this study (e.g. Strong and Meyer, 
1987; Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Zucca and Campbell, 1992), however, others are not (e.g. 
Riedl, 2004; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Zang, 2008), which found evidence consistent 
with Watts and Zimmerman’s (1990) debt-covenant hypothesis suggesting that managers 
have incentives to strategically reduce goodwill-impairment losses to avoid an anticipated 
violation of the firm’s debt covenants. An explanation for these seemingly contradictory 
results may be found in the work of Fields et al. (2001), who demonstrated that “the evidence 
on whether accounting choices are motivated by debt covenant concerns is inconclusive” (p. 
275). 
 
 In terms of managerial reporting behaviour, SMOOTH was positive and significant at the 
0.01 level, providing evidence consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis that 
managers of firms with unusually high earnings are more inclined to record higher amounts 
of goodwill-impairment losses. These results were generally comparable to those of previous 
studies (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004; Cowan et al., 2006; Van de Poel et al., 2009) 
in which asset/goodwill write-offs were strongly related to earnings smoothing reporting 
incentive proxy. However, no support was found for the Big Bath hypothesis as BATH was 
not found to be statistically significant. This was also the case for the concentration of 
ownership (OWN).  
 
211 
5.5.3 Control Variables 
The table presents evidence, which is consistent with Watts and Zimmerman’s political cost 
hypothesis, suggesting the impairing firms are considerably larger on the average than all 
firms within the pooled sample. Other things being equal, large firms recorded, on average, 
higher amounts of impairment losses than small firms. This finding was also consistent with 
the findings of previous studies (e.g. Zang, 2008), which indicate that firm size positively 
affects the amount of impairment losses recognised on goodwill. However, no support was 
found for the proposition that they type of auditor makes a difference to the magnitude of 
reported goodwill impairment losses. 
 
 In addition, results show that firms, on average, report more impairment losses during the 
crisis period (2007-2009) than after crisis period (2010-2013). Given the severity of the 
recent global economic crisis (the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s) and the need for 
a massive response by all firms, the actually reported goodwill-impairment losses during the 
crisis period (2007-2009) were significantly larger in magnitude than those reported after 
the crisis period (2010-2013). Specifically, sample firms experienced an increase of 9,180.1 
(about $9 Billion of dollars) in the average dollar amounts of impairment losses reported 
during the crisis period.  
 
In terms of the effect of industry, Telecommunications, and Utilities recorded the highest 
impairment losses. The lowest impairment losses were recorded by Oil & Gas and Health 
Care. The table also shows country differences in terms of goodwill-impairment amounts. 
The highest average dollar amount of impairment losses was reported by firms operating in 
South Africa, Austria and Australia. Countries such as Greece, Poland, Italy, and Belgium 
had the lowest average amount of impairment losses recognised on goodwill. According to 
Glaum et al. (2013), adding a set of dummy variables representing individual countries to 
212 
the explanatory variables in the model helps control for idiosyncratic country effects, but it 
does not tell us “which contextual variables are responsible for the observed country 
differences” (p. 190). I, therefore, test the impact of specific country-level predictors on the 
determination and reporting of firms’ goodwill-impairment losses.  
 
5.5.4 Robustness tests 
To check for the robustness/sensitivity of these results, I estimated the Tobit model with an 
alternative measure of the tightness of debt covenants (Δ debt-to-equity ratio), while keeping 
the other variables constant. Untabulated sensitivity test showed that the estimated 
coefficient on the change in debt-equity ratio is still positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that a firm’s debt level has a significant impact on a goodwill-impairment 
decision. I also carried out another sensitivity test by re-estimating the initial model with an 
alternative indicator of market-to-book ratio, equal to the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity at the end of t-1. Untabulated analysis indicated that M/B ratio did 
not materially change, either in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. The 
coefficient on M/B was statistically significant, with a negative sign. 
 
Following previous researchers (e.g. Beatty and Weber, 2006), I included a dichotomous 
variable (SEGMENT) to capture the effects of company’s organisational structure on the 
amount of goodwill-impairment losses. The variable takes the value of 0 for single-segment 
companies and 1 for multi-segment companies. Untabulated results reveal that the 
coefficient on SEGMENT is negative and significantly different from zero. This indicates 
that a switch from zero (single segment) to one (multiple segments), on average and other 
things being equal, is connected with a statistically significant decrease in the amount of 
goodwill-impairments of $18,426.69 (or 1.84%), indicating that firms with more than one 
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CGU appear to have made goodwill allocation decisions that allowed them to simply avoid 
the recognition of impairment losses. 
  
Furthermore, and in line with previous goodwill-impairment studies (AbuGhazaleh, 2011; 
Abdul Majid, 2013 and 2015), I included a dichotomous variable (GW_ADD) that takes the 
value of 1 if a firm has addition(s) to its goodwill following mergers and acquisitions during 
the financial year, and 0 otherwise. The untabulated results show that the estimated 
coefficient on GW_ADD is negative (-.0423) with t-statistics of -13.54. This is significantly 
different from zero (p-value= 0.000). This finding seems to be compatible with Abdul Majid 
(2015) who also found evidence suggesting that firms with lesser additions to their goodwill 
appeared to have recorded goodwill-impairment amounts, which is $42,309 higher than their 
counterparts with greater additions to goodwill. I also included a variable, capturing the 
number of years with goodwill-impairment losses before the current year (GWI_Number), 
and found evidence consistent with the suggestion of Glaum et al. (2015)’s study that the 
higher the number of years with goodwill-impairment losses, the higher the amounts of 
impairment losses (GWI_Number, coefficient=.017, t-statistics= 20.18, p-value=0.000). 
 
To check the stability and robustness of results, I also carried out another sensitivity test by 
considering alternative measures of big bath and earnings smoothing reporting incentives. 
The initial model was re-estimated using two alternative indicators of Bath and Smooth. 
Bath is an alternative to BATH and equals the change in pre-write off earnings from period 
t-1 to t, divided by total assets at the end of t-1 (if the value of this variable is negative) and 
0 otherwise. Smooth is an alternative variable to SMOOTH, and equals the change in pre-
write-off earnings from t-1 to t divided by total assets at the end of t- 1 (if the value of this 
variable is positive) and 0 otherwise. Untabulated analysis indicated that these two 
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alternative variables (Bath and Smooth) did not materially change, either in terms of 
magnitude and statistical significance. The coefficient on Smooth was statistically 
significant, with a positive sign, and replacing them in the model did not change the 
statistical inferences drawn above.  
 
In order to evaluate the impact of modifying the definitions of the crisis period, two further 
robustness tests were performed on the baseline regression containing all of the predictors 
under consideration. The baseline specification was re-estimated after excluding those 
observations belonging to the 2007 year (which in effect considers all observations from the 
year 2008 through 2013, the resulting sample includes 12,921 observations). Furthermore, 
in order to ensure that all 2007 observations belong to the crisis period, which, it is generally 
agreed, began in the fourth quarter of 2007, the baseline regression was re-estimated by 
including only those observations with year-end that falls during the last quarter of 2007. 
 
The comparison of sensitivity results between models, reported in the second and third 
columns of Table 16.1 (Appendix 7) exhibited some numerical differences between the 
coefficient estimates and their standard errors. These differences, however, were not 
significant in a practical sense (i.e., they were quantitatively close) and, therefore, did not 
materially change the qualitative conclusions about the impact of the crisis on goodwill-





5.6 Cultural/Institutional Model (2a) and Model (2b) 
5.6.1 Multicollinearity Analysis 
Table 5.9 presents the correlation coefficients among cultural and institutional variables. As 
can be seen, the cultural and institutional variables do not highly correlate with one another. 
The pairwise correlations between the cultural and institutional variables are mostly very 
modest. The highest pairwise correlation coefficient is 0.688 between power distance 
(Pwr_Dst) and individualism (Indvdlsm), indicating that there is no sign of collinearity 
among the country-specific variables included in the empirical analysis.  
Table 5.9 Pairwise Correlation among Cultural and Institutional Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Pwr_Dst 1.000         
2. Indvdlsm -0.688* 1.000        
3. Msclnty 0.049 0.077 1.000       
4. Uncrtnty_Avd  0.217 -0.227 -0.026 1.000      
5. LngTrm_Ornt -0.012 0.164 0.052 -0.017 1.000     
6. Invstr_Prtct -0.189 0.178 0.0176 -0.442* -0.010 1.000    
7. Qlty_Lglty -0.602* 0.579* -0.033 -0.499* 0.093 0.531* 1.000   
8. EqtyMrkt_Dvlp -0.167 0.146 0.030 -0.399* 0.130 0.455* 0.553* 1.000  
9. Book_Tax 0.041 -0.311 -0.150 0.176 0.156 -0.082 -0.095 0.177 1.000 
The * denotes correlation coefficients with values greater than or equal to 5% significance level.   
Among the cultural variables, Pwr_Dst was negatively associated with individualism 
(Indvdlsm) and long-term orientation (LngTrm_Ornt), implying that countries rank low on 
individualism exhibit less tolerance for uncertainty, and hierarchies.  Among the institutional 
variables, Invstr_Prtct, Qlty_Lglty, and EqtyMrkt_Dvlp are all positively correlated with 
one another, but negatively correlated with Book_Tax, implying that countries with strong 
investor protection tend to have a better quality of legal enforcement, and have fairly well-
developed domestic equity markets, but low alignment between accounting and tax rules.   
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Pwr_Dst, and Uncrtnty_Avd were both negatively correlated with Invstr_Prtct, Qlty_Lglty, 
and EqtyMrkt_Dvlp, and positively correlated with Book_Tax. Indvdlsm was also positively 
correlated with Invstr_Prtct, Qlty_Lglty, and EqtyMrkt_Dvlp, and negatively correlated with 
Book_Tax, implying that highly individualistic countries tend to have more rules to protect 
the rights of their investors, better enforcement systems, and well-developed equity markets, 
as well as low alignment between accounting and tax rules. 
 
5.6.2 Results- Model (2a) and Model (2b) 
The second column of Table 5.8 presents the estimation results for Model (2a) in which nine 
cultural and institutional variables (Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, Long-term Orientation, Legal System, Investor Protection, Quality of Legality, 
and Equity Market Development) are included, together with a country’s legal system. The 
third column of Table 5.8 presents the estimation results for Model (2b) when the extent of 
book-tax conformity (Book_Tax) is included in the specification. 
 
 The results show that all the economic and managerial reporting incentives variables that 
have been shown to be significantly associated with the amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses retain their significance levels from the baseline specifications, and their values are 
very similar to the first column of the table. 
 
 Turning to the cultural and institutional variables, five of eight variables have a significant 
association with goodwill-impairments. Power distance (Pwr_Dst) was, as predicted, 
negatively associated with goodwill-impairments, indicating that managers in large-power-
distance countries appear to have used their power to avoid impairment losses. Individualism 
was also statistically significant, with the predicted positive sign, suggesting that managers 
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in highly collectivist countries tend to report lower impairment losses to protect the welfare 
of the investors. 
 
 Consistent with the finding of Swanson et al. (2007), uncertainty avoidance (Uncrtnty_Avd) 
was positively related to the amount of impairment-losses recognised on goodwill. This 
finding, however, is contrary to the prediction that managers in uncertainty avoiding 
countries are less (rather than more) inclined to impair their goodwill, in their attempt to 
avoid uncertainties associated with potentially negative effects that are likely to arise 
following the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses (e.g. violating debt covenants or 
falling short of analysts’ earnings forecasts). One possible explanation for this finding is that 
managers from highly uncertainty-avoiding societies appear to have impaired greater 
amounts of their goodwill, in their attempts to reduce the year-to-year variability of reported 
earnings. Consistent with this explanation, Doupnik (2008) found that “earnings 
smoothing…is more prevalent in countries that are high in uncertainty avoidance” (p. 331). 
Another possible explanation is that managers from uncertainty avoiding societies may have 
recorded higher amounts of goodwill-impairment losses, in their attempt to avoid the worst 
possible outcomes (e.g. avoid a large tax payment).  
 
The Quality of legality (Qlty_Lglty), and the development of equity markets 
(EqtyMrkt_Dvlp) were both positively associated with impaired goodwill, implying that 
goodwill-impairments would be greater, in magnitude, the higher the institutional quality in 
a country. This finding was consistent with the suggestion of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2011) that 
“firms with stronger governance mechanisms are more likely to report higher amounts of 
non-opportunistic goodwill-impairment losses” (p. 177). Ball et al. (2000) and Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006) also provide evidence implying that the incentives for more 
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conservative/aggressive financial reporting were often found to have been instigated by the 
quality/effectiveness of a country’s legal institutions.  
 
In particular, “firms in countries with a high rule of law score take more goodwill-
impairments than firms in countries with a lower score” (Van de Poel et al., 2009, pp. 31). 
In such countries, regulatory bodies are “focusing attention on…rational for, why goodwill 
is not impaired” (Forsythe, 2013, p. 3). That is, non-impairing firms were under more 
scrutiny than their impairing counterparts. These findings alone would not have been 
sufficiently persuasive to conclude that the reporting of impairment losses corresponds to 
the decline in the economic value of goodwill, as reflected in accounting measures of 
performance. As Van de Poel et al. (2009) explain, the presence of effective governance 
mechanisms does not necessarily lead to a greater recognition of goodwill-impairment, 
because they have potentially two opposite effects, on the one hand, they force companies 
to record impairment losses when they fail to report any losses on goodwill, and, on the other 
hand, they prevent them from accelerating impairments when it is not appropriate. 
 
 In support of this opinion, Glaum et al. (2015) argued that the level of enforcement in a 
country can affect the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses in either of three ways. In the 
first way, firms in countries with strong enforcement will be enforced to take more 
impairment losses compared to their counterparts in weak enforcement countries (positive 
association). In the second way, firms in strong enforcement countries are more efficiently 
managed, and thereby are less likely to engage in wasteful mergers and acquisitions 
transactions. This, in turn, results in lower impairment losses (negative association). In the 
third way, due to the subjective nature of goodwill-impairments, the degree of enforcement 
in a country will not be relevant (no association). 
219 
5.6.3 Robustness Tests 
To strengthen the robustness checks, another sensitivity analysis was carried out considering 
institutional variables only, along with all of the specified predictor variables in the baseline 
specification. The analysis was repeated using cultural dimensions only, along with all of the 
specified predictor variables in the baseline model. 
Table 5.10 The Impact of Institutional vs. Cultural Variables on Goodwill-Impairments 
Variable  Institutional Cultural 
GW 0.114*** 0.109*** 
 (12.127) (11.887) 
M/B -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.795) (-6.869) 
ΔMrktCap -0.003 -0.002 
 (-1.460) (-1.289) 
ΔOCF -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.466) (-0.728) 
ΔSALES -0.020** -0.019** 
 (-2.012) (-2.018) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.880) (-2.893) 
Earn_Volt -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.113) (-0.561) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (6.857) (6.852) 
ΔIndMd_ROA 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.048) (-0.241) 
ΔGDP 0.000 0.001** 
 (0.796) (2.021) 
OWN 0.000** 0.000 
 (2.126) (1.486) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.385) (3.113) 
BATH 0.057 0.060 
 (1.248) (1.301) 
SMOOTH 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.068) (3.081) 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (10.809) (10.565) 
BIG4 -0.006* -0.007** 
 (-1.906) (-2.213) 
Crisis Period  0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (3.076) (3.131) 
Basic Materials 0.008 0.014* 
 (0.979) (1.777) 
Industrials 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (2.659) (3.257) 
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Consumer Goods 0.018** 0.019*** 
 (2.354) (2.607) 
Health Care 0.005 0.009 
 (0.547) (1.032) 
Consumer Services 0.021*** 0.026*** 
 (2.833) (3.468) 
Telecommunications 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (3.634) (3.768) 
Utilities 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (3.252) (3.358) 
Technology 0.019** 0.023*** 
 (2.336) (2.911) 
Common Law 0.008  
 (1.555)  
Invstr_Prtct -0.004***  
 (-3.415)  
Qlty_Lglty 0.006***  
 (3.959)  
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp 0.000***  
 (3.737)  
Book_Tax -0.003  
 (-0.413)  
Pwr_Dst  -0.000* 
  (-1.926) 
Indvdlsm  0.000 
  (0.574) 
Msclnty  -0.000 
  (-0.942) 
Uncrtnty_Avd  -0.000 
  (-0.321) 
LngTrm_Ornt  -0.000*** 
  (-3.108) 
Constant -0.266*** -0.185*** 
 (-10.625) (-10.048) 
N 14,248 14,898 
F-statistics 11.20 10.97 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results, reported in the first and second columns of Table 5.10, revealed that all of the 
institutional variables (except legal system and book-tax conformity) were highly significant 
(p-value < 0.001). The results also showed that apart from power distance and long-term 
orientation, none of the cultural dimensions were significant.  
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The observed results, however, are hard to explain, since the cultural effects cannot be 
isolated from the institutional effects on the process of making goodwill-impairment 
decisions (impair or not to impair, and how much to impair). Therefore, it would be 
misleading to analyse cross-country differences in goodwill-impairments solely from the 
culture side (without considering the role of institutions as modifiers of cultural 
predilections), especially because firms’ goodwill-impairment decisions are a joint product 
of culture and institutions (which may or may not be culturally-driven). In the context of 
earnings management, Han et al. (2010) state that “institutions can serve to modify or 
reinforce the effects of base culture” (p. 127). However, it is a priori unclear whether the 
institutional structure supersedes, restrains, or reinforces cultural perspectives. 
 
In an additional robustness test, I replaced county-specific dummy variables with indicator 
variables representing country’s legal origin (English, French, German, and Scandinavian), 
along with all of the variables in the Tobit model, to determine whether these variables 
contribute anything additional to the analysis. The estimation results, reported in the first 
column of Table 16.2 (Appendix 7), shed light on the heterogeneity of goodwill-impairment 
patterns across countries of different legal origins. In particular, firms in countries with 
English and Scandinavian legal origins had the highest level of goodwill-impairments, 
followed by their German and French counterparts. 
 
The results (reported in the second column of Table 16.2 in Appendix 7) remained largely 
unchanged, when I replaced legal origin dummies by a dummy variable that takes on the 
value 1 if the country’s legal system is of common, and 0 otherwise, implying that firms in 
common-law countries, on average, report higher goodwill–impairment losses, compared to 
their counterparts originating from civil-law countries. 
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Several robustness tests were also performed to evaluate the incremental impact of each 
institutional/cultural variable separately on the goodwill-impairment amounts. Results, 
reported in columns (3) to (6) of Table 16.2 in Appendix 7, did not point towards any 
significant difference. The direction and average effect of all independent variables were the 
same as in the baseline model. Results also revealed that institutions can directly affect the 
amounts of impairment losses recognised on goodwill. As predicted by the null hypotheses 
(H13, H14, and H15), the regression coefficients on Invstr_Prtct (β=0.002, t-
statistics=3.016, p-value <0.01) Qlty_Lglty (β=0.010, t-statistics=8.664, p-value <0.01), and 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp (β=0.000, t-statistics=8.054, p-value <0.01) were significant and positive. 
In contrast, the coefficient for Book_Tax (β=-0.020, t-statistics=-3.381, p-value <0.01), as 
predicted by the null hypothesis (H11), was significant and negative. The replication analysis 
thus confirms the original results indicating that firms in countries characterised with strong 
investor protection, better quality of legal enforcement, well-developed stock markets, and 
low book-tax alignment tend to impair greater amounts of their goodwill balances. 
 
In addition, I also studied the effect of the strength of national auditing and financial 
reporting enforcement, as developed by Brown et al. (2014), on the amounts of impairment 
losses recognised on goodwill. The analysis, surprisingly, revealed no significant 
relationship between Brown et al.’s measure of enforcement and goodwill-impairment 
amounts, raising serious concerns over the reliability and validity of the index values in their 
own studies. The regression results, as reported in all the columns in Table 16.3 (Appendix 
7), revealed that the coefficients associated with all cultural variables have the predicted 
signs and are statistically significant for Pwr_Dst (β=-0.000, t-statistics=-4.847, p-value 
<0.01), Indvdlsm (β=0.000, t-statistics=2.381, p-value <0.05), Uncrtnty_Avd (β=-0.000, t-
statistics=-4.937, p-value <0.01), and LngTrm_Ornt (β=-0.000, t-statistics=-3.838, p-value 
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<0.01). Note, however, that the coefficient associated with Msclnty is not statistically 
significant at an acceptable level.  
 
Last, I ran separate regressions for each country (apart from Poland), because the effects of 
economic/reporting incentives on goodwill-impairment amounts are likely to vary across 
countries. The results, which are reported in the all columns of Table 16.4 in Appendix 7, 
reveal that unlike all other firms in the study’s sample, Australian and British firms-in 
general- tend to report impairment losses that are weakly associated with big bath/earnings 
smooth reporting incentives and, at the same time, strongly associated with economic 
factors. The results are in line with prediction and largely confirm the original findings 
indicating that differences exist in goodwill-impairment practices across countries. In 
particular, the first column (headed AUS) in Table 16.4 shows that the GW (β=0.234, t-
statistics=7.503), and Price_Volt (β=0.002, t-statistics=3.067) are significantly positive as 
predicted. M/B (β=-0.028, t-statistics=-5.591), ΔOCF (β=-0.065, t-statistics=-1.741), 
ΔSALES (β=-0.039, t-statistics=-2.422), and ΔROA (β=-0.001, t-statistics=-3.330) are 
significantly negative as predicted. For the reporting incentive proxies, only SMOOTH 
(β=0.010, t-statistics=2.117) is significant in a statistical sense, but not in a practical sense73. 
The estimated coefficient of BATH (β=007, t-statistics=-0.373) is in the predicted direction, 
but statistically insignificant.  
    
 
                                                          
73 Finding statistical significance without practical significance is likely to occur with large sample sizes or 
small variances (Schlotzhauer, 2007, pp.169).  
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5.7 Results-Interaction Model 
Although very few studies have actually investigated the relationship between institutions 
and the patterns of goodwill-impairments, the nature of this relationship has not been 
thoroughly examined. Researchers normally analyse the direct effects of institutional 
factor(s) on goodwill-impairment decisions, and have therefore paid less attention to indirect 
effects. In the next step of the analysis, additional terms representing the interactions 
between company- and country-specific variables were considered to determine whether 
country-specific variables moderate the influence of economic/reporting incentives. I retain 
all predictor variables specified in the initial model and add cross-level interaction terms 
(note: only significant interaction terms are shown). 
 
As reported in Table 5.8, most of the previously significant variables lose their statistical 
significance, suggesting that their main/direct effects on the amount of goodwill-impairment 
losses are overwhelmed by the interaction terms. However, the coefficient associated with 
goodwill (GW) remains highly significant (at the 0.001 level) and maintains its sign, but its 
magnitude is almost five times larger in absolute value, which means (all other things being 
equal) a one percent increase in goodwill will lead to a less than one percent (0.53%) increase 
in impairment losses. In other words, a million-dollar increase in goodwill is associated, on 
average, with a five hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($525076.05) increase in the 
amounts of impairment losses.  
 
The coefficients on SIZE and Crisis Period are still very similar to the ones estimated within 
the previous models. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on ΔIndMD_ROA becomes 
positive and significant after the inclusion of the various interaction effects, indicating that 
companies in high growth industries can afford to impair greater amounts of their goodwill. 
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That is, firms in well-performing industries found it relatively cheaper to take more 
impairments, because have less a pronounced negative effect.   
 
5.7.1.1 Continuous X Categorical Interaction(s) 
The interaction variables (BIG4#ΔSALES, BIG4#ΔROA and BIG4#ΔGDP) capture the 
contribution of BIG4 auditors to the impact of sales and return on assets on the amount of 
impairment loss. Significant negative estimates of the interaction parameters suggest that the 
relationships between goodwill impairment losses and ΔSALES, ΔROA, and ΔGDP depend 
on the quality of auditing as proxied by BIG4 auditors. This is consistent with the findings 
of Stokes and Webster (2010), who also show that the association between goodwill-
impairments and certain economic factors (ΔSALES, and ΔROA) is stronger in the presence 
of high audit quality. This finding indicates that the presence of BIG4 auditors had the 
potential to strengthen management incentives to improve the quality of impairment losses, 
and thereby increasing the correlation between goodwill-impairments and economic 
performance measures. However, inconsistent with predictions, the estimated coefficients 
on the interaction terms (BIG4#BATH and BIG4#SMOOTH) remain positive and 
significant, suggesting that being audited by one of the BIG4 audit firms alone was not 
enough to effectively constrain the incentives of managers to take a big bath (or smooth their 
income).  
 
Once again, the test results were highly sensitive to the effect of a country’s legal system. 
As shown in Table 5.8, the coefficient on the interaction terms (LG_SYS#GW, 
LG_SYS#ΔOCF, LG_SYS#Earn_Volt, and LG_SYS#Price_Volt) had the expected sign 
and were statistically significant, suggesting that firms operating in common-law countries 
have impairment-losses strongly associated with their goodwill and change in OCF, while 
the effect of legal system on the relationship between IMP and ΔROA/ΔDebt_Ratio which, 
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although significant, had the opposite expected sign. Most importantly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term (LG_SYS#BATH) was negative and highly significant, suggesting that 
firms in common law countries are less likely to accelerate goodwill impairment losses. This 
finding appears similar to the findings of Riedl (2004) who reported a significant negative 
interaction between BATH and CEOCHR (an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise), suggesting that big bath behaviour is 
exacerbated when governance is weaker.  
 
5.7.1.2 Continuous X Continuous Interaction(s) 
To help interpret the cross-level or micro-macro interactions among continuous predictors, 
Cohen et al. (2003) identified three theoretically meaningful interaction patterns between 
two predictors; each pattern depends on the signs of the first-order and interactive effects. 
(i) When both the first-order and interactive effects are of the same sign (i.e., all three 
signs are positive or negative), the interaction is synergistic or enhancing, in which 
the two predictors (X and Z) affect the criterion (Y) in the same direction, and 
together they produce a stronger than additive effect on the outcome. For example, 
if we evaluate how ability (X) and motivation (Z) impact achievement in college 
(Y). When ability and motivation interact synergistically, graduate students with 
both high ability and high motivation perform better in college than would be 
expected from the simple sum of the separate effects of their ability and motivation. 
That is, graduate students that have high ability and are highly motivated become 
superstars. In this case, “the whole is greater than the sum of the parts” (Cohen et 
al., 2003, p. 285). 
 
(ii) When the two predictors have regression coefficients of opposite sign (i.e., one 
positive and one negative), the pattern of interaction is buffering, in which one 
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predictor weakens the effect of the other predictor; that is, as the impact of one 
predictor increases in value, the impact of the other predictor is diminished. For 
instance, students’ levels of academic achievement as measured by their grades is 
positively associated the amount of time spent studying, but negatively associated 
with the hours spent daily watching TV. A negative interaction effect would indicate 
that the beneficial effect of time spent on homework can be reduced or buffered by 
the average daily time spent watching TV. 
 
(iii) When the two predictors go in the same direction (both either positive or negative), 
and the interaction is of opposite sign, the pattern of interaction is interference or 
antagonistic. For example, ability and motivation can exhibit compensatory or 
opposing effects on graduate school achievement. In contrast, for students with very 
high ability, achievement is less dependent on motivation, whereas, for students with 
high level of motivation, the mere ability has less impact. In this case, “the whole is 
less than the sum of the parts” (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 286).  
 
Turning to the estimation results of the interaction effects between individual and contextual 
characteristics; the estimation results show that there are compensatory effects between 
goodwill (GW) and investor protection (Invstr_Prtct) on the amount of impairment losses 
recognised on goodwill, implying a partially either-or pattern of influence of the two 
predictors (Invstr_Prtct#GW) on impairment losses. That is, the importance of goodwill 
asset is lessened by the optimal level of investor protection. The results show, perhaps 
surprisingly, that the negative effect of ΔOCF on the impairment of goodwill has been 
buffered or reduced by the level of investor protection. The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term (Invstr_Prtct #Size) is positive and significant, revealing that larger firms 
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tend to operate in countries with better investor protection, and at the same time, take more 
impairments losses.  
 
Moreover, the results revealed the coefficients on the interactions of quality of legality 
(Qlty_Lglty) with M/B ratios, ΔOCF, and ΔIndMD_ROA have minus signs and are also 
statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that in countries that have better 
quality of law-enforcement, the impairment charges of goodwill are, on average, more 
closely related to the firm’s underlying economic performance. Results also show that the 
amounts of impairment losses were particularly highly associated with ΔROA in the 
presence of a relatively highly developed equity markets. In contrast, the proxy for big bath 
reporting (BATH) was associated with a small, but statistically significant, increase in the 
average amount of goodwill-impairments, implying that firms in countries with large equity 
markets tend to report large impairment losses. Those losses, however, are not necessarily 
discretionary in nature (i.e., big bath). Moreover, the results revealed that high book-tax 
alignment weakened or buffered the effects of ΔOCF and ΔSALES on the amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses.  
 
One might think that the findings are in some sense contradictory. A possible explanation 
why some of the two-way interactions have not shown the expected sign (or have the 
expected sign but no statistical significance) is that I do not include three-, four-, five-, and 
six-factor interactions that capture the complex inter-relationship among institutions with 
the impairment of goodwill. The inclusion of these interaction terms is very problematic to 
theoretically specify and will nearly always produce high levels of multicollinearity. In 
response to these concerns, an alternative approach has been proposed by many accounting 
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scholars (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003), which involves grouping countries according to their 
institutional characteristics. 
 
5.8 Additional analysis: Abnormal Goodwill Impairment Losses 
In the presence of internal and/or external control mechanism, firm managers are expected 
to record lower abnormal goodwill-impairment amounts. Following Lapointe-Antunes et al. 
(2008), I directly examined the association between a set of institutional factors, and 
abnormal goodwill-impairment losses, measured as the difference between the reported 
goodwill-impairment loss and the normal goodwill-impairment loss. To do so, I first 
predicted normal impairment losses of goodwill using OLS regression74 (with robust), by 
regressing reported goodwill-impairment losses on the actual impairment proxies from 
Model (1) for the full sample (i.e., impairing and non-impairing firms) using the following 
equation: 
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀/𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛥𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝛥𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +   𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑀𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  + 𝐵10∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖 +  𝛽12 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽13𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡            ,         (5.6) 
 
The resultant normal impairment losses are equal to zero when their predicted values are 
negative to mirror the censored distribution of the reported goodwill-impairment losses. The 
difference between the adjusted predicted losses and the reported losses represent the 
abnormal goodwill-impairment losses. The abnormal losses are positive when the reported 
losses are higher than the adjusted predicted losses (i.e., overstated); but negative when the 
reported losses are lower than the adjusted predicted losses (i.e., understated). Finally, the 
                                                          
74 Following Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2008), OLS regression was used to predict the normal losses of 
impairments, instead of Tobit regression model, because the residuals for censored observations are not well-
defined.  
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abnormal losses are equal to zero when the reported losses are equal to the predicted losses 
(i.e., neither overstated nor understated).  
 
Goodwill-impairment losses should be neither overstated nor understated, if the control 
mechanisms, which create strong disincentives for managers, are effective in constraining 
their opportunistic behaviour when they make decisions related to the impairment of 
goodwill. To assess whether this is the case, I regressed the computed abnormal losses 
(AIMPit) on all of the institutional variables for firms with positive and negative abnormal 
goodwill-impairment losses separately using the following equation. The type of auditor 
(BIG4 vs non-BIG4) was also included because it is considered in the literature (e.g. Van de 
Poel et al., 2009; Stokes and Webster, 2010) as a constraint for managerial opportunism.   
𝐴𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐺_𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑖 +𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑄𝑙𝑡𝑦_𝐿𝑔𝑙𝑡𝑦𝑖  +
𝛽5𝐸𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑀𝑟𝑘𝑡_𝐷𝑣𝑙𝑝𝑖   + 𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘_𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ,   (5.7)      
                       
I expect the coefficients on these variables to be negative (positive) for firms with positive 
(negative) abnormal goodwill-impairment losses. This model can jointly test whether (i) 
those control mechanisms imposed upon firms can constitute effective constraints of 
managerial opportunism, and (ii) provide incentives for an efficient use of impairment 
discretion, which should be translated into more tempered goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
Table 5.11 reports the estimation results of the impact that corporate governance may have 
on the determinants of abnormal goodwill-impairment losses. The first column of Table 5.11 
presents the results of the regression for companies with positive abnormal goodwill-
impairment losses. Consistent with the prediction of this study, the coefficients on BIG4, 
Invstr_Prtct, and EqtyMrkt_Dvlp are negative and significant. The second column of Table 
5.11 presents the results of the regression for companies with negative abnormal goodwill-
231 
impairment losses. The coefficients on BIG4, and EqtyMrkt_Dvlp are positive and 
significant as predicted. Taken together, the findings suggest these factors act as constraints 
on the ability of managers to behave opportunistically and record abnormal goodwill-
impairment losses. 
Table 5.11 The Impact of Governance on Abnormal Goodwill-Impairment Losses 
Variables Positive Negative 
BIG4 -0.018*** 0.002*** 
 (-4.295) (14.328) 
LG_SYS 0.075*** -0.003*** 
 (9.667) (-9.881) 
Invstr_Prtct -0.012*** -0.000 
 (-6.571) (-0.751) 
Qlty_Lglty 0.012*** -0.001*** 
 (4.704) (-9.409) 
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp -0.000** 0.000*** 
 (-2.155) (5.816) 
Book_Tax 0.011 -0.000 
 (1.047) (-0.724) 
Constant -0.003 0.001 
 (-0.116) (1.145) 
N 1,585 9,560 
F-statistics 30.98 121.32 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.070 
Root MSE .0681 .0063 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 The coefficients for LG_SYS and Qlty_Lglty were significant but of the opposite sign. More 
specifically, the highly significant and positive coefficients for LG_SYS (0.075) and 
Qlty_Lglty (0.012) show that firms located in common-law countries or countries with better 
enforcement quality appear to have recorded higher-than-necessary impairment losses, 
compared to their counterparts in code-law countries or countries with inferior quality of 
enforcement. This is generally consistent with Glaum et al. (2015) who argue that firms in 
countries with strong enforcement systems will be forced to impair their goodwill more often 
compared to their counterparts in countries with weak enforcement systems. The negative 
coefficients for LG_SYS (-0.003) and Qlty_Lglty (-0.009) were statistically significant, but 
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not significant in a practical sense. Taken together, the findings suggest that firms in a more 
litigious environment (common-law or high-enforcement countries) will engage in more 
goodwill-impairment activities, because those firms will find it less costly to impair their 
goodwill rather than not to impair or impair less than they should.  
 
5.9 Discussion and Summary 
The empirical results reveal that the goodwill impairment losses are associated with 
economic factors, as well as managerial reporting incentives. The results also reveal that 
cultural and institutional variables are partially responsible for the effects of economic and 
managerial reporting incentives on goodwill-impairment amounts. In particular, impairing 
firms have higher amounts of goodwill, and a greater fluctuation of the share price. Profit-
making firms are, however, found to report lower amounts of impairment losses. Consistent 
with managers’ preference for achieving smooth and consistent patterns of earnings, firms 
experiencing unexpectedly high earnings tend to impair greater amounts of their goodwill. 
 
Empirical results also reveal that goodwill-impairment losses increase with the firm’s level 
of debt. However, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as debt-to-assets and debt-
to-equity ratios may not be appropriate proxies for firms’ closeness to their potential debt 
covenant violation (Riedl, 2004; Georgiou, 2005). Therefore, one needs to consider other 
factors such as the existence of public debt. 
 
Furthermore, the results indicate that ownership structure (OWN) has no statistically 
significant impact on the reporting of goodwill-impairment losses (IMP). However, failing 
to detect a statistically significant relationship between OWN and IMP does not mean there 
is no impact. This could be due to either attrition (i.e., firm-year observations with missing 
data being excluded from the analysis) or, most likely, to large variations in the patterns of 
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ownership structures across firms. This study, however, found evidence of a positive 
relationship between OWN and goodwill-impairment losses. This is fully consistent with 
Lapointe-Antunes (2005), who argues that widely-held firms tend to report relatively lower 
impairment losses in their attempt to avoid scrutiny and intervention by outside investors.  
 
Moreover, this chapter investigated the direct and indirect impact of country-specific factors 
(cultural and institutional) on the reporting of goodwill-impairment amounts. The empirical 
results show that firms from common-law countries, on average, report higher amounts of 
goodwill–impairment losses, compared to their counterparts from code-law countries. 
Results also reveal that national culture in the form of power distance, individualism, and 
uncertainty avoidance, as well institutional variables also impact on the reporting of 
goodwill-impairment amounts.  
 
 Although there is no evidence to support a direct association between being audited by one 
of the BIG4 auditors and goodwill-impairment amounts, the type of auditor moderates some 
firm-specific variables. Most importantly, the results show that the type of legal system not 
only directly influences the reporting of goodwill-impairment amounts, but also moderates 
some firm-specific variables. Specifically, firms operating in common-law countries have 
apparently recorded goodwill-impairment losses that are, on the one hand, strongly 
associated with economic impairment proxies, and on the other, weakly associated with 
reporting incentive proxies. 
 
To provide further assurance, an additional analysis was then conducted to examine the 
direct impact of institutions, as well as the type of auditor on the determination and reporting 
of abnormal goodwill-impairment losses. Together, the findings reveal that BIG4 auditor, 
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investor protection, and equity markets development were more effective in constraining 
managers’ ability to either overstate or understate the amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses reported (i.e., record abnormal goodwill-impairment losses), and to ensure that no 
impairment loss has been made, unless the firm has suffered from impairment in the 




















6 Chapter 6: Goodwill-impairment Patterns across Country Clusters 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents additional analyses to examine whether the results of regression 
models reported in Chapter (5) differ across the two institutional clusters and the two cultural 
clusters of countries with regard to the relationship between goodwill-impairment amounts 
and economic/reporting incentives. Section 6.2 discusses the results of k-means cluster 
analysis using three and four institutional variables, respectively. Section 6.3 presents 
descriptive statistics across institutional and cultural clusters of countries. Sections 6.4 and 
6.5 present the results of a separate regression analysis run for each cluster. 
 
6.2 Cluster Membership  
Table 6.1 shows the cluster membership for the sample countries using a k-mean cluster 
analysis (k=2) using SPSS (22). The analysis uses the cultural and institutional variables 
from Table 5.4 (Chapter 5) with respect to investor protection, quality of legality and equity 
market development for which the country data are available for all countries sample. 
Following Leuz (2010), the indicator for the country’s legal system was excluded, “as binary 
variables can be problematic in cluster analysis” (p. 244), and is more likely to bias the 
cluster membership, by drawing institutional clusters that are more driven by the type of 
legal system, rather than other institutions.  
 
Panel (A) of Table 6.1 reports the results of the cluster analysis (Cluster1 versus Cluster2). 
It can be seen that Cluster1 is composed primarily of countries (Australia, South Africa, 
Sweden, and the UK) with relatively well-developed domestic equity markets. Then, cluster 
analysis was performed again using four institutional factors, namely: investor protection, 
quality of legality, and equity market development, along with book-tax conformity (BT). 
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Poland was automatically dropped from the analysis due to unavailability of data on book-
tax conformity variable. 
Table 6.1 Cluster Membership Using Institutional/Cultural Variables 
Institutional Clusters Cultural Clusters 
Panel (A) Panel (B) 
Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster1_BT Cluster2_BT Cluster1 Cluster2 
Australia Austria Australia Austria Australia Belgium 
South Africa Belgium South Africa Belgium Austria France 
Sweden Denmark Sweden Denmark Denmark Greece 
United Kingdom Finland United Kingdom Finland Finland Poland 
 France  France Germany Portugal 
 Germany  Germany Italy Spain 
 Greece  Greece Netherlands  
 Italy  Italy Norway  
 Netherlands  Netherlands South Africa  
 Norway  Norway Sweden  
 Poland  Portugal United Kingdom  
 Portugal  Spain   
 Spain     
Note: this table reports the cluster membership for the sample countries using institutional/cultural variables. 
As can be seen in Panel (B) of Table 6.1, two clusters of countries (Cluster1_BT versus 
Cluster2_BT) are formed, which are exactly the same except for Poland. Following Doupnik 
(2008), in order drive cultural clusters, I included the country scores for Hofstede’s five 
cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, masculinity and 
long-term orientation) and the result are reported in Table 6.1 under cultural clusters.  
 
A full list of countries included in the cluster analyses is available in Appendix 4. The sample 
countries are highlighted in Bold. The right-hand column of the table in Appendix (5) reports 
the one-way ANOVA and the p-values, indicating that there are significant differences 
across the institutional clusters on investor protection, quality of legality, and development 
of equity markets. That is, each institutional cluster differs significantly from the other 
cluster on each of these institutional variables, except for Blaylock et al. (2012)’s index of 
book-tax conformity. In terms of cultural clusters, the table also shows that there are 
statistically significant differences between these two clusters on only three out of five 
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cultural dimensions namely, power distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance. That 
is, cultural clusters do not differ significantly from one another on masculinity and long-term 
orientation.   
 
In general, groupings of countries (with or without book-tax) were consistent with strong 
equity-outsider and weak equity-outsider distinctions used in prior research (e.g. Nobes 
2011a). According to Nobes and Parker (2010), “differentiation between credit/insiders and 
equity/outsiders is the key cause of international differences in financial reporting” (p. 36). 
The common factor between all countries in Cluster1 (or Cluster1_BT) is the strength of 
equity markets. As indicated in Panel (A) and (B), all countries in Cluster1 (or Cluster1_BT) 
have relatively more developed equity markets (i.e., strong equity markets), while Cluster2 
(or Cluster2_BT) includes all the remaining countries in the sample, with relatively less 
developed equity markets (i.e., weaker equity markets). For example, equity market 
development has a score of 233 for South Africa, 144 for UK, 141 for Australia, and 127 for 
Sweden. While France, Germany, and Italy scored 96, 61, and 43 on equity market 
development (see Appendix 3). 
 
With regard to cultural clusters, countries in cluster1 have high individualism (e.g. UK with 
score of 89, Australia with a score of 90, whilst countries in cluster2 have low scores on 
individualism (e.g. Portugal has 27, and Greece 35). Cluster1 also includes countries with 
relatively low uncertainty avoidance and power distance (e.g. UK scores 35 on both power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance) while in Cluster2, countries have rather high power 
distance and high uncertainty avoidance (e.g. France with scores of 86 and 68 on power 
distance and uncertainty avoidance respectively). Note that scores for power distance, 
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individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation are available 
in Table 5.4 (Chapter 5).  
   
6.3 Descriptive Statistics across Institutional/Cultural Clusters 
Table 6.2 and 6.3 present the basic descriptive statistics for the two clusters identified by the 
cluster analysis. Table 6.2 reports the results of descriptive statistics for economic/reporting 
incentives for the institutional clusters that include all the sample firms.  
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics across Institutional Clusters (1) 
 Cluster1 Clsuter2  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff. Means 
IMP 7,547 0.008 0.041 9,595 0.003 0.020 0.000 
GW 7,384 0.176 0.189 9,093 0.136 0.142 0.000 
M/B 7,207 3.280 12.087 9,267 2.057 5.367 0.000 
ΔMrktCap 7,355 0.313 2.130 9,465 0.134 1.331 0.000 
ΔOCF 7,486 0.012 1.674 9,648 0.000 0.791 0.696 
ΔSALES 7,535 0.182 15.132 9,674 0.135 4.857 0.660 
ΔROA 7,414 590.144 55101.310 9,468 -0.672 21.107 0.293 
Earn_Volt 7,574 3.356 42.291 9,681 30.364 846.956 0.001 
Price_Volt 7,497 36.765 12.720 9,548 32.021 10.020 0.000 
ΔIndMD_ROA 7,574 -0.371 1.197 9,688 -0.333 1.094 0.017 
ΔGDP 7,574 1.781 2.243 9,688 0.397 2.924 0.000 
OWN 7,455 35.997 21.767 9,562 49.505 22.587 0.000 
ΔDebt_Ratio 7,548 96.195 29429.860 9,638 0.512 15.168 0.269 
BATH 7,574 -0.410 18.156 9,688 -0.047 1.993 0.037 
SMOOTH 7,531 0.237 3.866 9,503 0.036 0.342 0.000 
SIZE 7,561 5.210 2.541 9,677 6.255 2.121 0.000 







Table 6.3 reports the result of the descriptive statistics for economic/reporting incentives for 
the institutional clusters that exclude Polish firms.   
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics across Institutional Clusters (2) 
 Cluster1_BT Cluster2_BT  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff. Means 
IMP 7,547 0.008 0.041 8,758 0.003 0.020 0.000 
GW 7,384 0.176 0.189 8,377 0.140 0.143 0.000 
M/B 7,207 3.280 12.087 8,470 2.092 5.584 0.000 
ΔMrktCap 7,355 0.313 2.130 8,666 0.124 1.336 0.000 
ΔOCF 7,486 0.012 1.674 8,808 0.008 0.216 0.764 
ΔSALES 7,535 0.182 15.132 8,834 0.072 0.750 0.329 
ΔROA 7,414 590.144 55101.310 8,638 -0.683 20.068 0.314 
Earn_Volt 7,574 3.356 42.291 8,841 33.063 886.232 0.001 
Price_Volt 7,497 36.765 12.720 8,736 31.312 9.802 0.000 
ΔIndMD_ROA 7,574 -0.371 1.197 8,848 -0.330 1.088 0.012 
ΔGDP 7,574 1.781 2.243 8,848 0.087 2.819 0.000 
OWN 7,455 35.997 21.767 8,736 49.366 22.777 0.000 
ΔDebt_Ratio 7,548 96.195 29429.860 8,803 0.521 15.385 0.290 
BATH 7,574 -0.410 18.156 8,848 -0.026 0.158 0.034 
SMOOTH 7,531 0.237 3.866 8,668 0.033 0.345 0.000 
SIZE 7,561 5.210 2.541 8,837 6.381 2.108 0.000 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis, by cluster.  
The tables show that there are statistically significant differences between the means of two 
groups of clusters with respect to almost all variables. In particular, firms in Cluster1 (and 
Cluster1_BT) have, on average, significantly higher impairment losses, as well as higher 
amounts of goodwill, when compared to their counterparts in Cluster2 (and Cluster2_BT). 
Firms in Cluster1 (and Cluster1_BT) also display, on average, higher ΔMrktCap, as well as 
a higher percentage change in OCF, SALES, and ROA relative to firms in Cluster2. This 
might be interpreted as an indication that firms in the second cluster experience worse 
financial performance relative to their counterparts in the first cluster, but at the same time, 
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report lower levels of impairment losses. The percentage change in OCF, SALES, ROA, 
IndMD_ROA, and Debt_Ratio did not show any statistically significant difference of their 
mean values across the two sets of clusters. Earn_Volt, ΔIndMd_ROA, OWN are greater, 
and Price_Volt and ΔGDP are lower for firms in Cluster2 (and Cluster2_BT) relative to their 
counterparts in Cluster1 (and Cluster1_BT). 
Table 6.4 reports the result of the descriptive statistics for economic/reporting incentives for 
the cultural clusters. 
Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics across Cultural Clusters 
 Cultural Cluster1 Cultural Cluster2  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Diff. Means 
IMP 12,537 0.006 0.035 4,605 0.002 0.015 0.000 
GW 12,156 0.160 0.173 4,321 0.137 0.144 0.000 
M/B 12,053 2.853 10.176 4,421 1.882 4.113 0.000 
ΔMrktCap 12,257 0.250 1.957 4,563 0.113 0.848 0.000 
ΔOCF 12,478 0.012 1.308 4,656 -0.013 1.103 0.250 
ΔSALES 12,537 0.143 11.746 4,672 0.189 6.922 0.801 
ΔROA 12,299 355.509 42781.070 4,583 -0.751 15.869 0.573 
Earn_Volt 12,572 23.116 742.818 4,683 6.140 70.143 0.119 
Price_Volt 12,439 34.772 11.895 4,606 32.312 10.268 0.000 
ΔIndMD_ROA 12,579 -0.356 1.156 4,683 -0.332 1.098 0.222 
ΔGDP 12,579 1.190 2.631 4,683 0.504 2.936 0.000 
OWN 12,383 39.863 22.684 4,634 53.540 21.648 0.000 
ΔDebt_Ratio 12,532 58.015 22839.340 4,654 0.853 16.726 0.864 
BATH 12,579 -0.256 14.090 4,683 -0.062 2.860 0.350 
SMOOTH 12,503 0.156 3.015 4,531 0.024 0.143 0.003 
SIZE 12,564 5.623 2.422 4,674 6.262 2.162 0.000 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis, by cluster.  
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As can be seen from the table, firms in the first cultural cluster have, on average, significantly 
higher impairment losses, and higher amounts of goodwill, when compared to their 
counterparts in the second cluster. Firms in the first cluster also display, on average, higher 
M/B ratios and ΔMrktCap relative to firms in the second cluster. The percentage change in 
OCF, SALES, ROA, Earn_Volt, IndMD_ROA, and Debt_Ratio did not show any 
statistically significant difference of their mean values across the two sets of clusters. 
Price_Volt, ΔGDP are greater, and OWN are lower for firms in the first cluster relative to 
their counterparts in the second cluster. 
 
6.4 Regression Results across Institutional Clusters  
Table 6.5 presents the Tobit analysis examining the determinants of the amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses across the two institutional clusters. 
Table 6.5 Regression Results across Institutional Clusters 
Variable Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster1_BT Cluster2_BT 
GW 0.117*** 0.083*** 0.117*** 0.086*** 
 (8.004) (9.685) (8.004) (9.722) 
M/B -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.004*** 
 (-5.453) (-4.230) (-5.453) (-4.185) 
ΔMrktCap -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 
 (-1.456) (-0.241) (-1.456) (-0.075) 
ΔOCF -0.001 -0.017 -0.001 -0.011 
 (-0.558) (-1.020) (-0.558) (-0.605) 
ΔSALES -0.034*** -0.001 -0.034*** -0.001 
 (-2.962) (-0.257) (-2.962) (-0.184) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (-3.453) (-5.997) (-3.453) (-5.906) 
Earn_Volt 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.338) (-0.344) (1.338) (-0.498) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (4.923) (4.590) (4.923) (4.994) 
ΔIndMd_ROA -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.541) (0.466) (-0.541) (-0.705) 
ΔGDP 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** 0.000 
 (3.320) (-1.184) (3.320) (0.476) 
OWN 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.705) (-0.447) (0.705) (0.149) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
 (3.767) (0.497) (3.767) (0.769) 
BATH 0.012 0.210*** 0.012 0.210*** 
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 (1.093) (5.385) (1.093) (5.293) 
SMOOTH 0.003** 0.031* 0.003** 0.027 
 (2.567) (1.880) (2.567) (1.569) 
SIZE 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 
 (7.903) (6.506) (7.903) (6.430) 
BIG4 -0.018** 0.002 -0.018** 0.001 
 (-2.563) (1.079) (-2.563) (0.536) 
Crisis Period 0.008 0.007*** 0.008 0.005** 
 (1.425) (3.152) (1.425) (2.441) 
Basic Materials -0.013 0.020*** -0.013 0.019** 
 (-0.934) (2.803) (-0.934) (2.510) 
Industrials 0.017 0.020*** 0.017 0.020*** 
 (1.335) (2.970) (1.335) (2.908) 
Consumer Goods 0.011 0.018*** 0.011 0.020*** 
 (0.815) (2.696) (0.815) (2.808) 
Health Care 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 
 (0.194) (0.814) (0.194) (0.769) 
Consumer Services 0.019 0.021*** 0.019 0.021*** 
 (1.407) (2.994) (1.407) (2.852) 
Telecommunications 0.045** 0.023*** 0.045** 0.029*** 
 (2.323) (2.898) (2.323) (3.319) 
Utilities -0.025 0.029*** -0.025 0.031*** 
 (-1.161) (3.938) (-1.161) (3.911) 
Technology 0.012 0.022*** 0.012 0.022*** 
 (0.807) (2.934) (0.807) (2.821) 
Constant -0.259*** -0.129*** -0.259*** -0.132*** 
 (-9.435) (-8.752) (-9.435) (-8.625) 
N 6,662 8,236 6,662 7,586 
F-statistics 8.73 6.94 8.73 6.82 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As can be seen from the table, of the economic factors in Cluster1 (and Cluster1_BT), GW, 
M/B, ΔSALES, ΔROA, and Price_Volt are statistically significant and have the predicted 
signs. ΔMrktCap, ΔOCF, Earn_Volt, and ΔIndMd_ROA are insignificant but have the 
correct signs. In Cluster2 (and Cluster2_BT), GW, M/B, ΔROA are statistically significant 
and of the correct sign. For reporting incentives proxies, goodwill-impairment losses 
reported by firms in the first cluster were, on average, significantly related to SMOOTH, 
while those recorded in the second cluster were (statistically and practically) significantly 
related to BATH.  
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As mentioned above, the hypotheses are formulated in terms of the relative association 
between goodwill-impairment amounts and the economic/reporting incentives across the 
two sets of clusters. With reference to the economic proxies for goodwill-impairments, a 
comparison of the coefficients across the two clusters, on the one hand, reveals negative 
differences for M/B, ΔMrktCap, ΔSALES, and ΔIndMD_ROA, and on the other, reveals 
positive differences for GW, Price_Volt, BATH, and SMOOTH. Since the predicted sign 
for these economic proxies is negative (positive) within each cluster, the above negative 
(positive) differences suggest that these economic factors have relatively higher associations 
with goodwill-impairment losses recorded by firms in Cluster1 (Cluster1_BT), as compared 
to those reported by their counterparts in Cluster2 (and cluster2_TB).  
 
With regard to managerial reporting incentives, goodwill-impairment losses reported by 
firms in the second institutional cluster (Cluster2/Cluser2_BT) were found to have 
significantly a higher association with big bath reporting behaviour, compared to those 
recorded by their counterparts in the first cluster. More specifically, for 
Cluster2/cluster2_BT, the coefficient for BATH was 0.21, with a corresponding p-value of 
0.000, suggesting practical significance as well as statistical significance. For 
Cluster1/Cluster1_BT, the estimate for BATH was clearly not significantly different from 
zero, with an estimated beta coefficient of 0.01. All in all, the obtained results reveal, on the 
one hand, firms in Cluster1 (and Cluster1_BT) record impairment losses that are strongly 
associated with economic impairment proxies, but very weakly associated with big bath 
reporting proxy, and, on the other hand, firms in Cluster2 (and Cluster2_TB) tend to report 
impairment losses that are less reflective of their underlying economics, suggesting that 
managers in those firms use the greater flexibility permitted in the impairment standard in 
determining the magnitude of goodwill-impairment losses.
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6.5 Regression Results across Cultural Clusters  
Table 6.6 presents the Tobit analysis examining the determinants of the amounts of 
goodwill-impairment losses across the two cultural clusters. 
Table 6.6 Regression Results across Cultural Clusters 
Variable Cultural Cluster1 Cultural Cluster2 
GW 0.121*** 0.049*** 
 (10.986) (6.085) 
M/B -0.008*** -0.003*** 
 (-6.143) (-3.879) 
ΔMrktCap -0.003 -0.001 
 (-1.547) (-0.232) 
ΔOCF -0.001 0.025 
 (-0.579) (1.554) 
ΔSALES -0.021* -0.015*** 
 (-1.946) (-2.909) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.003*** 
 (-2.865) (-4.213) 
Earn_Volt -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.791) (-0.430) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.000** 
 (6.359) (2.246) 
ΔIndMd_ROA -0.002 0.002* 
 (-1.158) (1.929) 
ΔGDP 0.002*** -0.000 
 (2.739) (-0.809) 
OWN 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.094) (-0.096) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** -0.000 
 (3.564) (-0.057) 
BATH 0.060 0.238*** 
 (1.257) (3.437) 
SMOOTH 0.003*** 0.195*** 
 (2.923) (2.794) 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 (8.531) (7.242) 
BIG4 -0.011** -0.000 
 (-2.481) (-0.029) 
Crisis Period 0.010*** 0.003 
 (2.809) (1.371) 
Basic Materials 0.013 0.007 
 (1.321) (1.107) 
Industrials 0.027*** 0.007 
 (2.923) (1.150) 
Consumer Goods 0.026*** 0.005 
 (2.645) (0.843) 
Health Care 0.018 -0.012 
 (1.575) (-1.638) 
Consumer Services 0.030*** 0.009 
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 (3.133) (1.444) 
Telecommunications 0.053*** -0.004 
 (4.079) (-0.510) 
Utilities 0.025** 0.013* 
 (2.090) (1.916) 
Technology 0.029*** 0.002 
 (2.798) (0.381) 
Constant -0.229*** -0.082*** 
 (-11.866) (-7.393) 
N 11,025 3,873 
F-statistics 11.00 5.34 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6.6 shows that firms in the first cultural cluster, wherein countries score rather high 
on individualism, and rather low on uncertainty avoidance and power distance, seem to have 
reported, on average, goodwill-impairment losses that were strongly associated with proxies 
for economic impairment (GW, M/B, Price_Volt), but at the same time, they were weakly 
associated with reporting incentives proxies (SMOOTH). In contrast, firms in the second 
cultural cluster, wherein countries score relatively high on uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance, and medium to low on individualism, have apparently reported impairment losses 
that are more dominant in their associations with reporting incentives proxies (BATH and 








6.6 Additional Analysis: Abnormal Goodwill Impairment Losses across Country 
Clusters 
The results involving abnormal goodwill impairment losses reported in Chapter 5 are used 
to examine whether they are explained by cluster belonging. 
Table 6.7 The Patterns of Abnormal Goodwill-Impairment Losses across Country Clusters 
 Institutional Clusters Cultural Clusters 
Cluster Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Cluster2 -0.035*** 0.003***     
 (-10.087) (22.904)     
Cluster2_BT   -0.035*** 0.003***   
   (-9.952) (22.836)   
Cultural Cluster2     -0.029*** 0.002*** 
     (-6.936) (12.381) 
Constant 0.058*** -0.009*** 0.058*** -0.009*** 0.045*** -0.008*** 
 (22.570) (-95.510) (22.480) (-94.619) (22.651) (-103.474) 
N 1,606 10,137 1,585 9,560 1,606 10,137 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6.7 reveals that firms in the first institutional (Cluster1/Cluster1_BT) and cultural 
cluster, on average, have significantly higher positive (and lower negative) amounts of 
abnormal goodwill-impairment charges, compared to their counterparts in the second 
institutional (Cluster2/Cluster2_BT) and cultural clusters. This finding implies that firms in 
the first institutional/cultural cluster seem to have recorded more-than-necessary impairment 
losses, while firms in the second institutional/cultural cluster appeared to have recorded less-
than-necessary goodwill-impairments. This is not surprising, because firms in more litigious 
countries find it less costly to impair greater amounts of their goodwill rather than not to 
impair or impair lower amounts than they should do75. This is generally consistent with the 
findings of Amiraslani et al. (2013) who report that firms in countries with outsider 
economies and strong enforcement of law tend to recognise impairment losses76faster than 
                                                          
75 This is fully consistent with the findings of Ball et al. (2000) who find that firms in common-law countries 
report more conservative earnings (i.e. report less earnings/higher losses), compared to their counterparts in 
code-law ones.   
76 These losses are not necessarily fully economic.  
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their counterparts in countries with insider economies and relatively strong (or weak) law 
enforcement. In a more recent study, Glaum et al. (2015) also found evidence suggesting 
that firms in countries with strong law enforcement tend to publicly report impairment losses 
in a timely manner. 
  
6.7 Discussion and Summary 
This chapter compared the association between goodwill-impairment amounts and 
economic/reporting incentives across institutional and cultural clusters of countries. The 
results, in general, reveal that firms in the first institutional/cultural cluster(s) appear to have 
recorded goodwill-impairment losses that are more dominant in their association with 
economic factors rather than reporting incentives are, suggesting that managers in those 
firms are applying their accounting discretion afforded by the impairment standard in a 
relatively efficient manner to produce goodwill-impairment losses that are more reflective 
of their firms’ underlying economics.  
 
While firms in the second institutional/cultural cluster(s) appear to have recorded goodwill-
impairment losses that were less reflective of their underlying economics, suggesting that 
managers in those firms are applying greater reporting flexibility in determining goodwill-
impairment amounts. However, the results may also indicate that there is relatively little 
room for managers of firms within the first clusters to exercise their impairment discretion, 
and have therefore recorded goodwill-impairment losses that were to some extent influenced 
by managerial and firm-level incentives, such as taking more impairments when earnings 
are unexpectedly high. 
 
However, one should interpret the findings of this study with caution, since cultural clusters 
overlap with institutional clusters. This makes it difficult to evaluate whether the resultant 
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clusters are culturally-driven or institutionally-driven. Further research needs to be done to 
validate and extend this study by considering countries with vastly different cultural and 






7 Chapter 7: The Value-relevance of Goodwill-impairment Losses  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is to report the results with respect to the tests carried out in order to provide 
evidence concerning the value relevance of goodwill impairment losses for the study’s 
sample of firms (which is the second objective of the study). The value relevance model 
developed in Chapter 4 was tested for all sample firms and also separately for the different 
clusters developed in Chapter 6, i.e., institutional/cultural clusters. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 
present descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations between the model’s independent 
variables, as well as the empirical results regarding the value-relevance of goodwill-
impairment losses for the whole sample and across the two institutional clusters and the two 
cultural clusters. Section 7.4 reports the empirical results of the impact of various potential 
explanatory variables on the degree of association between firms’ goodwill-impairment 
losses and their market value of equity. Section 7.5 reports the results of the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. Section 7.6 
provides additional empirical evidence in a multivariate context on the timeliness of 
goodwill-impairment losses. 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.1 presents distributional statistics for a selected set of variables included in the OLS 
regression examining the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MV 16,712 15.981 29.262 0.011 289.025 
BV 14,000 7.934 16.997 0.000 166.425 
NI 16,758 0.825 2.432 -11.139 21.760 
GWA 16,110 3.394 7.334 0.000 64.381 
GIL 16,934 0.026 0.132 0.000 1.689 
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the 
regression analysis examining the value-relevance of goodwill-impairments 
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The table above demonstrates an average share price of $15.98, and an average pre-goodwill 
book value per share of $7.93. The table also exhibits that the sample firms report average 
earnings per share of $0.83. The average goodwill per share is $3.39 (i.e., 32.67% of the 
total book value per share). The average goodwill-impairment loss per share is £0.03.  
 
7.3 Regression Analysis 
7.3.1 Correlation coefficients 
Table 7.2 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients and their statistical significance for the 
variables included in the OLS regression for the full pooled sample.  
Table 7.2 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 MV BV NI GWA GIL 
MV 1.000     
BV 0.733* 1.000    
NI 0.706* 0.614* 1.000   
GWA 0.515* 0.398* 0.408* 1.000  
GIL 0.077* 0.089* 0.028* 0.142* 1.000 
The * denotes correlation coefficients with values greater than or equal to 5% significance level. 
As expected, BV, NI, GWA, GIL are significantly positively correlated with MV. Table 7.2 
reveals that the independent variables do not highly correlate with one another. The highest 
pair-wise correlation coefficient is 0.61, implying that the problem of multicollinearity does 
not appear to be a concern in this study. 
7.3.2 VIF 
Diagnostic tests were further carried out to check for the problems of multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity in the data.  
Table 7.3 Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
NI 1.73 0.579 
BV 1.61 0.621 
GWA 1.31 0.761 
GIL 1.03 0.968 
Mean VIF 1.42  
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Table 7.3 shows VIF values and its associated tolerance (1/VIF) for the independent 
variables of the regression analysis. VIF indicates how much inflation in the standard errors 
is caused by collinearity, and tolerance, on the other hand, shows the amount of collinearity 
that a regression can tolerate. As a rule of thumb, a VIF greater than 10, or equivalently, a 
tolerance value less than 0.1 indicates the presence of harmful collinearity (Myers, 1990; 
Gujarati, 2009). The results of the VIF statistics show no sign of multicollinearity, all VIF 
values are much lower than the critical cut point of 10.  
 
7.3.3 Heteroscedasticity 
Finally, the Breusch-Pagan /Cook-Weisberg test has been carried out in Stata with the estat 
hettest command to check for the heteroscedasticity of the panel data, i.e., the non-constant 
variance of the residuals (or error terms). Results strongly reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity (P-value is essentially zero, p <0.001) and find support for the presence of 
heteroscedastic residuals. To account for the violations of the homoscedasticity assumption, 
the Huber-White sandwich robust method were used. According to Bernhard (2003), “this 
method assumes that observations are independent across countries but not necessarily 
independent within countries” (p. 120). In Stata, the robust standard errors of the estimated 
parameters can be obtained by adding the vce (robust) option to the regression commands 
(Baum, 2006). 
 
7.3.4 Results- Pooled and Institutional Clusters  
Table 7.4 provides the results of the multivariate OLS-regression models analysing the 
value-relevance of goodwill-impairment charges for the whole sample of firms, and for each 
of the four subsamples involving the firms belonging to the institutional clusters (without 
and with book-tax conformity). 
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Table 7.4 Value-relevance of Goodwill-Impairment Losses across Institutional Clusters 
Variable Pooled_OLS Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster1_BT Cluster2_BT 
BV 0.745*** 1.298*** 0.701*** 1.298*** 0.694*** 
 (23.480) (8.818) (21.078) (8.818) (20.539) 
NI 4.256*** 3.258*** 4.402*** 3.258*** 4.408*** 
 (19.878) (7.533) (18.857) (7.533) (18.586) 
GWA 1.041*** 1.631*** 0.956*** 1.631*** 0.948*** 
 (19.813) (7.843) (17.304) (7.843) (16.901) 
GIL -2.607 -4.754*** -2.999 -4.754*** -3.345 
 (-1.609) (-2.588) (-1.429) (-2.588) (-1.582) 
Constant 3.477*** 1.119*** 5.103*** 1.119*** 5.508*** 
 (23.803) (4.621) (19.739) (4.621) (19.812) 
N 13,510 6,056 7,454 6,056 6,789 
F-statistics 976.719 112.053 795.367 112.053 760.668 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared77 0.704 0.622 0.680 0.622 0.677 
Root MSE 14.248 6.228 18.142 6.228 18.687 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The coefficients for explanatory variables and their associated p-values are highlighted with 
one star indicating 95 percent certainty that the results did not happen by chance, two stars 
99 per cent certainty, and three stars indicating 99.9 per cent certainty. All F-Statistics were 
significant with explanatory power (R-Squared) ranging from 62% to 70%, which is 
comparable to prior research (e.g. Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2009). 
 
In line with the results obtained by (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2009; AbuGhazaleh et al., 
2012), and on the basis of the pooled model presented in the leftmost column of Table 7.4, 
book value per share (BV), and earnings per share were positively and significantly (p < 
0.001) associated with share price.  As Table 7.4 shows that there is a positive and significant 
                                                          
77 When using robust standard errors, the adjusted R-squared is not purposefully displayed/reported, “as it is 
no longer appropriate in a statistical sense even though, mechanically, the numbers would be unchanged. That 
is, sums of squares remain unchanged, but the meaning you might be tempted to give those sums is no longer 
relevant. The F statistic, for instance, is no longer based on sums of squares; it becomes a Wald test based on 
the robustly estimated variance matrix” (StataCorp, 2005, p. 44).  
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(p < 0.001) relationship between goodwill per share before impairment (GWA) and share 
price.  
 
The table also shows that the goodwill-impairment loss per share (GIL) has the expected 
negative sign, but is insignificant, indicating that these impairment losses do not appear to 
provide information useful to investors, which will be of assistance in assessing the firm’s 
market value, i.e., they are not value relevant. The estimated coefficient on GIL, however, 
appears to be sensitive to the inclusion of country-specific dummy variables (GIL, 
coefficient = -3.376, t-statistics= -2.126, p-value=0.034), suggesting that clear differences 
between investors in different countries in terms of the perceptions about the importance or 
value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. Although it probably would not have suited 
the purpose of this study, which sought to trace differences in value-relevance of goodwill-
impairment losses to country-specific factors, I consider the inclusion of industry- and time-
fixed effects separately (and both jointly with country-fixed effects), and their inclusion, 
however, had almost no effect on either the coefficient of GIL or its statistical significance. 
 
Once again, however, after splitting the sample into two sub-samples and running separate 
regressions for each sub-sample, the results reveal notable differences from the baseline 
results. Specifically, companies in Cluster1 (and cluster1_BT) appeared to have recorded 
goodwill-impairment charges that are negatively and significantly related to their market 
values (𝛽 = −4.75, 𝑝 < 0.01). While goodwill-impairment losses incurred by companies in 
Cluster2 (and Clsuter2_BT) generally failed to significantly affect market values.  
 
All in all, the obtained results indicate that companies within the strong equity-outsiders 
cluster, tend to report goodwill-impairment losses that are, on average, more informative to 
254 
all users, and more relevant than those reported by companies within the weak equity-
outsider cluster. Although goodwill-impairment losses reported by firms belonging to 
Cluster2 (and Cluster2_BT) are not value relevant, they are value relevant for firms 
belonging to Cluster1 (and Cluster1_BT). 
 
This pattern of results was, in general, comparable with the earlier findings of Ali and Hwang 
(2000), who showed that the value-relevance of accounting numbers is lower in bank-
oriented countries than market-oriented countries. Davis-Friday et al. (2006) also found 
evidence broadly consistent with the findings of this study, implying that accounting 
numbers have relatively low value-relevance, when corporate governance is weak. The 
overall results suggest that (small) investors are more likely to trust accounting numbers in 
countries where they feel their investment are well protected by the law (i.e., the rule of law 
is upheld). This helps to explain why investors in countries with strong equity markets 
perceive reported impairment losses as reliable measures of the reduction in the carrying 











7.3.5 Results- Cultural Clusters  
Table 7.5 provides the results of the multivariate OLS-regression models analysing the 
value-relevance of goodwill-impairment charges for the whole sample of firms and for each 
of the two subsamples involving the firms belonging to the two cultural clusters. 
Table 7.5 Value-relevance of Goodwill-Impairment Losses across Cultural Clusters 
Variable Cultural Cluster1 Cultural Cluster2 
BV 0.878*** 0.618*** 
 (16.407) (15.276) 
NI 3.975*** 4.651*** 
 (12.944) (15.180) 
GWA 1.344*** 0.879*** 
 (15.844) (13.026) 
GIL -0.926 -5.236 
 (-0.561) (-1.609) 
Constant 2.578*** 4.903*** 
 (13.709) (14.567) 
N 10,077 3,433 
F-statistics 487.144 498.541 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.688 0.709 
Root MSE 12.175 18.537 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 7.5 showed no statistically significant differences in the value-relevance of goodwill-
impairment losses between the two cultural clusters- albeit this is somewhat contradictory.78 
Firms in both clusters have, on average, failed to report any goodwill-impairment losses that 
are relevant or strongly associated with their market values of equity. The lack of significant 
differences between the two clusters can be attributed to the large variations within the 
cluster, which may have obscured any variations between the clusters.  
 
                                                          
78 My earlier analysis showed significant differences between the two institutional clusters, implying that 
investors belonging to institutional clusters differ in terms of their perceptions about the importance of 
goodwill-impairment losses. This, unfortunately, was not the case since cultural clusters which, although 
overlapping with institutional clusters, are not really Siamese, and will never be.    
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This finding indicates that classifying countries on the basis of their cultural 
similarities/differences does not often successfully reflect the underlying structure across all 
the countries included in this study. This suggests the need for another clustering that truly 
captures much of the cultural uniformity (and diversity) within (and between) the clusters. 
To maximise the homogeneity within the cultural clusters, and at the same time, maximise 
the heterogeneity between the cultural clusters, one needs to: (i) include countries that are 
vastly heterogeneous in terms of Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture; (ii) exclude cultural 
attributes that are less important and have failed to contribute to cultural diversity among 
countries (e.g. masculinity and long/short-term orientation), and (iii) develop up-to-date 
measures of cultural attributes that their reliability and validity are established through 
empirical methods. 
 
Following Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2009), I examine the sensitivity of the results to the 
inclusion of an interaction term (Expect#GIL) between goodwill-impairment losses (GIL) 
and Expect, an indicator variable that captures the possible decline(s) in the value of 
goodwill (i.e., the anticipated goodwill-impairment loss), and equals 1 if the market value of 
a firm’s equity is lower than its book value and an impairment loss is reported (as 
anticipated), or the market value of a firm’s equity is higher than its book value and no 
impairment loss is reported (as anticipated); and 0 otherwise. Results, reported in the second 
column of Table 7.6, revealed that the association between 1.Expect#GIL and share price 
was negative and statistically significant (β= -14.675, t-statistics= -7.365, p-value < 0.01). 
This result suggests that goodwill-impairments are deemed to be value-relevant when 
investors perceive that firms behave as expected, i.e., report (do not report) goodwill-
impairment losses when the market values of their own equity are lower (higher) than their 
book values. 
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7.4 The Effects of BIG4 Auditors and Institutions on the Value-Relevance of Goodwill-Impairment Losses 
Table 7.6 presents the results of a set of regressions that examine the indirect-moderating- impact of BIG4 auditors and other institutions (strength 
of national enforcement of auditing/accounting standards, investor protection, quality of legality, and equity market development) on the degree of 
association between firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their market value of equity. 
Table 7.6  The Effects of BIG4 Auditors and Institutions on the Value-Relevance of Goodwill-Impairment Losses 
Variable Baseline Expect BIG4 Audit_Enforce Invstor_Prtct Qlty_Lglty EqtyMrktDvlp 
BV 0.745*** 0.750*** 0.752*** 0.752*** 0.751*** 0.753*** 0.750*** 
 (23.480) (23.827) (23.684) (23.647) (23.633) (23.671) (23.633) 
NI 4.256*** 4.175*** 4.215*** 4.219*** 4.223*** 4.217*** 4.226*** 
 (19.878) (19.541) (19.659) (19.642) (19.673) (19.655) (19.722) 
GWA 1.041*** 1.049*** 1.031*** 1.031*** 1.032*** 1.031*** 1.034*** 
 (19.813) (20.293) (19.635) (19.608) (19.663) (19.631) (19.741) 
GIL -2.607       
 (-1.609)       
0.Expect#GIL  10.810***      
  (4.755)      
1.Expect#GIL  -14.675***      
  (-7.365)      
0.BIG4#0.NEG#GIL   -10.291***     
   (-3.926)     
0.BIG4#1.NEG#GIL   -11.913     
   (-1.643)     
1.BIG4#0.NEG#GIL   3.826*     
   (1.817)     
1.BIG4#1.NEG#GIL   -14.545***     
   (-4.618)     
0.NEG#GIL#Audit_Enforce    0.047    
    (1.055)    
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1.NEG#GIL#Audit_Enforce    -0.282***    
    (-4.360)    
0.NEG#GIL#Invstr_Prt     0.234   
     (0.945)   
1.NEG#GIL#Invstr_Prt     -1.516***   
     (-4.221)   
0NEG#GIL#Qlty_Lglty      0.201  
      (1.219)  
1.NEG#GIL#Qlty_Lglty      -1.214***  
      (-4.739)  
0.NEG#GIL#EqtyMrkt_Dvlp       0.011 
       (0.682) 
1.NEG#GIL#EqtyMrkt_Dvlp       -0.112*** 
       (-4.347) 
Constant 3.477*** 3.462*** 3.491*** 3.476*** 3.477*** 3.478*** 3.484*** 
 (23.803) (24.192) (24.152) (23.951) (23.952) (23.986) (23.998) 
N 13,510 13,510 13,510 13,510 13,510 13,510 13,510 
F-statistics 976.72 826.88 570.31 793.13 791.69 794.10 791.51 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.704 0.707 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.705 
Root MSE 14.248 14.165 14.214 14.225 14.228 14.221 14.229 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 = Market value of firm i’s equity at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for impairment. 
𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡  = Value of firm i‘s equity at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for impairment, minus goodwill’s carrying amount at the same year-end. 
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡  = Net income at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for impairment, plus the amount of goodwill-impairment losses reported at the same year-end. 
𝐺𝑊𝐴𝑖𝑡  = Goodwill’s carrying amount at the end of the year wherein goodwill is tested for impairment, plus the amount of goodwill-impairment losses reported at the same 
year-end.  
𝐺𝐼𝐿𝑖𝑡  = Goodwill-impairment losses reported at the end of t.   
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In order to evaluate the impact that the type of auditor (BIG4 auditor and non-BIG4 auditor) 
may have on the association between goodwill-impairment losses and the market values of 
the firm’s equity, I include a three-way interaction term between BIG4 (an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the firm’s independent auditor is one of the BIG4 auditors, and 0 otherwise), 
NEG (an indicator variable equal to 1 if the market value of equity is lower than the book 
value of equity, and 0 otherwise), and GIL (goodwill-impairment losses). Results, reported 
in the third column of Table 7.6, show that the coefficient for the interaction term 
(1.BIG4#1.NEG#GIL) is negative and significant (β=-14.545, t-statistics=-4.618, p-value < 
0.01). This result indicates that investors put a higher valuation weight on goodwill-
impairment losses recorded by firms audited by one of the BIG4 auditors. This is likely to 
be the case, as investors may perceive that there are reduced opportunities for managers to 
abuse their impairment discretion in the presence of BIG4 auditors.  
 
In this study, I also examine the impact of national institutions on the association between 
goodwill-impairment losses and share prices. Table 7.6, column 4 to 7, shows the results of 
the three-way interaction between Expect, goodwill-impairment losses, and institutional 
variables (strength of national enforcement of auditing/accounting standards, investor 
protection, quality of legality, and equity market development). The estimated coefficients 
on the interaction terms (1.NEG#GIL#Audit_Enforce, β=-0.282, t-statistics= -4.360, p-value 
< 0.01); (1.NEG#GIL#Invstr_Prt, β=-1.516, t-statistics= -4.221, p-value < 0.01); 
(1.NEG#GIL#Qlty_Lglty, β=-1.214, t-statistics= -4.739, p-value < 0.01); and 
(1.NEG#GIL#EqtyMrkt_Dvlp, β=-0.112, t-statistics= -4.347, p-value < 0.01) were negative 
and significant in all specifications. These results suggest that investors perceive goodwill-
impairment losses recorded by firms operating in countries with strong institutions as value-
relevant. This is consistent with the role that national institutions play in constraining 
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potential opportunistic behaviour of the management on goodwill-impairment decisions, 
thereby ensuring that the reported goodwill-impairment losses are neither overstated nor 
understated (i.e., no impairment losses are reported when the market value of equity is 
greater than the book value of equity, but they are only reported when the market value of a 
firm’s equity is lower than its book value).  
 
7.5 The Effect of the Crisis on the Value-relevance of Goodwill-Impairment Losses  
Table 7.7 reports results of the value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses for two sub-
samples: during (2007-2009), and after (2010-2013) crisis periods. 
Table 7.7 Value-relevance of Goodwill-impairments during and after the Global Crisis 
Variable Crisis Period Post-crisis Period 
BV 0.794*** 0.703*** 
 (14.971) (17.448) 
NI 3.683*** 4.805*** 
 (11.740) (16.131) 
GWA 1.054*** 1.021*** 
 (11.489) (16.283) 
GIL -4.771** -1.270 
 (-2.244) (-0.537) 
Constant 3.970*** 3.088*** 
 (16.933) (16.514) 
N 5,783 7,727 
F-statistics 357.439 631.401 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.674 0.727 
Root MSE 14.731 13.811 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In this study, I also examine the consequences of the recent global financial crisis on the 
association between goodwill-impairment losses and the market values. To assess whether 
the association has increased or decreased after the global financial crisis, I divide the whole 
sample period (2007-2013) into two subsamples: from 2007 to 2009 (the crisis period) and 
from 2010 to 2013 (the after-crisis periods). This split is consistent with Glaum et al. (2015). 
261 
Although economies recovered from the crisis at different speeds, 2009 is the ending point 
that seems to be applicable to all economies.  
 
In the table above, one can see that the association between market prices and accounting 
numbers changes over the sample period. In particular, the value-relevance of both book 
values (BV) and goodwill (GWA) declined after the financial crisis. This is generally 
consistent with the suggestion of several authors (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Brown et 
al., 2006) that the value relevance of accounting numbers varies across the business cycle. 
In particular, Bertomeu and Magee (2011) develop a model linking financial reporting 
quality to the cyclical variations in macroeconomic activity, and their analytical results show 
that the quality of financial reporting increases in expansionary times, decreases as the 
economy deteriorates (i.e., moderate times), and increases again when the economy falls into 
recessionary times.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, however, the results reveal that goodwill-impairment losses do 
not seem to have a statistically significant impact on firms’ share prices in the period 
following the global financial crisis, implying that investors have become less sensitised to 
the importance of goodwill-impairments after the crisis than they were in the crisis period. 
Another possible reason in favour of higher value-relevance of goodwill-impairment charges 
reported in periods of crisis relates to the fact that firms are subject to a higher litigation risk 
or increased scrutiny in crisis periods from investors, creditors, auditors, regulators, and 
other stakeholders (Chia et al., 2007; Jenkins et al., 2009). One could also consider that 
investors are more likely to tolerate poor firm performance in crisis periods (Ahmad-Zaluki 
et al., 2011). These two features should result in mangers having less opportunistic discretion 
(or less incentive) to manipulate goodwill-impairment reporting, thereby increasing the 
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extent to which firms’ goodwill-impairments reflect their underlying economics, and 
consequently the value-relevance of their impairment losses. 
 
7.6 Additional Analysis: The Timeliness of Goodwill-Impairment Losses  
 Timeliness is defined as having “information…available to decision-makers in time to be 
capable of influencing their decisions” (Conceptual Framework, 2010, QC29). According to 
Zeghal (1984), “timeliness is recognised as an important characteristic of accounting 
information by the accounting profession, the users of accounting information and the 
regulatory agencies” (p. 367). The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (2010, 
QC19), however, considers the timeliness as ancillary or complementary to the fundamental 
qualitative characteristics that make accounting information useful (relevance and faithful 
representation). To be relevant, however, information must also be made available when it 
is needed. Timeliness alone cannot make information relevant, but the lack of timeliness can 
rob information of its relevance/usefulness which it might otherwise have had.  
 
In this study, I evaluate the timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses by investigating their 
associations with both contemporaneous and (one-year and two-year) lagged stock returns 
using equation the following equation.79 
𝐺𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 +𝛽2 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−2+𝜀 ,        (7.6) 
 
where GWIit= Goodwill-impairment losses reported of a given firm in year t. 
                                                          
79 Timeliness is similar to value-relevance in the sense that they both are market-based measures of earnings 
quality, and the measures themselves are based on the association between stock prices/returns and accounting 
numbers (Francis et al., 2004). While value-relevance is studied by regressing stock returns/prices on earnings 
following Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson (1995), timeliness is studied using reverse regressions of 
earnings on stock returns/prices following Beaver et al. (1987) and Basu (1997). 
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RETURNit = Annual stock returns for the year in which goodwill-impairment loss is 
reported. 
RETURNit−1= Annual stock returns for the year preceding the announcement of goodwill-
impairments. 
RETURNit−2 = Annual stock returns for the second year preceding the announcement of 
goodwill-impairments. 
 
The equation (7.6) is estimated using OLS regressions with robust standard errors, after 
deleting the set of observations lying within the 1st and 99th   percentile of the pooled sample. 
If firms record goodwill-impairment losses in a timely fashion, then one would expect a 
strong negative association between goodwill-impairment losses and current stock market 
returns, i.e., the impairment losses will be followed by changes in share prices. However, if 
firms delay the recognition of goodwill-impairments, then one would observe a strong 
negative association between impairment losses and stocks’ prior one-year (and/or two-year) 
returns on one hand, and either a weak or no association between goodwill-impairment 
losses and contemporaneous stocks’ returns on the other hand. Under such a scenario, 
negative performance in stocks’ returns will lead the impairment losses, which will already 
have been impounded into share prices that capture the economic decline(s) in goodwill 
value ahead of the recognition of the impairment losses, i.e., that losses have little or no 
effect on share prices. In this case, the goodwill-impairment losses “only represent catch-up 
adjustments” (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2009, p. 59) and may, therefore, “only have 





Table 7.8 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression model 
examining the associations between firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their stocks’ 
current and prior returns. 
Table 7.8 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐆𝐖𝐈𝐢𝐭 16,965 1.952 10.518 0 141.37 
𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭 16,480 7.150 50.832 -82.61 251.61 
𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭−𝟏 16,149 7.257 50.814 -82.61 251.49 
𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭−𝟐 15,679 9.821 52.347 -82.61 251.49 
     Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables in the timeliness model.  
As can be seen from the table above, the average stock returns are 7.15%, 7.26%, and 9.82% 
for the year in which goodwill-impairment is recognised, the year preceding the recognition 
of an impairment loss, and the second year preceding the recognition of goodwill-
impairments respectively.  
 
Table 7.9 presents the pairwise correlation matrix for the variables included in the timeliness 
regression model. The figures with an asterisk (*) denote significance at the 5% level.  
Table 7.9 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 𝐆𝐖𝐈𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭−𝟏 𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭−𝟐 
𝐆𝐖𝐈𝐢𝐭 1.000    
𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭 -0.055* 1.000   
𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭−𝟏 -0.048* -0.010 1.000  
𝐑𝐄𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐢𝐭−𝟐 -0.013 -0.148* 0.003* 1.000 
The * indicates p-values > 0.05. 
In line with prediction, the table above shows that goodwill-impairment losses (GWI) are 
negatively and significantly correlated with both contemporaneous and lagged stock returns. 
The independent variables exhibited very weak correlations between themselves, falling 
below the 0.20 threshold, which indicates that there is no sign of collinearity among the 
independent variables included in the regression model. 
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Table 7.10 presents the results of the timeliness model examining the associations between firms’ goodwill-impairment losses and their current 
and prior returns. The table also reports the empirical results comparing the associations between goodwill-impairment losses and contemporaneous 
and lagged return across different institutional clusters of countries.   
Table 7.10 Timeliness of Goodwill-Impairment Losses across Different Institutional Clusters of Countries 
Variable Baseline Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster1_BT Cluster2_BT Strong_Enforce Weak_Enforce 
RETURNit  -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.012*** 
 (-8.080) (-6.777) (-4.619) (-6.777) (-4.454) (-6.900) (-4.312) 
RETURNit−1  -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-7.693) (-5.755) (-5.010) (-5.755) (-4.811) (-6.178) (-4.605) 
RETURNit−2  -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.004* -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (-3.737) (-3.309) (-2.045) (-3.309) (-1.766) (-2.697) (-2.661) 
Constant 2.218*** 2.399*** 2.090*** 2.399*** 2.238*** 2.367*** 1.892*** 
 (22.093) (14.614) (16.580) (14.614) (16.520) (18.967) (11.342) 
N 14,761 6,282 8,479 6,282 7,843 10,153 4,608 
F-statistics 33.35 23.21 11.63 23.21 10.96 22.24 11.69 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.007 
Root MSE 10.511 10.824 10.273 10.824 10.661 10.979 9.394 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: 𝐺𝑊𝐼𝑖𝑡= Goodwill-impairment losses reported of a given firm in year t.  
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡  = Annual stock returns for the year in which goodwill-impairment loss is reported. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−1= Annual stock returns for the year preceding the announcement of goodwill-impairments. 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−2 = Annual stock returns for the second year preceding the announcement of goodwill-impairments. 
266 
The estimation results of the first timeliness model (headed Baseline) are reported in the first 
column of Table 7.10, and reveal that goodwill-impairment losses, reported by all firms in 
the sample, are negatively and significantly associated with their current-year returns 
(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡= -0.013, t-statistics= -8.080, p-value <0.01) and their stock returns in the first 
year (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−1=-0.010, t-statistics=-7.693, p-value <0.01) and the second year 
(𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡−2=-0.005, t-statistics=-3.737, p-value <0.01) before the recognition of any 
impairment losses. The association was, however, stronger for current returns than for lagged 
returns, i.e., firms’ goodwill-impairment losses were more strongly associated with their 
contemporaneous stock returns and less strongly related to their prior returns. Taken 
together, these findings are generally consistent with timely reporting of goodwill-
impairment losses.     
 
To examine whether the timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses is influenced by the 
strength of legal institutions, I partition the sample into observations in countries with strong 
equity-outsider systems (Cluster1/Cluster1_BT), and those in countries with weaker equity-
outsider systems (Cluster2/Cluster2_BT). Results, as reported in columns (2) to (5) of Table 
7.10, show that the firms in strong equity-outsider countries tend to have reported goodwill-
impairments that were slightly more strongly associated with their contemporaneous returns 
(RETURNit= -0.016, t-statistics= -6.777, p-value <0.01) than those reported by their 
counterparts in weaker equity-outsider countries (RETURNit= -0.010, t-statistics= -4.619, p-
value <0.01). 
 
Consistent estimates were obtained when partitioning observations into countries with strong 
auditing/accounting enforcement systems, and those in countries with weak 
auditing/accounting enforcement systems. The last two columns of Table 7.10 reveal that 
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the association between goodwill-impairment losses and contemporaneous returns was 
slightly stronger for firms in countries with strong national enforcement (RETURNit= -0.014, 
t-statistics= -6.900, p-value <0.01) than it was for firms in weak enforcement countries 
(RETURNit= -0.012, t-statistics= -4.312, p-value <0.01).  Overall, the results in Table 7.10, 
are broadly in line with the findings of Glaum et al. (2015), and confirm that firms in 
countries with better institutional quality tend to report goodwill-impairment losses that are 
somewhat more timely than those reported by their counterparts in countries with inferior 
institutional quality. 
 
Table 7.11 present the results comparing the associations between firm’s goodwill-
impairment losses and their contemporaneous and lagged return across the two cultural 
clusters that were also used in the value-relevance test (see section 7.3.5).   
Table 7.11 Timeliness of Goodwill-Impairment Losses across Cultural Clusters 
Variable Cultural Cluster1 Cultural Cluster2 
RETURNit  -0.015*** -0.010*** 
 (-6.908) (-3.096) 
RETURNit−1  -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.507) (-3.013) 
RETURNit−2  -0.006*** -0.003 
 (-3.631) (-0.874) 
Constant 2.394*** 2.339*** 
 (16.899) (13.075) 
N 8,184 4,829 
F-statistics 28.55 4.49 
Prob > F 0.000 0.004 
R-squared 0.008 0.003 
Root MSE 10.756 11.016 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
As can be seen from the table above, the association between goodwill-impairment and 
contemporaneous stock returns was stronger for firms in Cluster1 (RETURNit= -0.015, t-
statistics= -6.908, p-value <0.01) than it was for firms in Cluster2 (RETURNit= -0.010, t-
statistics= -3.096, p-value <0.01). These findings suggest that firms in countries 
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characterised as being less individualistic with a low tolerance for uncertainty and high 
power distance tendencies seemed not to impair their goodwill as fast and as timely as their 
counterparts in individualistic countries with low degrees of uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance.   
 
I also examine the consequences of the recent global financial crisis on the association 
between goodwill-impairment losses and their stocks’ returns for the current and prior years. 
To assess whether the association has increased or decreased after the global financial crisis, 
I divide the whole sample period (2007-2013) into two subsamples: from 2007 to 2009 (the 
crisis period) and from 2010 to 2013 (the after-crisis period). Table 7.12 reports results.  
Table 7.12 Timeliness of Goodwill-impairments during and after the Global Crisis 
Variable Crisis Period Post-crisis Period 
RETURNit  -0.011*** -0.015*** 
 (-4.589) (-6.875) 
RETURNit−1  -0.012*** -0.009*** 
 (-5.988) (-4.917) 
RETURNit−2  -0.005** -0.005*** 
 (-2.251) (-2.751) 
Constant 2.162*** 2.260*** 
 (14.150) (16.346) 
N 5,802 8,959 
F-statistics 15.72 19.43 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.006 0.007 
Root MSE 10.384 10.594 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results show that timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses has been influenced by the 
financial crisis. In particular, the association between goodwill-impairment losses and 
contemporaneous returns was somewhat stronger in the post-crisis period (RETURNit= -
0.015, t-statistics= -6.875, p-value <0.01) than it was for the crisis period (RETURNit= -
0.011, t-statistics= -4.589, p-value <0.01), suggesting that the timeliness of goodwill-
impairment losses is higher in the post-crisis period than it is in the crisis period. An 
explanation for this finding is that in their attempts to restore investors’ confidence, who 
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“react instantaneously more strongly to bad news compared to their reactions to good news” 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999, p. 558), firm managers have greater incentives to report 
good news, and delay (or conceal) bad news (Vichitsarawong et al., 2010), resulting in lack 
or less timely recognition of their goodwill-impairment losses during crisis periods. This is 
consistent with the suggestion of Ball (2006) that governments are more likely to turn a blind 
eye on irregularities in their accounting/financial reporting in their attempt to minimise the 
negative impact of the crisis. 
 
7.7 Discussion and Summary 
This chapter examined the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses across the 
institutional and cultural clusters of countries. Empirical findings, on the one hand, revealed 
that goodwill impairment losses were not value relevant for the total sample. However, when 
cluster membership was considered, firms in the first institutional clusters appear to have 
recorded goodwill-impairment losses that are, on average, more informative to all users, and 
more relevant than those recorded by firms in the second institutional cluster. This finding 
indicates that in countries where investors feel their investments are well protected by the 
law, they will perceive impairment losses as a reliable measure of the economic decline in 
goodwill value, and are therefore impounded into their evaluation of a firm’s market value. 
On the other hand, results revealed that no statistically significant differences exist between 
the two cultural clusters on the value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. 
 
Additional analyses were also conducted to assess the timeliness of goodwill-impairment 
losses across different country clusters. The results provide evidence that the association 
between goodwill-impairment losses and contemporaneous returns was relatively stronger 
than the one between goodwill-impairment losses and lagged returns, implying that firms, 
in general, tend to recognise goodwill-impairment losses in a somewhat timely manner. 
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Moreover, the results provide evidence of cross-country differences in the 
recognition/reporting patterns of goodwill-impairments. In particular, firms in countries with 
inferior institutional quality tended to react with delays to the decline(s) in the economic 
value of their goodwill and, therefore, recognised their impairment losses in a less timely 
fashion, when compared with firms in countries with better institutional quality. 
Furthermore, the results show that different reporting patterns of goodwill-impairment also 
existed across cultural clusters, suggesting that the timeliness of goodwill-impairment losses 
appeared to be driven by cultural differences. Finally, the results show differences in the 
patterns of goodwill-impairment reporting during the crisis and post-crisis periods. In 
particular, goodwill-impairment losses reported during the crisis were not as timely as those 
reported in the post-crisis period. 
 
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the empirical findings of value-relevance studies, 
since the value-relevance, as defined in the academic literature, is not one of the IASB/FASB 
stated criteria of relevance and reliability (Barth et al., 2001). Value-relevance is mere 
association between accounting numbers (book value of equity and earnings) and equity 
market values, and the accounting standard-setters do not consider “a high association with 
stock values a ‘desirable’ attribute for accounting earnings” (Holthausen, and Watts, pp. 4). 
However, this does not rule out that value-relevance (and timeliness) are always construed 
as attribute(s) of reporting quality. Therefore, future research needs to continue to find ways 
to examine the quality of accounting information, specifically in terms of decision 
usefulness, relevance, or faithful representation. Research findings of this study concerning 
the value-relevance (and timeliness) of goodwill-impairment losses should be extended to 
determine whether they will hold up over time. 
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8 Chapter 8: Conclusion   
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will first summarise the main findings of the study and then discuss some of 
their possible implications for, academics, investors, analysts, auditors, regulators, and 
standard setters. Next, there will be discussion of the limitations of the study. Then, the 
chapter concludes by providing a recommendation for future research and practice.  
 
8.2 Objectives and Design of the Study  
The focus of this study has been on whether and how goodwill-impairment practices vary, 
in predictable ways, across countries with varying cultural and institutional environments. 
The study set two specific research objectives:  
i) To investigate the factors that influence the magnitude of goodwill-impairment 
losses for a sample of companies drawn from a number of countries. 
 
ii) To investigate whether the value-relevance of goodwill-impairment losses differ 
between different clusters of countries.  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed empirical studies relating to the research questions which provided 
additional support for the chosen theoretical frameworks. Chapter 3 developed a framework, 
which takes into consideration the influence of firm-specific, industry-specific, and country-
specific variables, rightfully allowing to embed the process of making goodwill-impairment 
decisions within its cultural and institutional context. The general hypothesis is that the 
associations between the amounts of goodwill-impairment losses and economic/reporting 
incentives differ across countries (or groups of countries) with different cultures/institutions. 
For example, firms operating in countries with well-functioning institutions will record 
goodwill-impairments that are more dominant in their associations with economic factors 
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than managerial reporting incentives are. Chapter 3 also discussed the Ohlson (1995) 
valuation model, linking firm’s market value with its book value and earnings, as the 
theoretical framework underlying the value relevance of goodwill-impairment losses. 
Following Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2009) and AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012), Ohlson’s (1995) 
model was altered to incorporate goodwill and its impairment losses. 
 
Chapter 4 developed testable hypotheses and statistical models to investigate the impact of 
firm- and country-specific characteristics on the determination and reporting of goodwill-
impairment amounts.  
 
Using a sample of 70 countries, which is exactly the same (Taiwan and Tunisia are excluded) 
as that used by Djnakov et al (2008) who produced a revised index of La Porta’s anti-director 
rights, I developed empirically tested measures of institutions (Investor Protection, Quality 
of Legality, and Development of Equity Markets), which proved to be inappropriately 
measured (or misused) in prior research, and unless circumstances dictated otherwise, they 
were highly correlated with one another. 
 
 These institutions have, then, been utilised to identify robust patterns in institutional 
characteristics among certain countries using a K-means cluster analysis. Two clusters of 
countries were formed, corresponding to strong equity-outsider versus weak equity-outsider 
clusters. I have further conducted another cluster analysis using Hofstede’s cultural 
dimension indices (Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty, Masculinity, and Long-
term orientation), and two clusters were produced. By comparing the relative associations 
between goodwill-impairment amounts and economic/reporting incentives across 
institutional and cultural clusters of countries, the study helps to determine whether 
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managerial discretion afforded by the impairment standard is differently exercised across 
country clusters. 
 
8.3 Summary of Empirical Findings 
The empirical part that comprises Chapters 5, 6, and 7 was devoted to analysing and 
interpreting the results obtained from the econometric analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 investigated the determinants of goodwill-impairment losses as reported by firms 
operating in 17 different countries over the period 2007-2013. Companies in these 17 
countries have made more acquisitions (i.e., been more acquisitive) than companies in any 
other IFRS-adopting countries. Empirical results reveal that firms operating in different 
countries have different goodwill-impairment patterns. The highest average dollar amounts 
of impairment losses were reported by firms operating in South Africa, Australia, and the 
UK. Countries such as Greece, Poland, Italy, and Belgium had the lowest average amount 
of goodwill-impairments. Specifically, firms in countries with English and Scandinavian 
legal origins impaired greater amounts of their goodwill, compared to their German and 
French counterparts.  
 
The results also showed that the amounts of goodwill impairment losses are related to 
proxies for actual (economic) losses, but also to proxies for managerial reporting incentives. 
The results do, however, indicate that cultural and institutional parameters are partially 
responsible for the effects of economic and managerial reporting incentives on goodwill-
impairment amounts.  
 
In particular, impairing companies tend to have higher intensity of goodwill, and a greater 
fluctuation of the share price. Well-performing companies or companies with growth 
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potential are however found to report lower amounts of impairment-losses. These results are 
highly consistent with the predictions of this study. Consistent with managers’ preference 
for achieving smooth and consistent patterns of earnings, firms with unusually high earnings 
are found to impair greater amounts of their goodwill. Empirical results also show that 
goodwill-impairment amounts increase with the level of debt (and firm size). This probably 
reflects the higher levels of scrutiny by debtholders (and analysts) that levered (and large) 
companies face.  
 
At the country level, results provide evidence that national cultural in the form of power 
distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance directly impacts goodwill-impairment 
amounts in combination with firm-specific factors. Although there is no evidence to support 
a direct association between being audited by one of the BIG4 auditors and goodwill-
impairment amounts, the type of auditor moderates some firm-specific variables (ΔSALES, 
ΔROA, and SMOOTH). Most importantly, the results showed that the type of legal system 
not only directly influence the reporting of goodwill-impairment amounts, but also moderate 
some firm-specific variables. Specifically, firms operating in common-law countries have 
apparently recorded goodwill-impairment losses that are, on the one hand, strongly 
associated with economic impairment proxies (GW, ΔOCF, ΔROA, and ΔDebt_Ratio), and 
on the other, weakly associated with big bath reporting incentive. 
 
In order to identify which of the common-law institutions were responsible for these 
differences in goodwill-impairment practices, I, therefore, test the impact of four specific 
institutional characteristics (namely, investor protection, quality of legality, equity market 
development, and book-tax conformity) on the assessment of goodwill-impairment across 
countries. Results indicate that the effectiveness of legal institutions and the development of 
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equity markets play important roles-both directly and indirectly- in the determination and 
reporting of goodwill-impairment amounts.  No evidence of either a direct or an indirect 
association between the degree of book-tax conformity in a country and goodwill-
impairment amounts was found in this study, implying that Blaylock et al.’s (2012) index of 
book-tax conformity may not be measured accurately enough.  
 
To provide further assurance, an additional analysis was then conducted to examine the 
direct impact of institutions, as well as the type of auditor on the determination and reporting 
of abnormal goodwill-impairment losses. Together, findings reveal that BIG4 auditor, 
investor protection, and equity markets development were more effective in constraining 
managers’ ability to either overstate or understate the amounts of goodwill-impairment 
losses reported (i.e., record abnormal goodwill-impairment losses), and to ensure that no 
impairment loss has been made, unless the firm has suffered from impairment in the 
economic value of its goodwill. 
 
In the second empirical chapter, Chapter 6, I compare the association between goodwill-
impairment amounts and economic/reporting incentives across institutional and cultural 
clusters of countries. The results, in general, reveal that firms in the first institutional (and 
cultural) cluster appear to have recorded goodwill-impairment losses that are more dominant 
in their association with economic factors than reporting incentives are, suggesting that 
managers in those firms are applying their accounting discretion afforded by the impairment 
standard in a relatively efficient manner to produce goodwill-impairment losses that are 
more reflective of their firms’ underlying economics.  While firms in the second institutional 
(and cultural) cluster appear to have recorded goodwill-impairment losses that were less 
reflective of their underlying economics, suggesting that managers in those firms use the 
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greater flexibility permitted in the impairment standard in determining the amounts of 
impairment losses recognised on goodwill. However, the results also indicate that there may 
be relatively little room for managers of firms within the first cluster to exercise their 
impairment discretion, and have therefore recorded goodwill-impairment losses that were to 
some extent influenced by managerial and firm-level incentives, such as taking more 
impairments when earnings are unusually high.   
 
In the last empirical chapter, Chapter 7, I compare the value-relevance (and timeliness) of 
goodwill-impairment losses across institutional and cultural clusters of countries. The results 
do provide support for the study’s hypothesis that the value relevance of goodwill 
impairment losses varies across different country clusters. They revealed that firms in the 
first institutional clusters appear to have reported goodwill-impairment losses that are, on 
average, more relevant (and somewhat more timely) than those recorded by firms in the 
second institutional cluster, signifying that in countries where investors feel their investment 
are well protected by the law will perceive reported impairment losses as valid measures of 
reduction in the carrying amount of goodwill. There were, however, no significant 
differences found to exist between the two cultural clusters on the value-relevance of 
goodwill-impairment losses. These findings can be validated through additional research to 
confirm their generalisability to others countries (or groups of countries) with vastly 
different cultural backgrounds. 
 
8.4 Implications, Limitations, and Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings of this study have several practical implications. For academics, this research 
paves the way for the development of new, reliable and valid measures of institutions that 
can be used across many different accounting subjects (e.g. earnings management across 
countries), and improves the understanding of the determination and reporting of goodwill-
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impairment amounts. The findings suggest that goodwill is not only driven by 
economic/reporting incentives, but also by country-specific factors. In particular, the 
associations between goodwill-impairment amounts and economic/reporting incentives are 
conditional on the strength and quality of a country’s institutions. This indicates that the 
impairment of goodwill is not merely an accounting issue, and countries are at different 
stages of maturity in goodwill-impairment valuation and practices.  
 
The findings also add to the growing body of empirical evidence that IFRS standards are not 
evenly implemented across countries (as intended by the IASB), potentially impeding the de 
facto aspect comparability in financial reporting. Hence, investors, analysts and other users 
should be aware of the particular regulatory environment that exists in the country where the 
company has operations. Findings also encourage audit firms, in particular, the BIG4, to 
intensify effort to provide uniform audit quality globally.  
 
Finally, findings should give a signal to IASB and other supervisory authorities that 
changing accounting standards alone is not enough, and more effort is necessary to 
effectively and consistently enforce accounting standards across countries. 
 
This study is subject to several caveats. First, due to the lack of publicly available data at 
CGU(s), this research follows in the footsteps of previous studies, in which all economic 
factors are measured at level(s) other than that required by the IAS 36. The impacts of these 
economic factors on the amounts of goodwill-impairments are therefore likely to be 
underestimated. In addition, crude proxies are used to capture firms’ closeness to their 
potential debt covenant violation (deb-to-assets and debt-to-equity) and managerial 
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compensation (BATH and SMOOTH) because information on firms’ actual (or private) debt 
and bonus contracts are not directly (or freely) available.  
 
Second, as with all econometric studies, this research may also be subject to omitted-variable 
bias. Although variables defined in the current study have been carefully chosen, they are 
not comprehensive of all possible determinants of goodwill-impairment amounts, due to 
limited data availability.  
 
Third, owing to the limited availability of comparable cross-country data, especially data on 
revised anti-director rights, anti-self-dealing, and book-tax conformity, this study has been 
limited to those countries involved in the study (Djankov et al., 2008; Blaylock et al., 2012). 
Finally, as with almost all studies in international accounting, this research is based on the 
assumption that a country’s institutions are independent from one another (although in 
reality national institutions evolve jointly over time) and exogenous (i.e., the direction of 
causality runs from culture/institutions to accounting practices).  
 
Future research needs to examine whether the findings of the present study will hold over 
time, as enforcement of accounting standards continues to develop further. More precisely, 
future research should take steps to determine whether the results are representative of all 
IFRS-adopting countries, and whether this is of real concern, or whether this is a temporary 
situation and IFRS users will converge, and the diversity will decrease (or even disappear) 
over time.  
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Future research could also use the study’s newly-developed (and empirically-tested) 
measures of institutions across many different accounting subjects, and test whether their 
findings are consistent with the general pattern of the reported results.  
 
Finally, future studies need to find other institutions that drive differences in goodwill-
impairment practices across countries, and develop a new measure of the degree of 
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Appendix (1) 
The Measures of Three Institutions 
i) Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis or Principal component analysis is a useful technique in searching for 
structure among a set of indicators that are highly interrelated (known as factors) or as a method 
for data reduction. These groups of indicators are assumed to represent dimensions within the data. 
These dimensions may correspond to concepts that cannot be adequately described by a single 
measure (Hair et al., 2010). Using a sample of 70 countries, which is exactly the same (Taiwan 
and Tunisia are excluded) as that employed by Djnakov et al. (2008) who produced a revised index 
of La Porta’s anti-director rights, empirically tested measures of institutions were developed. 
 
Several indicators were considered which drawn from the following databases: World 
Development Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Global Financial Development, 
Doing Business Report, Economic Freedom of the World, Global Competitiveness Report. In total 
48 indicators were considered on the basis of face-value criteria (i.e., content validity), and 
subsequently empirically tested by principal component analysis. The results of this analysis 
include communalities 80and factor loadings81which help determine which indicators belong to 
particular institutions and which ones need to be excluded from further analysis. I retain all factors 
with an eigenvalue greater than 1.00 which results in three factors (institutions), jointly explain 
81.837 percent of the total variance in the original data. In addition, the analysis results in 29 items 
(14 indicators and three indices) that are not cross-loaded with other factors. The table below 




                                                          
80 Communality means the amount of variance a measured variable has in common with the constructs upon 
which it loads (i.e. the variance explained in a measured variable by the construct). 





The Bartlett’s test finds that indicators collectively meet the necessary threshold of sampling 
adequacy with a value of 0.885 (significant at the level of 0.001). All variables have a commonality 
value exceeding 0.5. These 17 measured indicators also exceed the threshold value (0.65) which 
means that they meet the fundamental requirement for factor analysis. According to Hair et al. 
(2010), in a sample of 70, a factor loading of 0.65 is considered practically significant. 
 
The contribution of each factor to the total amount of explained variance obviously covaries with 
the number of items loading on it. The factor loadings show a clearly structured pattern (i.e., there 
are no cross/double loadings or situations where the same indicator is associated with more than 
one factor). The loading pattern of the items suggests a distinction between three factors 
(institutions). Each factor (or institution) is assigned a name based on the characteristics of the 
1 2 3
Government Effectiveness 0.932 0.963
Control of Corruption 0.936 0.961
Regulatory Quality Index 0.924 0.96
Rule of Law 0.925 0.957
Ethical behavior of firms 0.915 0.955
Strength of auditing and reporting standards 0.865 0.922
Regulatory Quality 0.825 0.907
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 0.804 0.875
Efficacy of corporate boards 0.763 0.851
Regulation of securities exchanges 0.724 0.845
Anti-self-dealing index 0.830 0.903
Strength of investor protection index 0.808 0.886
Business extent of disclosure index 0.757 0.868
Revised Anti-director Index 0.552 0.742
Stock market capitalisation to GDP 0.862 0.926
Stocks market value traded to GDP 0.822 0.905
Number of listed companies 0.670 0.813
Eigen Value 10.19 2.38 1.35




indicators that are related to the factor. Several of the factors are associated with indicators that 
one might expect ex-ante to be highly correlated and thus, it is simple to name these factors. 
The first factor (shown as 1 in Structure Matrix Table) has three relevant indicators that are 
measures of the size of the stock market (market capitalization, the number of listed domestic 
companies) and activity/liquidity of the stock market (value of shares traded as a percentage of 
GDP). Thus, I termed this factor/institution as Development of Equity Markets, and high scores 
on this factor are associated with well-developed equity markets, whereas low scores are 
associated with relatively less developed stock markets. 
 
The second factor has three indicators that are all related to the level of protection provided to 
shareholders with one of its indicators (disclosure level), measuring the degree to which 
shareholders’ rights are protected via financial reporting disclosure. Thus, the second 
factor/institution is termed as Level of Investor Protection. 
 
However, the naming of the first factor can be tricky and difficult. The first factor/institution has 
six relevant indicators, which measures of the legality, or the effectiveness/efficiency of the 
existing legal rules, institutions and procedures; with two of its indicators seemingly82 related to 
the legal protection for investors; as well as two indicators purporting to measure the regulation 
                                                          
82 Many researchers seem to slavishly rely on their own understanding/judgement as well as the wording of 
survey questions to arrive at their interpretation of what is measured by a single-item indicator. This is a serious 
problem (usually referred to as interpretational confounding) arising from a discrepancy between a construct’s 
nominal and empirical meaning, which is solely based on the epistemic relationships between the latent 
construct and a set of observed variables (Burt, 1976; MacKenzie et al., 2011). Experienced researchers should, 
therefore, attest that “seemingly identical statements produce widely different answers. By incorporating 
slightly different nuances of meaning in statements in the item pool, the researcher provides a better foundation 
for the eventual measure” (Churchill Jr., 1979, p. 68). Because we know what we mean by our questions and 
we are not confused by the layout and organisation of our instrument, data collected using this instrument will 
naturally produce content valid measures (i.e., any errors which result are obviously a function of the 
respondent and not a function of our instrument). But what about ambiguous questions which produce guessing 
(e.g. survey administered in different countries). 
300 
and supervision of securities exchanges and the strength of auditing and reporting standards 
respectively. Thus, the second factor/institutions is named as Effectiveness of Legal Institutions 
or quality of Legality. 
Component Correlation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 
1 1.000 0.380 0.517 
2 0.380 1.000 0.384 
3 0.517 0.384 1.000 
The measures of these three factors/institutions demonstrate discriminant/divergent validity. 
Discriminant validity is established when measures of different factors are distinct (i.e., there are 
low correlation among the factors) (Harrington, 2008). According to Brown (2012), “factor inter-
correlations above .80 or 0.85 imply poor discriminant validity” (p. 32). As can be seen from the 
correlation matrix table, the correlations between the three factors/institutions are relatively low 
or moderate, ranging from 0.40 to 0.49, which would indicate that the items underlying the concept 
of investor protection should not be used to measure the concept of legality or vice versa. 
 
i) Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
According to Hair et al. (2010), “validation of any factor analysis result is essential, particularly 
when attempting to define the underlying structure among the variables”. Confirmatory factor 
analysis enables us to analytically test proposed measurement models, which may arise from 
theoretical considerations or be based on the results of an exploratory factor analysis.83Such 
models show how and how well (i.e., construct validity/reliability) different measured items come 
together (i.e., factor structure) to represent the constructs. 
                                                          
83 According to Everitt and Hothorn (2011), it is perfectly appropriate to arrive at a measurement model from 
an exploratory factor analysis. Any such model must, however, be tested on a fresh set of data. “Models must 
not be generated and tested on the same data” (p. 201). I randomly split the sample into two equal samples of 
thirty-five countries and re-estimate the factor models to test for comparability. The result shows that the 





Initially, exploratory factor analysis was used to ascertain which item to include as a part of a 
factor. An item is included in as part of a factor when it is loaded at 0.65 or higher. The figure 
above presents the results of confirmatory factor analysis. As can be seen, three composite 
measures were formed based on 24 items (9 indicators and 3 indices) as the analysis excluded five 
items. Confirmatory factor analysis (such as structural equation modelling using Amos 22) was 
used to test the reliability and validity of the measurement instruments. To do so, I construct a 
parsimonious84measurement model (it consumes fewer degrees of freedom) for each dimension of 
institutions (i.e., factor).  The various dimensions are subsequently combined into an 
encompassing model that estimates the relations between institutional dimensions to check the 
discriminant validity among the factors. 
 
                                                          
84 A researcher should always strive to have the most representative and parsimonious set of variables possible 
to include in the analysis, “guided by conceptual and practical considerations” (Hair et al., 2010). 
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A review of the fit indices for the three-factor model resulted in concluding that the model, overall, 
provides a satisfactory (or an adequate) fit for the observed data. The ratio of the chi-square85to 
the degrees of freedom CMIN/DF was found to be approximately 1.4 (below the thresholds 2-5), 
which suggests an acceptable model fit. Furthermore, although both values are lower than desired, 
the goodness of fit index (GFI=0.86 < 0.90) and the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI=0.79 < 
0.90) indicate a reasonable model fit. The root means square error of approximation (RMSE=0.08 
<0.10) is at an acceptable level. Finally, the comparative fit index (CF=0.91 >0.90) suggests a 
good model fit. 
Regression Weights, and Standardized Regression Weights 
 Regression Weights Standardized 
Regression 
Weights>0.7 
Estimate S.E. C.R. P  Estimate 
Regulatory Quality Index 1.000     .820 
Strength of auditing and reporting 
standards 
.493 .041 12.081 ***  .976 
Efficacy of corporate boards .310 .032 9.823 ***  .880 
Protection of minority shareholders’ 
interests 
.457 .040 11.316 ***  .944 
Regulation of securities exchanges .432 .042 10.381 ***  .905 
Stock market total value traded 1.000     .820 
Stock market capitalization .974 .113 8.629 ***  .983 
Number of listed companies .003 .000 5.947 ***  .646 
Business extent of disclosure index 1.000     .826 
Strength of investor protection index .611 .070 8.718 ***  .877 
Anti-self-dealing index .093 .010 8.973 ***  .899 
Revised Anti-director Index .312 .057 5.491 ***  .622 
All of the loadings estimates are positive and statistically significant as required for convergent 
validity. Two of the estimates fall below the 0.7 cut-off (.622 and .646). 
 
                                                          
85 The Chi-square statistic is marginally useful when used alone, due to its sensitivity sample size. 
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The next step is to calculate the construct reliabilities of the three constructs. The reliabilities for 
all of our constructs exceed the suggested Threshold of .70. 
 
In terms of discriminant validity, I compare the average variance extracted (AVE) estimates for 
each factor with the squared inter-construct correlations (SIC) associated with that factor. Note 
that all variance extracted (AVE) estimates in Table (4) exceed the suggested level of .5, and are 
greater than the corresponding squared inter-construct correlation estimates (SIC). The model, 
therefore, demonstrates discriminant validity. 
Construct Reliability, Average Variance Extracted, and inter-construct Correlations 








0.86 0.69 0.83   
Quality of Legality 0.96 0.83 0.54 0.91  







In summary, the above analysis resulted in the following measures for the three variables of 
interest, Investor protection, Quality of Legality, and Development of Equity Market and for the 










 Description of the Institutional Variables 
1 Investor Protection 
The principal component of: (1) Revised anti-director rights index; (2) Anti-self-dealing index; (3) Strength 
of investor protection index; and (4) Business extent of disclosure index. 
1.1 Revised anti-director rights index. It represents an aggregate measure of legal protection of 
minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders. Source: Djankov et al. (2008). 
1.2 Anti-self-dealing index (0-1). Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control over self-dealing 
transactions. Source: Djankov et al. (2008). 
1.2.1 Ex-Ante Private Control of Self-Dealing. It captures the strength of private enforcement of 
provisions against self-dealing by insiders focusing on ex ante control (e.g. requiring approval by 
disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosures). Source: Djankov et al. (2008). 
1.2.2 Ex-Post Private Control of Self-Dealing. It captures the strength of private enforcement of 
provisions against self-dealing by insiders focusing on ex post control (e.g. periodic filings requirements 
and ease of proving wrongdoing). Source: Djankov et al. (2008). 
1.3 Strength of investor protection index (0-10): The average of (1) the extent of disclosure index, (2) 
the extent of director liability index and (3) the ease of shareholder suits index. Source: Doing Business 
Indicators (World Bank Group). 
1.4 Extent of disclosure index: Disclosure index measures the extent to which investors are protected 
through disclosure of ownership and financial information. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher 
values indicating more disclosure. Source: World Bank/World Development Indicators. 
2 Quality of Legality 
The principal component of: (1) Regulatory quality index; (2) Strength of auditing and reporting standards; 
(3) Efficacy of corporate boards; (4) protection of minority shareholders; and (5) Regulation of securities 
Exchanges. 
2.1 Regulatory Quality Index & Government Investment: The simple average of (1) Judicial 
independence (2); Impartial courts; (3) Protection of property rights; (4) Military interference in 
rule of law and politics; (5) Integrity of the legal system; (6) Legal enforcement of contracts; (7) 
Extra payments/bribes/favouritism; and (8) Government enterprises and investment. Source: 
Economic Freedom of the World, Global Competitiveness Report.  
2.1.1 Judicial independence. This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report question: “Is 
the judiciary in your country independent from political influences of members of government, 
citizens, or firms? No—heavily influenced (= 1) or Yes—entirely independent (= 7).” All variables 
from the Global Competitiveness Report were converted from the original 1-to-7 scale to a 0-to-
10 scale using this formula: EFWi = ((GCRi− 1) ÷ 6) × 10. Source: World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitiveness Report. 
2.1.2 Impartial courts. This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report question: “The legal 
framework in your country for private businesses to settle disputes and challenge the legality of 
government actions and/or regulations is inefficient and subject to manipulation (= 1) or is efficient 
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and follows a clear, neutral process (= 7).” Note the “Rule of Law” ratings from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project have been used to fill in country omissions in 
the primary data source since 1995. Source: World Economic Forum. 
2.1.3 Protection of property rights. This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report question: 
“Property rights, including over financial assets, are poorly defined and not protected by law (= 
1) or are clearly defined and well protected by law (= 7).” Note this replaces a previous Global 
Competitiveness Report question on protection of intellectual property. Source: World Economic 
Forum. 
2.1.4  Military interference in rule of law and politics. This component is based on the International 
Country Risk Guide Political Risk Component G. Military in Politics: “A measure of the military’s 
involvement in politics. A system of military government will almost certainly diminish effective 
governmental functioning, become corrupt, and create an uneasy environment for foreign 
businesses.” Note the “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” ratings from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project have been used to fill in country omissions in 
the primary data source since 1995. Source: World Economic Forum. 
2.1.5  Integrity of the legal system. This component is based on the International Country Risk Guide 
Political Risk Component (Law and Order): “Two measures comprising one risk component. Each 
sub-component equals half of the total. The ‘law’ sub-component assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, and the ‘order’ sub-component assesses popular observance of the 
law.” Source: World Economic Forum. 
2.1.6 Legal enforcement of contracts. This component is based on the World Bank’s Doing Business 
estimates for the time and money required to collect a debt. Zero-to-10 ratings were constructed 
for (1) the time cost (measured in number of calendar days required from the moment the lawsuit 
is filed until payment) and (2) the monetary cost of the case (measured as a percentage of the debt). 
Source: World Economic Forum. 
2.1.7 Extra payments/bribes/favouritism. This sub-component is based on the Global Competitiveness 
Report questions: “In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with the following: A – Import and export 
permits; B – Connection to public utilities (e.g., telephone or electricity); C – Annual tax payments; 
D – Awarding of public contracts (investment projects); E – Getting favourable judicial decisions. 
Common (= 1) Never occur (= 7)”; “Do illegal payments aimed at influencing government 
policies, laws or regulations have an impact on companies in your country? 1 = Yes, significant 
negative impact, 7 = No, no impact at all”; and “To what extent do government officials in your 
country show favouritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and 
contracts? 1 = Always show favouritism, 7 = Never show favouritism.” Source: World Economic 
Forum. 
2.1.8 Government enterprises and investment. Data on government investment as a share of total 
investment were used to construct the zero-to-10 ratings. Countries with more government 
enterprises and government investment received lower ratings. When the government investment 
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share was generally less than 15% of total investment, countries were given a rating of 10. Source: 
World Economic Forum.  
2.2 Strength of auditing and reporting standards. This component is from the Global Competitiveness 
Report question: “In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards 
regarding company financial performance?” [1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong]. Source: 
Global Competitiveness Report. 
2.3 Efficacy of corporate boards. This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report question: 
“How would you characterize corporate governance by investors and boards of directors in your 
country?” [1 = management has little accountability to investors and boards; 7 = investors and 
boards exert strong supervision of management decisions]. Source: Global Competitiveness Report. 
2.4 Protection of minority shareholders. This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report 
question: “In your country, to what extent are the interests of minority shareholders protected by the 
legal system?”  [1 = not protected at all; 7 = fully protected]. Source: Global Competitiveness 
Report. 
2.5 Regulation of securities Exchanges. This component is from the Global Competitiveness Report 
question: “How would you assess the regulation and supervision of securities exchanges in your 
country?”  [1 = ineffective; 7 = effective]. Source: Global Competitiveness Report. 
3 Development of Equity Market 
The principal component of: (1) the ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its 
population; (2) Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP); and (3) Stock market total value 
traded to GDPP. 
3.1 The average ratio of the total market capitalisation to the country's GDP for the period 2006-2010. 
Source: World Bank/The Global Financial Development (GFD). 
3.2 The national Logarithm of the average ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country 
to its population (in millions) for the period 2006-2010. Source: World Bank/The Global Financial 
Development (GFD). 
3.3 The average ratio of the total value of shares traded to the country’s GDP for the period 2006-2010. 













Data on Measures of Institutions for 70 countries classified by their legal origin 






Australia English 8.7 141.03 11.91 
Canada English 9.65 140.98 11.91 
Ghana English 8.24 23.1 9.51 
Hong Kong English 11.87 510.38 11.75 
India English 8.02 101.66 10.46 
Ireland English 10.43 53.53 10.57 
Israel English 9.54 117.84 10.95 
Jamaica English 6.04 78.04 10.12 
Kenya English 4.72 49.73 8.93 
Malaysia English 11.31 143.33 10.91 
New Zealand English 11.62 56.13 12.1 
Nigeria English 6.55 36.38 8.32 
Pakistan English 6.98 40.22 8.7 
Singapore English 11.93 188.57 12.11 
South Africa English 10.27 232.95 12.24 
Sri Lanka English 6.19 35.34 10.15 
Thailand English 9.7 75.11 9.93 
Uganda English 4.95 22.74 8.11 
United Kingdom English 11.04 144.36 11.5 
United States English 9.1 141.71 10.78 
Zimbabwe English 6.58 216.9986 9.84 
                                                          
86 Stock market development index exhibits a considerable variability across countries. The top ten countries 
are Hong Kong, Switzerland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Luxembourg, Singapore, Jordan, UK, Malaysia, and 
US (none of these ten countries was included in the regression, apart from South Africa and UK). These 
findings tell us three important things. First, stock market development has little to do with the size of a country. 
The US, although being the largest economy in the world, has an average score lower than Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong is a major outlier). Second, contrary to expectations, corporations from emerging economies rely more 
heavily on equity financing. Third, although the data on stock market development indicators were obtained 
from official World Bank publications and its website, emerging market economies would suffer from serious 
informational and disclosure deficiencies owing to the lack of effective supervision by regulatory authorities. 
As Yartey (2008) states, “compared with the highly organised and properly regulated stock market activity in 
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Argentina French 5.54 31.81 7.89 
Belgium French 8.22 76.73 11.22 
Bolivia French 3.45 24.12 7.01 
Brazil French 6.28 76.32 9.83 
Chile French 8.13 121.7 10.83 
Colombia French 8.13 56.8 8.78 
Ecuador French 3.26 17.38 7.74 
Egypt French 5.85 73.23 9.18 
El Salvador French 4.47 33.91 8.88 
France French 7.27 95.69 11.12 
Greece French 3.6 56.89 9.52 
Indonesia French 8.36 47.91 9.5 
Italy French 6.68 42.95 8.28 
Jordan French 4.64 174.27 10.39 
Kazakhstan French 7.18 48.56 8.17 
Lithuania French 6.05 30.26 9.73 
Luxembourg French 5.56 204.41 11.51 
Mexico French 6.14 44.16 9.16 
Morocco French 5.8 83.34 8.86 
Netherlands French 4.71 100.78 11.54 
Panama French 4.74 40.54 9.8 
Peru French 7.65 71.52 9.43 
Philippines French 4.64 62.56 9.42 
Portugal French 6.82 53.44 10.07 
Romania French 7.67 36.92 8.73 
Russia French 6.28 81.61 7.61 
Spain French 6.35 110.52 9.74 
Turkey French 7.01 44.71 8.84 
Ukraine French 3.75 40.27 7.06 
Uruguay French 4.41 11.53 9.03 
Venezuela French 2.73 11.48 7.64 
                                                          
the US and the UK, most emerging markets do not have such a well-functioning market. Not only are there 
inadequate government regulation, private information gathering and dissemination firms as found in more 
developed stock markets are inadequate” (p. 9).  
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Austria German 5.37 46.11 11.43 
Bulgaria German 8.29 38.65 8.17 
China German 8.01 110.89 8.81 
Croatia German 4.12 67.7 8.73 
Czech Rep. German 5.41 38.89 9.73 
Germany German 5.82 60.67 11.46 
Hungary German 4.18 36.52 9.93 
Japan German 8.09 98.08 10.55 
Korea (Rep.) German 7.14 106.75 9.63 
Latvia German 6.17 20.35 9.24 
Poland German 6.26 46.02 9.49 
Slovak Rep. German 5.06 18.97 9.34 
Switzerland German 3.97 243.12 11.37 
Denmark Scandinavian 7.63 83.35 11.78 
Finland Scandinavian 7.08 100.71 12.18 
Iceland Scandinavian 5.94 108.34 10.39 
Norway Scandinavian 7.56 81.09 12.04 





Results of K-Means Cluster Analysis Using Institutional and Cultural Traits 
Institutional Clusters Cultural Clusters 
Panel (A) Panel (B) 
Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster1_BT Cluster_2BT Cluster1 Cluster2 
Australia Argentina Australia Austria Australia Argentina 
Canada Austria Canada Belgium Austria Belgium 
Chile Belgium Chile Brazil Canada Brazil 
Israel Bolivia Malaysia Denmark Denmark Bulgaria 
Jordan Brazil Singapore Finland Finland China 
Luxembourg Bulgaria South Africa France Germany Colombia 
Malaysia China Sweden Germany Hungary Croatia 
Singapore Colombia Switzerland Greece Iceland Czech Rep. 
South Africa Croatia United Kingdom India Ireland Egypt 
Sweden Czech Rep. United States Indonesia Israel El Salvador 
Switzerland Denmark   Ireland Italy France 
United Kingdom Ecuador   Italy Latvia Ghana 
United States Egypt   Japan Lithuania Greece 
Zimbabwe El Salvador   Korea (Rep.) Luxembourg Hong Kong 
  Finland   Mexico Netherlands India 
  France   Netherlands New Zealand Indonesia 
  Germany   New Zealand Norway Japan 
  Ghana   Norway South Africa Jordan 
  Greece   Pakistan Sweden Korea 
(Rep.) 
  Hungary   Philippines Switzerland Malaysia 
  Iceland   Portugal United Kingdom Mexico 
  India   Spain United States Morocco 
  Indonesia   Thailand   Nigeria 
  Ireland       Pakistan 
  Italy       Peru 
  Jamaica       Philippines 
  Japan       Poland 
  Kazakhstan       Portugal 
  Kenya       Romania 
  Korea (Rep.)       Russia 
  Latvia       Singapore 
  Lithuania       Slovak Rep. 
  Mexico       Spain 
  Morocco       Sri Lanka 
  Netherlands       Thailand 
  New Zealand       Turkey 
  Nigeria       Ukraine 
  Norway       Uruguay 
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  Pakistan       Venezuela 
  Panama         
  Peru         
  Philippines         
  Poland         
  Portugal         
  Romania         
  Russia         
  Slovak Rep.         
  Spain         
  Sri Lanka         
  Thailand         
  Turkey         
  Uganda         
  Ukraine         
  Uruguay         







Differences in Institutional and Cultural Traits across Country Clusters 
  Cluster Number of Cases in each Cluster               
  1 55 Institutional-Panel (A) Cluster   Error   F Sig. 
  2 14   Mean Square df Mean Square df     
Valid   69 Investor Protection 46.126 1 3.821 67 12.072 0.001 
Missing   1 Equity Market Development 134785.374 1 989.736 67 136.183 0.000 
      Quality of Legality 36.863 1 1.408 67 26.187 0.000 
  1 10 Institutional-Panel (B) Cluster   Error   F Sig. 
  2 23   Mean Square df Mean Square df     
Valid   33 Investor Protection 26.107 1 4.052 31 6.443 0.016 
Missing   37 Equity Market Development 56197.874 1 938.981 31 59.85 0.000 
      Quality of Legality 9.35 1 1.029 31 9.083 0.005 
      Book Tax 0.008 1 0.06 31 0.133 0.718 
  1 40 Cultural Cluster   Error   F Sig. 
  2 22   Mean Square df Mean Square df     
Valid   62 Power Distance 20561.731 1 142.656 60 144.135 0.000 
Missing   8 Individualism 20939.15 1 201.022 60 104.163 0.000 
      Masculinity 9.767 1 427.289 60 0.023 0.880 
      Uncertainty Avoidance 4475.291 1 426.817 60 10.485 0.002 




IFRS Requirements for Domestic Listing 
IFRS Not Permitted, 
Permitted, or Required for 
Some 
 









































































































































































































































Papua New Guinea 
Qatar 
Romania 
























Virgin Islands (British) 
























Trinidad and Tobago 











Table 8.1  Different Definitions/Treatments of Crisis Years 
Variable 200787-2013 2008-2013 2007-2013 
GW 0.114*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 
 (12.096) (11.842) (12.015) 
M/B -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.716) (-6.173) (-6.458) 
ΔMrktCap -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.424) (-0.748) (-0.905) 
ΔOCF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.524) (-0.848) (-0.729) 
ΔSALES -0.019** -0.029*** -0.019** 
 (-2.040) (-3.314) (-1.961) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.878) (-2.656) (-2.684) 
Earn_Volt -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.299) (0.204) (-0.230) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (7.168) (6.916) (7.080) 
ΔIndMd_ROA 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.149) (1.502) (1.123) 
ΔGDP -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-1.089) (-0.213) (-1.037) 
OWN 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.758) (0.574) (0.952) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.245) (3.886) (4.019) 
BATH 0.059 0.082 0.075 
 (1.313) (1.581) (1.493) 
SMOOTH 0.003*** 0.008 0.009** 
 (2.987) (1.589) (2.016) 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (10.255) (9.816) (10.324) 
BIG4 -0.006* -0.005 -0.006* 
 (-1.815) (-1.604) (-1.807) 
Crisis Period 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 
                                                          
87 Although the 2007 year includes some observations, not exactly belonging to the crisis period, defining the 
2007-2009 as a crisis period is not an issue, and it is consistent with several studies (e.g. Anand et al., 2013; 
Dimpfl and Peter, 2014; Aizenman et al., 2015; Thakor, 2015) published in top academic journals in recent 
years. Furthermore, the effects of the financial crisis may take place, even before the crisis is officially 
announced (i.e. enterprises may feel it even before the crisis flows to the surface). It will take no less than six 
months (two consecutive quarters of decline in a real GDP) to announce that a particular country officially 
enters into a recession, resulting in crisis having different starting points in different countries. Many 
enterprises (e.g. Lehman Brothers) naturally go bankrupt before or around the official announcement of the 
crisis (i.e. not overnight), and when they do so, the whole economy (as measured by GDP) will seriously 
deteriorate (GDP is affected by the contribution of each enterprise to total GDP).  
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 (3.336) (3.174) (3.210) 
Basic Materials 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (1.217) (1.110) (1.155) 
Industrials 0.019*** 0.020** 0.019*** 
 (2.598) (2.552) (2.644) 
Consumer Goods 0.016** 0.019** 0.017** 
 (2.152) (2.375) (2.246) 
Health Care 0.005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.552) (0.135) (0.143) 
Consumer Services 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (2.857) (2.808) (2.917) 
Telecommunications 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 
 (3.331) (2.985) (3.087) 
Utilities 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 
 (3.159) (3.335) (3.191) 
Technology 0.018** 0.019** 0.018** 
 (2.183) (2.139) (2.218) 
Austria 0.009 0.004 0.003 
 (1.236) (0.555) (0.368) 
Belgium -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.033*** 
 (-3.897) (-4.224) (-4.140) 
Denmark -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
 (-1.207) (-1.286) (-1.412) 
Finland -0.009 -0.009 -0.011* 
 (-1.358) (-1.340) (-1.719) 
France -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (-3.784) (-3.741) (-4.293) 
Germany -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 (-3.445) (-3.137) (-3.706) 
Greece -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.062*** 
 (-6.142) (-5.775) (-6.306) 
Italy -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (-6.099) (-5.844) (-6.411) 
Netherlands 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.390) (0.087) (-0.081) 
Norway -0.013** -0.016** -0.016** 
 (-1.974) (-2.153) (-2.275) 
Poland -0.045*** -0.051*** -0.047*** 
 (-6.182) (-6.474) (-6.411) 
Portugal -0.023*** -0.021** -0.026*** 
 (-2.673) (-2.248) (-2.999) 
South Africa 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 
 (3.524) (2.924) (2.680) 
Spain -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
 (-3.767) (-3.426) (-4.079) 
Sweden -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (-3.346) (-3.263) (-3.525) 
United Kingdom -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (-4.889) (-4.920) (-5.208) 
Constant -0.186*** -0.189*** -0.183*** 
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 (-12.492) (-11.481) (-12.013) 
N 14,898 12,921 14,213 
F-statistics 8.74 8.54   8.63 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 










Table 8.2  Comparisons of the Incremental Effects of Institutional Characteristics on Goodwill-Impairments 
Variable LG_Orgn LG_SYS Invstr_Prtct Qlty_Lglty EqtyMrkt_Dvlp Book_Tax Audit_Enforce 
GW 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 
 (11.990) (12.041) (11.986) (12.091) (12.117) (12.189) (12.082) 
M/B -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.955) (-6.963) (-6.884) (-6.837) (-6.955) (-6.778) (-6.806) 
ΔMrktCap -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.358) (-1.340) (-1.268) (-1.473) (-1.340) (-1.252) (-1.223) 
ΔOCF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.669) (-0.688) (-0.712) (-0.668) (-0.513) (-0.613) (-0.768) 
ΔSALES -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.020** -0.019** 
 (-1.997) (-2.009) (-1.987) (-1.995) (-1.984) (-2.042) (-2.016) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.894) (-2.896) (-2.896) (-2.884) (-2.897) (-2.887) (-2.896) 
Earn_Volt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.488) (-0.478) (-0.615) (-0.203) (-0.298) (-0.758) (-0.675) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (6.883) (6.888) (7.085) (7.264) (6.907) (7.023) (7.003) 
ΔIndMd_ROA -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.107) (-0.162) (-0.499) (0.243) (0.116) (-1.027) (-0.721) 
ΔGDP 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (1.660) (1.805) (2.433) (0.922) (1.176) (2.958) (2.922) 
OWN 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.761) (1.355) (0.795) (1.977) (1.867) (0.774) (-0.017) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.135) (3.158) (3.143) (3.203) (3.173) (3.310) (3.118) 
BATH 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.059 0.060 
 (1.282) (1.283) (1.275) (1.289) (1.260) (1.268) (1.278) 
SMOOTH 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.085) (3.076) (3.089) (3.074) (3.077) (3.068) (3.097) 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
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 (10.384) (10.166) (9.867) (10.731) (10.423) (10.070) (9.640) 
BIG4 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006** -0.004 -0.006* -0.004 
 (-1.633) (-1.136) (-1.332) (-2.014) (-1.422) (-1.827) (-1.179) 
Crisis Period 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (3.195) (3.182) (3.060) (3.177) (3.289) (2.820) (2.992) 
Basic Materials 0.013* 0.013* 0.013* 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.013* 
 (1.730) (1.670) (1.748) (1.537) (1.463) (1.357) (1.693) 
Industrials 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (3.237) (3.166) (3.160) (2.939) (2.913) (2.973) (3.042) 
Consumer Goods 0.019*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.019** 0.017** 
 (2.584) (2.470) (2.434) (2.412) (2.333) (2.532) (2.291) 
Health Care 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 
 (1.040) (0.934) (0.903) (0.753) (0.856) (0.591) (0.720) 
Consumer Services 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (3.320) (3.195) (3.211) (3.174) (3.002) (3.034) (3.143) 
Telecommunications 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 
 (3.804) (3.787) (3.844) (3.641) (3.709) (3.896) (3.741) 
Utilities 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
 (3.301) (3.177) (3.222) (3.514) (3.259) (3.109) (3.149) 
Technology 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.020** 0.019** 0.020*** 0.019** 0.018** 
 (2.896) (2.766) (2.569) (2.408) (2.598) (2.340) (2.323) 
French -0.015***       
 (-4.997)       
German -0.014***       
 (-4.123)       
Scandinavian -0.007*       
 (-1.959)       
Common Law  0.012***      
  (4.771)      
Invstr_Prtct   0.002***     
   (3.016)     
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Qlty_Lglty    0.010***    
    (8.664)    
EqtyMrkt_Dvlp     0.000***   
     (8.054)   
Book_Tax      -0.020***  
      (-3.381)  
Audit_Enforce       0.000 
       (0.260) 
Constant -0.199*** -0.210*** -0.217*** -0.325*** -0.226*** -0.195*** -0.201*** 
 (-13.159) (-13.440) (-13.180) (-13.858) (-13.936) (-12.678) (-12.352) 
N 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,248 14,898 
F-statistics 11.74 12.57 12.56 13.01 12.93 12.26 12.31 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 












Table 8.3  Comparisons of the Incremental Effects of the Cultural Dimensions on Goodwill-Impairments 
Variable Pwr_Dst Indvdlsm Msclnty Uncrtnty_Avd LngTrm_Ornt 
GW 0.112*** 0.110*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 
 (12.192) (11.892) (12.187) (11.987) (12.224) 
M/B -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.876) (-6.835) (-6.789) (-6.907) (-6.824) 
ΔMrktCap -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.234) (-1.281) (-1.206) (-1.262) (-1.288) 
ΔOCF -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.758) (-0.780) (-0.765) (-0.700) (-0.729) 
ΔSALES -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (-2.026) (-2.006) (-2.013) (-1.994) (-2.021) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.893) (-2.894) (-2.896) (-2.894) (-2.895) 
Earn_Volt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.663) (-0.660) (-0.643) (-0.595) (-0.617) 
Price_Volt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (7.074) (7.076) (7.026) (7.068) (6.786) 
ΔIndMd_ROA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.627) (-0.484) (-0.756) (-0.486) (-0.329) 
ΔGDP 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (2.881) (2.373) (2.983) (2.552) (2.133) 
OWN 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.098) (0.602) (-0.048) (1.635) (0.242) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.099) (3.155) (3.115) (3.144) (3.099) 
BATH 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.059 
 (1.295) (1.291) (1.277) (1.285) (1.281) 
SMOOTH 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.101) (3.077) (3.099) (3.103) (3.081) 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
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 (10.187) (9.847) (9.632) (10.224) (10.100) 
BIG4 -0.006* -0.004 -0.004 -0.006** -0.004 
 (-1.950) (-1.331) (-1.261) (-2.078) (-1.382) 
Crisis Period 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (3.013) (3.024) (2.983) (3.061) (3.128) 
Basic Materials 0.014* 0.013* 0.013* 0.014* 0.013* 
 (1.778) (1.733) (1.650) (1.798) (1.731) 
Industrials 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (3.113) (3.129) (2.987) (3.135) (3.233) 
Consumer Goods 0.018** 0.017** 0.017** 0.019** 0.018** 
 (2.476) (2.362) (2.244) (2.506) (2.478) 
Health Care 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 
 (0.859) (0.805) (0.685) (0.938) (0.936) 
Consumer Services 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (3.350) (3.207) (3.110) (3.323) (3.322) 
Telecommunications 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 (3.727) (3.798) (3.721) (3.793) (3.778) 
Utilities 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (3.276) (3.150) (3.154) (3.329) (3.246) 
Technology 0.020** 0.020** 0.018** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (2.563) (2.475) (2.253) (2.643) (2.742) 
Pwr_Dst -0.000***     
 (-4.847)     
Indvdlsm  0.000**    
  (2.381)    
Msclnty   -0.000   
   (-0.755)   
Uncrtnty_Avd    -0.000***  
    (-4.937)  
LngTrm_Ornt     -0.000*** 
     (-3.838) 
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Constant -0.189*** -0.217*** -0.197*** -0.190*** -0.189*** 
 (-12.662) (-12.375) (-12.819) (-12.691) (-12.560) 
N 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898 14,898 
F-statistics 12.46 12.39 12.30 12.58 12.41 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 

















Table 8.4 Cross-Country Comparisons of the Association between Goodwill-Impairments and Economic/Reporting Incentives (1) 
Variable AUS AUT BEL DNK FIN FRA DEU GRC ITA 
GW 0.234*** 0.111*** -0.072*** 0.064* 0.159*** 0.040*** 0.080*** 0.081** 0.077*** 
 (7.503) (4.354) (-2.948) (1.771) (4.383) (4.715) (3.355) (2.512) (4.816) 
M/B -0.028*** -0.003* -0.010*** -0.001 -0.011** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.004* 
 (-5.591) (-1.903) (-2.745) (-1.373) (-2.444) (-2.826) (-1.394) (-1.296) (-1.889) 
ΔMrktCap -0.011 0.003 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.003*** -0.004 
 (-1.462) (1.236) (1.000) (-0.518) (-0.398) (-0.955) (0.137) (2.746) (-0.719) 
ΔOCF -0.065* 0.006 -0.047 0.035 -0.018 0.021 0.032 0.038 0.025 
 (-1.741) (0.350) (-1.155) (0.981) (-0.316) (1.187) (1.481) (1.316) (0.810) 
ΔSALES -0.039** 0.012* -0.001 0.001 -0.055** -0.016* -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 
 (-2.422) (1.810) (-0.070) (0.055) (-2.378) (-1.937) (-0.550) (-0.450) (-1.007) 
ΔROA -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.002** 
 (-3.330) (-4.405) (-2.834) (-3.886) (-3.325) (-3.602) (-3.225) (-4.735) (-2.321) 
Earn_Volt 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.017*** -0.000* -0.001** -0.002 -0.000*** 
 (0.857) (-0.891) (1.197) (0.779) (-3.824) (-1.726) (-2.505) (-1.083) (-5.355) 
Price_Volt 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.001** 
 (3.067) (-3.757) (1.053) (0.950) (0.273) (3.263) (0.862) (0.734) (2.143) 
ΔIndMd_ROA -0.001 0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.008** 0.001 
 (-0.231) (0.309) (1.403) (-0.626) (0.025) (-0.268) (-1.077) (2.548) (0.296) 
ΔGDP 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.006*** 0.001 
 (0.128) (0.206) (1.027) (0.772) (0.001) (0.292) (-0.897) (-3.452) (0.632) 
OWN -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (-0.025) (-1.952) (0.032) (2.588) (0.239) (0.965) (0.373) (0.258) (2.621) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.002*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 
 (3.251) (0.944) (1.126) (-3.417) (0.857) (0.156) (0.213) (2.194) (2.102) 
BATH 0.007 0.321*** 0.443** 0.084*** 0.284* 0.242** 0.319*** 0.591*** 0.144 
 (0.373) (3.203) (2.332) (3.492) (1.652) (2.369) (3.158) (4.319) (1.523) 
SMOOTH 0.010** 0.266*** 0.395*** 0.170*** 0.296*** 0.368*** 0.236*** 0.586*** 0.215** 
 (2.117) (3.083) (2.671) (3.357) (4.014) (3.974) (3.219) (4.019) (2.549) 
SIZE 0.010*** 0.000 0.005** 0.003 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 
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 (2.888) (0.382) (2.451) (1.138) (3.729) (7.457) (3.719) (3.483) (3.640) 
BIG4 0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.022 - -0.007*** -0.003 0.010 0.008 
 (0.034) (0.347) (-0.732) (-1.529) - (-2.637) (-0.488) (1.498) (1.036) 
Crisis Period 0.010 0.001 0.012** 0.032*** 0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.028** 0.001 
 (0.748) (0.253) (1.974) (3.168) (0.312) (0.179) (-0.023) (2.519) (0.121) 
Industry 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.207) (-0.580) (0.716) (0.491) (-0.865) (-1.253) (1.572) (-0.416) (0.614) 
Constant -0.319*** 0.013 -0.067** -0.125*** -0.117*** -0.084*** -0.119*** -0.152*** -0.123*** 
 (-5.907) (0.853) (-2.528) (-3.119) (-3.414) (-6.934) (-3.626) (-4.432) (-5.071) 
N 2,602 228 346 362 564 1,884 1,563 397 878 
F-statistics 7.45 2.83 1.69 2.79 5.58 5.28 2.84 3.50 3.31 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 













Cross-Country Comparisons of the Association between Goodwill-Impairments and Economic/Reporting Incentives (2) 
Variable NLD NOR PRT ZAF ESP SWE GBR 
GW 0.201*** 0.123*** 0.029* 0.123*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.061*** 
 (4.537) (3.254) (1.708) (4.110) (4.184) (2.732) (4.968) 
M/B 0.003 -0.018*** -0.001 -0.003* -0.004*** -0.014*** -0.004*** 
 (0.791) (-3.328) (-1.369) (-1.887) (-2.986) (-3.451) (-2.732) 
ΔMrktCap -0.035* -0.002 -0.007** -0.008 -0.007 0.011* -0.000 
 (-1.859) (-0.932) (-2.060) (-1.210) (-1.249) (1.808) (-0.161) 
ΔOCF 0.009 0.000 -0.016 0.007 0.028 -0.168** 0.025 
 (0.097) (0.009) (-0.891) (0.445) (0.785) (-2.580) (0.851) 
ΔSALES -0.010 0.016 -0.018 -0.008 -0.008 -0.045*** -0.037*** 
 (-0.379) (0.630) (-1.625) (-1.173) (-0.510) (-2.661) (-3.526) 
ΔROA -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.002*** 
 (-4.252) (-3.112) (-1.375) (-3.601) (-4.625) (-8.181) (-3.808) 
Earn_Volt 0.000 0.000* 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.096) (1.839) (1.006) (-0.208) (-1.146) (-0.154) (1.282) 
Price_Volt 0.002** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.378) (-0.538) (0.412) (0.123) (1.022) (0.461) (0.203) 
ΔIndMd_ROA 0.001 0.012** 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.003 
 (0.120) (2.364) (1.068) (1.532) (0.324) (0.680) (1.108) 
ΔGDP -0.003 -0.007** -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.823) (-2.005) (-1.359) (0.467) (-0.256) (0.929) (-0.406) 
OWN 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.819) (-2.321) (1.331) (-1.253) (1.781) (0.471) (1.308) 
ΔDebt_Ratio 0.001 0.001* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.904) (1.801) (-1.267) (0.584) (-0.482) (0.954) (1.498) 
BATH 0.428*** 0.280** 0.096 0.373*** 0.500*** 0.825*** 0.022 
 (3.298) (2.407) (0.902) (3.000) (3.777) (6.872) (0.249) 
SMOOTH -0.006 0.187*** 0.126* 0.225*** 0.541*** 0.651*** 0.007*** 
 (-0.108) (2.655) (1.682) (3.101) (4.377) (6.890) (2.886) 
SIZE 0.001 0.008*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
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 (0.300) (2.921) (1.804) (3.889) (2.753) (3.968) (6.284) 
BIG4 0.041 0.002 -0.001 -0.014** -0.006 -0.044 -0.009 
 (1.213) (0.094) (-0.089) (-1.993) (-1.213) (-1.574) (-1.064) 
Crisis Period 0.024 0.031*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.013 0.005 
 (1.318) (2.694) (0.127) (-0.145) (-0.434) (1.040) (0.823) 
Industry -0.001 0.005** -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.399) (2.093) (-1.022) (-1.248) (0.963) (0.654) (0.697) 
Constant -0.241*** -0.084* -0.047* -0.069*** -0.085*** -0.133*** -0.135*** 
 (-3.131) (-1.799) (-1.960) (-2.742) (-3.946) (-2.798) (-7.204) 
N 351 417 195 840 401 869 2,351 
F-statistics 5.67 2.92 0.52 2.77 3.51 9.40 4.69 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.947 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
